

## Chapter 14

---

# The Reflecting Power of Judgment

*Reflection gathers experiences together and perceives their relative worth; which is as much as to say that it expresses a new attitude of will in the presence of a world better understood and turned to some purpose.*

Santayana

### § 1. The Systematic Faculty of Mind

Having spent the last two chapters discussing practical Reason and the practical Standpoint, one way to proceed with this treatise is to immediately delve into the representations of practical judgments and to discuss these representations in a manner such as we used in discussing the representation of cognitions. However, we have also seen that the determination of choice is tied not only to the practical principles of pure Reason but, also, to the Organized Being's receptivity for feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust*. We have also alluded to the relationship of cognitions to those subjective functions we have called the aesthetic Idea and the judicial Idea. Indeed, the role of reflective judgment has been touched upon several times in the course of our previous discussions, but without any detail being provided as to its character or the nature of combinations in this subjective process of judgment. Practical representations of Reason are not representations of appearances nor of feelings, but to understand the former we must understand the latter. Therefore it seems the more prudent course to take up the subjective side of representation before we go ahead with the theory of practical judgment.

We saw in the diagram of the cycle of thought (Chapter 9, Fig. 9.3.1) that reflective judgment occupies an intermediate position between perception in sensibility and Reason. Like Janus, this capacity of mind has two faces, one looking back to sensibility and making a mediate connection with determining judgment (through the power of imagination), the other looking forward to the power of Reason as the regulative power of mind. Intuition and the concepts of determining judgment make reference to objects as appearances; practical judgment makes reference to the appetites of the Organized Being. Now, these objects of representation are clearly and obviously separated by a fundamental gap in our understanding since their objects are of wholly different sorts. It is the task of the power of reflecting judgment to bridge this gap,

connecting that which is wholly objective on the one side with that which is wholly practical on the other.

The laws that arise from practical Reason are entirely practical; the concepts arising from determining judgment are entirely theoretical. As such, the laws of the former do not serve as laws of Nature and can connect to physical Nature only through analogy, as, e.g., in Piaget's type IIC interactions of Chapter 9. The problem for the theory of reflective judgment is to explain how laws of Nature such as those structured by type IIC interactions are possible, and to provide a ground for the systematic unity of experience in an Organized Being who can be both agent and patient *in* Nature as a real whole. The pure categories of understanding formulate particular rules of appearances (as determinant judgments subsume empirical particulars under general concepts via notions of the categories), but by themselves the categories can formulate no *general* laws of empirical Nature (because these must go from the particular to a concept of the general). This is because in every instance of experience there are a great many possible ways in which concepts could be joined in determinant judgments. As Kant put it, empirical cognitions constitute an analytic unity of all experience, but not a synthetic unity *of* experience as a system [KANT5c: 9fn (20: 203-204fn)]. A fundamental *principle of judgment* is required for this. We have already given a name to this principle: the principle of formal expedience of Nature. This principle is the fundamental acroamatic principle of the judicial Standpoint.

What the category is to each particular experience, that is what the expedience or fitness of nature is to our capacity of the power of judgment, according to which it is represented not merely as mechanical but also as technical [KANT5c: 9fn (20: 204fn)].

Kant goes on to say the principle of formal expedience yields *subjective* fundamental principles that "serve as guidelines for the investigation of Nature." The principle of expedience

. . . grounds a maxim for the power of judgment by which to observe and to hold together the forms of nature [KANT5c: 10 (20: 205)].

Unlike Aristotle's entelechy, the principle of the formal expedience of Nature is not a non-Copernican hypothesis about the world but, instead, is a fundamental transcendental acroam of the power of judgment. It pertains to our ability and drive to construct our objective knowledge of Nature (one's world model) as a *system*, and, at the same time, to our capacity to deal with natural experience through one's acts. Objects conform to our cognitions and the Object we call Nature is known to us through the manner in which our cognitions of Nature can be made into a system of experience. Here it is notable that: experience *does not teach us* that Nature is constituted as a system of interconnected empirical laws with particular empirical facts subsumed under particular empirical laws and these particular laws, in turn, subsumed under higher or more general laws.

We can, and do, know specific empirical facts and can find specific empirical laws governing these facts. But empirical facts presents us with no proof (from the theoretical Standpoint) of any objective necessity that Nature be a system of unified laws.

Yet no scientist seriously doubts it is true that Nature works in such a systematic way. Even the non-scientist constructs his or her world model with an underlying supposition that “it must all somehow makes sense” and then proceeds as best as he or she can to make sense out of personal experience. In every human culture we know anything about, we find some system of paradigms – whether through science, superstition, a system of religion, or what have you – that, however imperfectly, attempts to tie the contingent appearances of Nature together as a system. World views did not come into being with the invention of science; science came into being under the presupposition of a world view that there is order amongst the chaos of natural experience. There is only one place we can look for a reason to explain this *psychological* phenomenon, and that place is within oneself.

Thus it is a subjectively necessary transcendental *presupposition* that the former disturbingly unbounded diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms are not due to Nature; rather she herself qualifies for an experience as an empirical system through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones.

This presupposition is now the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. For this is not merely a capacity to subsume the particular under the general (whose concept is given) but likewise vice versa, to find the general for the particular [KANT5c: 14 (20: 209-210)].

In Chapter 5 (§5.3) we spoke of the principle of the *affinity of concepts* that legislates for the construction of the manifold of concepts in representation. This principle legislates for the balancing of the principle of homogeneity of the manifold under higher concepts (which we may call a principle of assimilation in cognition) and the principle of specification in the distinction of concepts (which is a principle of accommodation). We are now in a position, as a result of our discussion in Chapter 13, to see that the principle of affinity serves the equilibration dictated by pure Reason’s categorical imperative. With regard to the power of judgment, this principle of affinity is nothing else than the exhibition of the transcendental principle of the formal expedience of Nature.

When we survey all the capacities of the human mind, we find that these can all be traced back to three basic capacities: the *Erkenntnißvermögen* or “faculty of knowledge”; the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*; and the appetitive power of practical Reason. All conscious representations pertain to one or more of these basic capacities, and there is a great difference among various representations that depends upon the manner of their relationship to these capacities. We can say of some specific representation that it “belongs” to the capacity that produces it, but this same representation may nonetheless *appertain* to the other capacities in one way or another, either

immediately or mediately.

We can break this down in the following manner [KANT5c: 11 (20: 206)]:

- 1) Representation appertains to knowledge insofar as it is relative to Objects and the unity of consciousness these Objects serve;
- 2) Representation appertains to appetitive power insofar as it has an objective reference by which it is regarded, at the same time, as the cause of the actuality of this Object; and,
- 3) Representations are referenced to the Subject so far as they are regarded in relationship to the feeling of *Lust*, where they are grounds merely to keep or maintain their object's *Existenz* or, in the case of *Unlust*, they are grounds for the prevention or abolition of their object's *Existenz*.

In the third case, we must add that the feeling of *Lust* (or *Unlust*) is not knowledge nor does it, by itself, provide knowledge but it can presuppose a ground of determination in cognition. We can empirically know of the connection between the cognition of an object and the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* for the *Existenz* of that object. We can also know empirically of a relationship between the cognition of an object and the determination of appetitive power to produce that object. However, to merely know of these relationships empirically is sufficient only to produce an aggregate and not a system. To have a system, we must have an *a priori* principle (the principle of formal expedience of Nature) regulating the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*. To obtain such a principle requires a *critique* of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* since this feeling has an *objective* reference only in regard to receptivity for a determination of the Subject's state of mind. This determination belongs to the power of judgment; hence this critique is the theory of the judicial Standpoint and the topic of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.<sup>1</sup>

## § 2. The Synthetic Capacity of Aesthetical Reflective Judgment

We call the two faces of the reflecting power of judgment aesthetical reflective judgment and teleological reflective judgment. Aesthetical judgment faces sensibility, and we will begin with this.

To reflect upon something (*Überlegen*), as an activity, means

---

<sup>1</sup> Many people view *Critique of Judgment* as nothing more than Kant's "theory of aesthetics" with the additional supposition that the third Critique is more or less an attempt to formulate a theory of "fine arts" and what Santayana called the "sense of beauty." The dainty Victorian-era translation of *Lust und Unlust* as "pleasure and pain" or "pleasure and displeasure" is a reflection of this supposition and is prejudicial in favor of this overly-restricted view of *Critique of Judgment*. It is true enough that Kant saw this part of the critique of human reason as being applicable to such topics as the fine arts. But we must not confuse the application with the science. *Critique of Judgment* is, first and last, the theory of the reflecting power of judgment and the *subjective* factors underlying human knowledge.

. . . to compare and to hold together given representations, either with each other or with one's faculty of knowledge, in reference to a thereby possible concept [KANT5c: 15 (20: 211)].

This description should remind us at once of the three-fold synthesis of sensibility we call the acts of understanding (*Verstandes-Actus*). We have already examined many aspects of the *Verstandes-Actus* with regard to the cognitive side of mental phenomena. We now must examine this three-step synthetic process in regard to the affective side of mental phenomena. By way of introducing this context, let us first recall some of the characteristics we find in the manifold of concepts (since these characteristics must draw their possibility from the conditions of sensibility). In particular, there are three formal characteristics found in the manifold of concepts that must look to the reflecting power of judgment for their transcendental ground. These characteristics are: 1) the classification of concepts by higher concepts as *genera*; 2) the specification of concepts as species and subspecies under *genera*; and, 3) the continuity in the transition from each species to its subspecies through a step-wise increase in varieties. (Recall that higher concepts of *genera* are abstracted from lower concepts and, therefore, variation decreases as we ascend the series of connected concepts in the manifold). In Chapter 5 we said Reason “prepares the field” for understanding to take place according to this schema through, respectively, the principle of homogeneity of the manifold, the principle of specification in lower species, and the principle of the affinity of all concepts (Chapter 5 §5.3).

Now such a system of concepts necessarily presupposes a transcendental principle of judgment. This is because this orderly structure in the manifold of concepts likewise brings an inferred order to Nature. Immediate experience presents us with no such order-in-the-world; sensible appearances follow upon one another and unless we invoke the copy-of-reality hypothesis we have no ground for saying these appearances bring with them any necessary order *in their combinations*. That judgment nonetheless *posits* such an order in Nature presupposes what Kant called the suitability (*Angemessenheit*) of the power of judgment for being able to find order in Nature. We cannot say that the *world*, regarded as it is in itself, possesses any such order, but our power of judgment, from whence comes understanding of Nature, carries on *just as if it does*. The transcendental principle is therefore called the principle of the *formal* expedience of Nature.

The order-in-Nature that science holds dear and never questions must be regarded not as a property that the world possesses (for this idea is transcendent) but as a property of Nature *given* to our understanding of Nature *by reflective judgment*. Seen in this way, the order-in-Nature is not a merely empirical fact but a *transcendental* principle that underlies *all* empirical facts. In the structure of the manifold of concepts, Kant likened *genera* to ‘matter’ in a rather Aristotelian way, as a ‘raw substratum’ that “nature works up through its determinations to particular species

and subspecies” [KANT5c: 18 (20: 215)]. Since, however, all concepts (as generalizing representations) have their origin in the synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus*, it is here where we must look first for the explanation of reflective judgment’s capacity to produce such an orderly structure in our understanding of Nature.

The three steps of the synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus* are comparison (*Comparison*), reflexion, and abstraction. We discussed the meaning of these terms in Chapter 3. What we must now do is tie these acts to the power of aesthetical reflective judgment. To establish the context we require for this task, let us work backwards from the *Realdefinition* of the categories of understanding as seen from the transcendental reflective perspective<sup>2</sup>. From this perspective in the theoretical Standpoint the categories are:

*In Quantity*: notions of association concordant with an aesthetic Idea and pertaining to identity, difference, and completion of the extensive magnitude of the sphere of a concept;

*In Quality*: notions of the form of compatibility in the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension (as agreement, opposition, distinction);

*In Relation*: notions of transcendental anticipation in the determination of the connection of concepts in inner sense (as immanent, transeunt, and reciprocal);

*In Modality*: notions of expedience with signification for meanings.

Representation in sensibility is not judgment, but the *making* of a representation in intuition still requires representation of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality since these four titles are required in *any* representation of a combination. Quantity and Quality are the form and matter, respectively, of composition; Relation and Modality are the form and matter of connection (*nexus*). Of these only the first three pertain to the object of representation; the last pertains to the manner of connection in consciousness, hence apperception. But although sensibility is not judgment, the making of an intuition nonetheless requires an act of judgment, specifically an act of reflective judgment, and this judgment we must view from the judicial Standpoint.

From the judicial Standpoint we may align the acts of comparison, reflexion, and abstraction with representation in sensibility as follows:

- 1) Comparison  $\Leftrightarrow$  Association (Quantity);
- 2) Reflexion  $\Leftrightarrow$  Compatibility (Quality);
- 3) Abstraction  $\Leftrightarrow$  Transcendental anticipation (Relation).

---

<sup>2</sup> Recall that the transcendental perspective deals with the relationship of cognition to the thinking Subject rather than the relationship of cognition to objects.

Reflective judgment adds to this the Modality of the representation through the manner in which sensibility is connected in consciousness (apperception). The possibility of determinations of association, compatibility, and anticipation by an act of judgment necessarily presupposes that we have some criterion or standard against which these determinations may be *evaluated*, and in reflective judgment such criteria or standards must be examined in terms of affective perception since the process of reflective judgment is not concerned with an intuition's object of appearance.

When we introduced the aesthetic Idea we described it as “a representation of imagination which calls forth much to think but to which no determinant concept can be adequate, hence no language can make it fully attained and intelligible” [KANT5: 157 (5: 313-314)]. This description is obviously inadequate as a *Realerklärung* of what is meant by aesthetic Idea and we must fill in what is meant by the idea of such a representation. First, let us recall that imagination in this context is viewed as a power of the productive *Erkenntnißvermögen* (faculty of knowledge) and so the aesthetic Idea is involved with this capacity of mind. *Feelings*, as we said in Chapter 8, *present* an aesthetic Idea by marking the expedience of the representation of sensibility for a purpose of Reason. It is this marking of sensibility that makes possible the determination of the transcendental schema by which an intuition will come under the categories in the synthesis of recognition. What we ask now is: what is presented through an aesthetic Idea?

We made a small beginning in answer of this question in Chapter 12 (§2.3). The *matter* of an aesthetic Idea refers to *Begehren* (composition of desire), its *form* to *Begehrung* (desiration). We will now show that *presentation through* an aesthetic Idea is represented in Quantity, Quality, and Relation in terms of the transcendental ground for the *possibility* of:

*Quantity* in regard to satisfaction - dissatisfaction (*Wohlgefallen - Mißfallen*);  
*Quality* in regard to the matter of satisfaction (pleasure, beauty, and sublimity, technical terms we will explain in more detail later)<sup>3</sup>;  
*Relation* in regard to interest or disinterest.

The capacities for association, compatibility, and anticipation are, from the judicial Standpoint, presented in combinations made by aesthetical reflective judgment between objective and affective perceptions – intuitions on the one side, feelings on the other. Modality, the matter of the form of representation, does not belong to a specific *Verstandes-Actus* (that is, does not belong to comparison, reflexion, or abstraction) because the *momenta* of Modality in general go to apperception in the specification of the determinable, the determination, and the determining factor in representation.

---

<sup>3</sup> Let us recall the philosopher's triad of truth, goodness, and beauty. Kant's theory of "the beautiful and the sublime" describes an *a priori* synthetic capacity in the phenomenon of mind peculiar to the judicial Standpoint in regard to aesthetical reflective judgment. We touched upon this topic briefly in Chapter 10 (§2) where we spoke of "the sense of beauty."

## § 2.1 Comparison and Association

We described the *Verstandes-Actus* of comparison (*Comparison*) in Chapter 3 as a “likening” of representations to one another in order to make possible a determination of their identity and difference, agreement and opposition, internal and external Relations, and the relationship of determinable to the determination. We described what happens *through* the act of comparison, and illustrated Kant’s description of this in Figure 3.4.1. However, we also noted that the “simple, even primitive” idea of comparison is not so simple or obvious and that a number of important issues and questions attach to this idea. Among them were questions regarding: 1) how do comparates come *to be* comparates? 2) when comparates are “likened” to each other, *in what way* are we to understand what is meant by “likened”? and, 3) by what *standards* or *criteria* are comparates to be judged as “alike” or “not alike”? We said that the ability to *compare* implies the ability to *decide*, but even if we regard the latter to mean “make the determination” we are still left with the fact that we require a ground for such a “decision”. In Chapter 3 we did not know enough to be able to address these issues; the time has come to take them up.

Hegel wrote that “likeness by itself” is identity, and “unlikeness by itself” is difference. The judgment of likeness and unlikeness between two comparates is, of course, a determination and we are examining the act through which such determination is possible. When two representations are alike they are *associated* with each other through this “likeness”. But we have also said that *association* is a form of combination through an aesthetic Idea. In the theoretical Standpoint, association belongs to the categories of Quantity, and so when we turn to the judicial Standpoint and examine comparison as an act of synthesis we see that the form of combination we call association is *form of the matter* of combination, i.e. Quantity. This conclusion is even supported in Hegel’s view since identification and differentiation belong to the title of Quantity in the general 2LAR of representation. What, then, is the form of the matter in representation through an aesthetic Idea?

We have already one clue. The *composition* (matter) of an aesthetical judgment is desire (in the context of *Begehren*). To inquire into Quantity through an aesthetic Idea is therefore to inquire as to what is needed to represent the form of this composition. To put it another way, what are we to call the title of Quantity when we specialize Quantity in the context of desire? Here we must keep foremost in mind that the reflecting power of aesthetical judgment pertains solely to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* and that this capacity of *nous sets* the general context for discussion from the judicial Standpoint.

Now, desire always has some reference to representation in sensibility but aesthetical reflective judgment never has any direct reference to any appearance and refers only to affective perception as subjective representation. Furthermore, perception always denotes conscious representation, and so aesthetic Quantity as a form of composition must always be considered in



terms of combination of sensibility with *state of mind* so far as we regard one's state of being in terms of the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. Kant's terms for such a relationship are *Wohlgefallen* (satisfaction) and *Mißfallen* (dissatisfaction), terms we have encountered already in our earlier discussion of the Modality of state-of-satisfaction in the sensorimotor idea of *psyche*.

The subjective representation of the collective power of life to receive or to exclude objects is the relationship of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Thus the feeling is not the relationship of the object to the representation but rather to the collective power of mind, either to most intimately receive or to exclude the same [KANT19: 63 (28: 247)].

*Lust* that springs from the play of the power of imagination without a determined concept to combine immediately with it is satisfaction [KANT19: 377 (28: 676)].

It is clear that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are opposites and that furthermore they do not align with the general ideas of identification, differentiation, or integration in the 2LAR of general representation. This means that satisfaction and dissatisfaction *per se* are not *momenta* of aesthetic Quantity; rather, these terms are divided members of a general Object, namely aesthetic composition. Why, in contrast to the title of Quantity from the theoretical Standpoint, do we have *two* terms here? We will discuss this more later on, but for now it will suffice to say that the reflecting power of judgment is two-sided and connects to sensibility on the one side and Reason on the other. We will see later that this division of the general Object of aesthetic composition serves to associate aesthetical affective perceptions with appetitions of *Lust* and *Unlust*. Dissatisfaction is to satisfaction as *Unlust* is to *Lust*. As for the *momenta* of aesthetic Quantity, we postpone their discussion until we come to the details of the making of aesthetical judgments.

The idea of satisfaction-dissatisfaction, as that in affective perception which serves to “receive or exclude” representations (a function that *does* speak to identification, differentiation, and integration of representations), is the idea of a *criterion* for comparison. Under this idea the act of comparison is seen as none other than the act of “likening” compare representations *insofar* as these compares can be put in an association in either the feeling of a state of satisfaction or of dissatisfaction. And thus we have: the *Verstandes-Actus* of comparison is the act of the synthesis of apprehension by which representations are associated (or not) in affective perception through a *sense* of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. We can thus see that the likening of comparison and the idea of a satisfaction do not bear a merely semantic relationship. Comparison is an *act* of synthesis and association is a commonality-producing *function* of judgment insofar as act and function are considered in regard to aesthetic Quantity.

## § 2.2 Reflexion and Compatibility

We now turn to the second act in the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension. Reflexion is

the act of determining the transcendental place of a representation and is “the consciousness of the relationship of these representations to our various sources of knowledge” (as we said in the discussion in Chapter 3). It is this consciousness of the transcendental place from which representations arise that sets the context for the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension.

Transcendental place refers to the origin of representations in sensibility, either as arising through the power of receptivity (where we regard the Organized Being as patient) or through the power of spontaneity (where we regard it as agent). Representations as comparates may either agree in their transcendental place of origin or they may be in opposition as to their transcendental place of origin. We can see from this that the *Verstandes-Actus* of reflexion viewed as an act of synthesis speaks to the title of aesthetic Quality.

Now *compatibility* also refers to a relationship of agreement or opposition, namely as the function of reflexion, inasmuch as such a relationship must, in the judicial Standpoint, pertain to relationship to the *Erkenntnißvermögen* (faculty of knowledge) in an Organized Being. Reflexion (as the act) and compatibility (as the function) in apprehension therefore both pertain to coalition of the matter of composition in aesthetic Quality. Just as aesthetic Quantity pertains to the form of the state of satisfaction, aesthetic Quality pertains to the matter in this state of satisfaction, and the representation of Quality through an aesthetic Idea must show itself as affective, not objective, perception. Comparison associates representations of sensibility through an aesthetic Idea; compatibility is the coalescence of the matter of this association in the act of reflexion.

We call the sensational matter of an affective perception a *feeling* in the narrow sense (using this term to distinguish the matter of an affective perception from sensation as the matter of an intuition).<sup>1</sup> Unlike the case with the idea of satisfaction - dissatisfaction, the word “feeling” is a bit too vague to stand alone at this point in this treatise as an explanation of the idea of aesthetic Quality. It therefore seems best to at least name the *momenta* of aesthetic Quality now. These *momenta* – as contextual and specialized ideas of agreement, opposition, and subcontrarity – must be descriptive of the idea of Quality in the context of a feeling and, fortunately, the terms for these *momenta* serve this task reasonably well.

The ideas for describing Quality in our general 2LAR are agreement, opposition, and subcontrarity. In the context of aesthetic Quality, our first task is to establish how these ideas are to be viewed in the context of the composition of feelings, i.e. agreement *with what?* etc. Since the affective perception of feeling pertains to the state-of-being of the Subject, and because aesthetical reflective judgment links sensibility to this state according to the principle of expedience, these two requirements establish the fundamental context for our ideas of the

---

<sup>1</sup> It is more than a little inconvenient to have such a homonymous use of the word "feeling" (which we also use in another and wider sense when we refer to the *feeling* of *Lust* and *Unlust*). For this inconvenience we will blame Kant, whose terminology this is.

*momenta* of aesthetic Quality.

Expedience in a representation is marked in aesthetical judgment by the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*, and this aesthetical judgment always signifies a purpose, whether that purpose is derived from experience or is a pure purpose of practical Reason. The feeling is not part of the cognition of any object, but it is a representation necessary for referring objective sensibility to the Subject's non-cognitive faculty.

However, the subjective in a representation *which cannot become part of cognition at all* is the *Lust* or *Unlust* combined with it; for through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition. Now the expedience of a thing, so far as it is represented in a perception, is not also characteristic of the Object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be deduced from a cognition of things. Thus the expedience that precedes the cognition of an Object - which moreover is immediately combined with it without wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition - is the subjective that cannot become part of cognition at all. The object is therefore called expedient in this case only because its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of *Lust*; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of expedience [KANT5c: 75 (5: 189)].

If we consider what “agreement” refers to in this context, recognizing that this agreement in our 2LAR of representation in general is a transcendental affirmation, we must regard this as an affirmation of the expedience of either sensation alone or of sensibility serving a purpose of Reason. We have, however, only one formal pure *a priori* purpose of Reason and that is the mandate for equilibrium dictated by the categorical imperative. Therefore, that which is being affirmed in the *latter* imaginative case (which is subcontrarity) is *equilibrium* in apprehension.

Kant's word for this subcontrary affirmation of aesthetic Quality in the form of a representation is **beauty**. Now most likely this will strike most readers of this treatise as a very strange term to use for expressing this idea. Without going into too great a depth (which is not appropriate just now, although it will be appropriate and necessary to do so later on), we can nonetheless describe the flavor of this term. First, we should recall that the definition of beauty *per se* is an ancient debate in philosophy. To some “beauty” is equated with esthetic perfection; to others it is linked to the idea of values; Aquinas regarded “beauty” as the same thing as “good”, differing from the good “in aspect only” and being “that which calms desires.” Others have held it to be “something pleasing” in an object. The dictionary definitions for this term, omitting slang usages, include the following:

- beauty**, *n.* [ME. *bewty*, *beute*; OFr. *biaute*, *bealtet*, *beltet*; L. *bellitus*, from *bellus*, fair, pretty].
1. the quality which makes an object seem pleasing or satisfying in a certain way; those qualities which give pleasure to the esthetic sense, as by line, color, form, texture, proportion, rhythmic motion, tone, etc., or by behavior, attitude, etc.
  2. a particular grace, feature, or ornament; any particular thing having this quality; as, the *beauties* of nature.
  3. any very attractive feature.

In the Critical Philosophy beauty cannot be regarded as something in an object; objects conform to our cognitions and not the other way around. The Kantian idea of beauty *per se* does not make beauty a quality of objects but, rather, a Quality of affective perception. Kant, like Aquinas, associates this term with the “calming” of desires at least insofar as the feeling of *Lust* is concerned:

We *linger* over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) that lingering when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly awakens attention, in which the mind is passive [KANT5c: 107 (5: 222)].

Now the process of assimilation manifests itself by repetitive *cycles*. In *equilibrium* such a cycle is stable, which is to say that it has come “to rest” inasmuch as it is no longer undergoing adaptation with accommodation<sup>2</sup>. The Organized Being is no longer striving to accommodate, nor to change the existing perceptual circumstance but only to maintain it. However, this *action* on the part of the Organized Being presupposes an aesthetic judgment by which the Subject is conscious of its satisfaction in the perception of its state of being.

Second, the affective perception of beauty always involves at the same time a representation of sensibility in the process of apprehension. There is in this representation an on-going interplay between the power of imagination and the process of determining judgment. Kant calls this the free play of imagination and understanding. Equilibrium between these two cognitive processes means nothing else than what Kant called the harmony of imagination and understanding.

Finally, we have said all along that an intuition is a representation of sensibility marked by reflective judgment at a moment in time. We can now say that this *marking* is none other than the making of an aesthetic judgment of beauty – the affective perception of harmony in the cognitive process. **The aesthetic Quality of beauty is, consequently, the matter of composition in a reflective judgment through an aesthetic Idea in which sensibility is presented in consciousness as a state of equilibrium.**

The second idea of Quality in our general 2LAR is opposition. Opposition in our present context is a transcendental negation (or denial) of equilibrium. In Piagetian terminology, this is nothing else than the perception of an irresolvable “disturbance” (irresolvable because the aesthetic judgment is one of negation). Here we can recall that in adaptation either accommodation to the disturbance succeeds or else the cycle is *ruptured*. With regard to sensibility, the Organized Being’s compensation behavior called into play in achieving the mandate for equilibrium is type  $\alpha$  behavior – e.g., the ignoring or canceling of inassimilable factors.

---

<sup>2</sup> In mathematics and in system theory, such a stable cycle is called a *limit cycle*.

If the cycle of the free play of imagination and understanding cannot close – i.e. if it goes on to cycle rupture – the affective perception of this circumstance has an aesthetic Quality Kant calls **sublimity**. In normal usage, the sublime is that which inspires awe, although common usage of this term typically has a much more positive connotation than Kant's Critical sublimity. However, this is due to the fact that our everyday usage of this term, like that of beauty, is vested in the object. The affective perception of sublimity has an effect opposite to that of beauty: beauty denotes a “restful state” but sublimity denotes instead an “energizing state” of being. Kant indeed called the feeling of the sublime a negative *Lust* [KANT5c: 129 (5: 245)]. In contrasting beauty and sublimity, Kant writes:

But there are also notable differences between the two<sup>3</sup> striking the eye. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which subsists in limitation; instead the sublime is found in a formless object so far as *limitlessness* is represented in it or through its occasion, and yet totality of the same [i.e. the object] is additionally thought [KANT5c: 128 (5: 244)].

In an aesthetic judgment of sublimity the perceiving Subject is conscious of the object and does have an intuition of its appearance. However, it is also conscious at the same time of a feeling of inadequacy in the Subject's own power to fully comprehend this object. Put another way, there is apprehension but this apprehension involves a negative feeling of *Lust* due to thwarted comprehension. **Sublimity is the matter of composition in a reflective judgment through an aesthetic Idea which brings consciousness of a disturbance without any presentation of how this disturbance might be remedied.**

Finally, we come to the idea of transcendental agreement. Here it is useful to recall our discussion of the category of reality, which is the correspondent of agreement in the notions of understanding. In all perceptions, affective as well as objective, the matter of sensibility is sensation. With regard to affective perceptions, sensation, there called *feeling*, must pertain to the formal expedience of sensibility, i.e. to the manner in which sensation is expedient for a purpose. In our first two *momenta* of aesthetic Quality we have transcendental affirmation and transcendental negation, and affirmation and negation are, so to speak, singular in the sense of specifying an “is” or an “is-not.” What is contained in sensuous affirmation is a reference to the composition of a sensuous desire as a combination of sensation and the effect of this representation on the state of the perceiving Subject. Put another way, *particular* feelings are known by a presentation of their sensation as *expedient to happiness*.

The point of reference for any affirmation of feelings must always be taken in the judicial Standpoint as the Subject's inner sense of its own state of being. Here we have a familiar word for describing the aesthetic Quality of affective affirmation; the word is **pleasure**:

---

<sup>3</sup> i.e. the beautiful and the sublime.

Pleasure [*Vergnügen*] (the cause of which may still lie in Ideas) always seems to subsist in a feeling of the promotion of the collective life of a human being, hence likewise of corporeal well-being, i.e. of health [*Gesundheit*] [KANT5c: 207 (5: 330-331)].

Pleasure is described here by Kant in positive terms; this means that this presentation is a feeling in combination with *Lust*. A negative pleasure – i.e., displeasure – is one that denotes combination with *Unlust*. Here it seems worthwhile to state that in all judgments of affective perception the judgment can turn toward either *Lust* (which is promoting) or *Unlust* (which is abolitionist). The behaviorally observable distinction is found in the kind of appetite arising from this judgment. In the case of *Lust* the appetite is for the production or continuation of the *Existenz* of the state. For *Unlust* it is for the abolition or avoidance of the *Existenz* of the state. For example, sublimity is a spur to productive action if it is combined with *Lust*; it is a spur to type  $\alpha$  compensation behavior (abolition or ignorance) if combined with *Unlust*.

The specification of the particular desire through the aesthetic Idea depends both upon reflexion (in the determination of transcendental place) and upon the perception that marks this desire. For example, we will call the type of desire where the aesthetic Quality of pleasure takes its transcendental place in receptivity “pleasant” (*Angenehmen*); that which takes its transcendental place from spontaneity we will call “good” since in this case it is grounded in a maxim or a practical rule. In this latter case we may also distinguish between desire combined with an inclination as “good for” or “useful for”; that which has instinct rather than inclination for its corresponding appetite – in which case the Subject knows no specific object of its desire – can be justly called “good in itself” or “good for its own sake.”

In all the cases we have just discussed, the function of compatibility is a function coalescing compares in sensibility according to the principle of the formal expedience of Nature. Again, reflexion is the act and compatibility the function in aesthetic Quality.

*Remark:* Those readers of this treatise who are also familiar with *Critique of Judgment* might well be wondering how the theory just set down here is in any way connected with the critique of aesthetical judgment found in Kant’s third great Critique. The ideas we have just discussed (beauty, sublimity, pleasure, and so forth) are, of course, ideas Kant discussed in that work. Equally obvious is that the Piagetian terms (equilibrium, cycle rupture, etc.) are not to be found anywhere within that work. Furthermore, the 2LAR we are constructing with our theory here bears little resemblance to Kant’s sections on the Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Modality “moments” in Book I of the Critique (the “Analytic of the Beautiful”).

The explanation for this is quite simple. Let us take note that so far as the analytic of the beautiful is concerned, Kant referred to the first through fourth *moments*, not *titles*, of

representation. The analytic of the beautiful (and, likewise, the analytic of the sublime) is not attempting to lay down a complete representation of aesthetical reflective judgment as a whole but only those *momenta* that correspond to the *pure a priori* capacity of reflective judgment. Such ideas as “the good” and “the pleasant” appear there only to help explain by contrast the ideas of beauty and sublimity. In other words, Kant means precisely what he says when he calls these sections the analytic *of the* beautiful and the analytic *of the* sublime, respectively. What we find in *Critique of Judgment* is not so much a systematic critique of the entire faculty of reflective judgment as it is his *Realerklärung* of the beautiful and the sublime.

### § 2.3 Abstraction and Transcendental Anticipation

In Chapter 3 (§4.2) we saw that the *Verstandes-Actus* of abstraction is the “segregation” of representations based on whether these representations are expedient for a purpose or not. Those representations that are not expedient are removed from the final determination of a sensibility (which in behavioral terminology is type  $\alpha$  compensation). It is this character of abstraction that makes possible the representation of higher concepts by providing the intuitions which will become these higher concepts. Viewed as an act of synthesis, abstraction determines combination through a negative act (removal of representations), and what remains is combined in expedience for some purpose. It leads, therefore, to a connection (*nexus*) of *subjective* judgment and is not merely limited to an intuitive representation of sensibility.

On the other hand, anticipation is “all knowledge through which I can recognize and determine *a priori* what belongs to empirical cognition” [KANT1a: 290-291 (B: 208)]. The *function* of anticipation in the combination of representations therefore has the forward-looking character required for determining an appetite (since all appetites are “future-directed”). The principle of all transcendental anticipations is: **Unconditioned unity of all relationships is grounded in the *a priori* anticipation of the form of connections of perceptions in time according to the *modi* of persistence, succession, and coexistence.**<sup>4</sup> But form of connection is Relation. Thus both the act (abstraction) and the function (transcendental anticipation) pertain to connections of Relation in a manifold. Now, the matter of composition in aesthetic reflective judgment we call a desire; the connection in a *nexus* of affective perception carried out in anticipating abstraction is therefore what we previously called desiration (*Begehrung*).

When we regard transcendental anticipation in reference to sensibility, this Relation is one of either the immanent (expedience represented as contained in sensibility), the transeunt (expedience represented as directed in the manifold from one representation to another by the connection of different perceptions), or the reciprocal (expedience represented in the mutual

---

<sup>4</sup> This is none other than the first psychological Idea (Relation) from the judicial Standpoint.

connection, each perception to the other, in both directions). For the synthesis of re-cognition in a concept, these Relations align with the transcendental schemata of Relation, respectively, as persistence of the real in time (the real which once granted at one's discretion always leads to something else), succession, and coexistence of determinations of reciprocal causality of substances with respect to their accidents. This is the view of abstraction and anticipation from the theoretical Standpoint.

From the judicial Standpoint we have an analogous explanation for the synthesis of an aesthetic reflective judgment of affective perception. The combination of *composition* is an anticipation of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction); the form of *connection* we call **interest**:

The satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the *Existenz* of an object is called interest [KANT5c: 90 (5: 204)].

Such a judgment always makes a reference to appetitive power, either for its determination or in terms of what is necessary for the coherence of appetite with its ground of determination. Let us note that Kant's description of interest ties the matter of composition (satisfaction) to cognitive sensibility (representation of the *Existenz* of an object). Interest is the affective representation of this tie between an intuition and a purpose of the Organized Being.

**Immanent interest** is the representation of formal expedience aesthetically judged as subsisting in the representation itself. This interest is to aesthetic judgment what the category of substance and accident is to determining judgment: the representation of what we might call an "aesthetic substance" that has no reference to any object of appearance but rather to a perceivable state of being. The representation serves no purpose of Reason other than the mandate of equilibrium itself. Since such an aesthetic judgment depends upon no objective perception for a determination of appetitive power, it is an interest without a determined object of appearance. Kant expressed this idea by saying, "the satisfaction of the beautiful is without an interest" – a phrase by which he meant that the satisfaction subsists in the presentation and does not depend upon having a predetermined object of desire.

We could call this *objective disinterest*, a term by which we do not mean *uninterest* (for that which is uninteresting fails to capture or hold our attention, but an immanent Relation in affective perception *is* conscious presentation and *does* attract our attention). The equilibrium in the free play of the power of imagination and understanding is also an equilibrium of form in the act of perceiving. On the other hand, when the cycle of adaptation in perception is ruptured (the negative satisfaction of the sublime), the aesthetic judgment is similarly one of objective disinterest since it is the synthesis of comprehension that is thwarted. Here, because a satisfactory state of equilibrium is *not* achieved, the effect is *energizing* rather than one of "restful contemplation." Putting this another way, the perceiving Subject is left without the know-how for



bringing about a desired state of equilibrium; its powers of cognition have been *checked* leaving a subjective need unfulfilled. If this representation is tied to *Lust* we can say that there is a potential for choice that can, at present, be nothing more than a wish. On the other hand, if tied to *Unlust* the appetitive power turns to disinclination for the state of being presented in sensibility. The aesthetic judgment is still disinterested, but it can become the seed for subsequent judgments in which an objective interest is involved. Likewise, the immanent interest in “the beautiful,” although without an objective interest contained in the initial aesthetic judgment, may become the seed for future inclinations. In either case the affective perception is presented as a feeling of **value**.

**Transeunt interest** presupposes some prior representation of immanent interest because the aesthetic transeunt Relation always involves the connection of two aesthetic presentations (and these must first form in the aesthetic analog of the notion of substance, hence require prior judgments of immanent interest). While immanent interest is the internal in terms of our 2LAR of general representation, transeunt interest is the external. The expedience of transeunt interest subsists in joining the aesthetic manifold to appetitive power in terms of an appetite for the *Existenz* of the object of desire and does so “for the sake of” the actual *Existenz* of this object. This is nothing else than an interest in the object of desire *as an end*. The aesthetical judgment of transeunt Relation bridges cognition and possible choice by making possible the representation of an objective end towards which the action of choice can be directed *in concreto*.

This does not mean that the representation of such an end is a representation in which an external object is differentiated from the action that is to produce it. Quite the contrary, the psychological fact is that infants are incapable of making such a distinction in the early stages of sensorimotor development. Here, though, we must note that the affective interest is tied up with an objective cognition – the intuition – and the appearance of such an intuition (especially early in life before the Subject has made the all-important division between representations of the Self and the not-Self) will tend to be syncretic owing to a lack of clear and distinct object concepts; the infant simply has not gained enough experience to crisply judge manifold objective expedience to produce a well-diversified manifold of concepts. It is the totality of sensible presentation that undergoes the three-fold synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus* in sensibility, and the only judgment possible from this synthesis is subjective reflective judgment, not objective determining judgment (which necessarily must come later and must be preceded by the synthesis of re-cognition). The first acquired habits an infant displays are actions that we can only judge with objective validity to be actions performed “for their own sake” – the sensorimotor schemes of the primary circular reactions.

**Reciprocal interest** is, in terms of our 2LAR of general representation, the transitive Relation. The appetite for the actual *Existenz* of an object under the transeunt interest is an appetite for the object of desire as an end. In reciprocal interest the object of desire is a subjective state for which the object of appearance is interesting merely as a *means*. In other words, reciprocal interest presents a distinction between a subjective *end* and action as an objective means for realizing this end. The possibility of such a judgmentation necessarily presupposes prior acts of judgment from which distinct comparates have been conceptualized with sufficient aesthetic clarity to make possible comparison, reflexion, and abstraction (and the functions of association, compatibility, and anticipation) by which means become differentiated from ends.

Piaget has noted the remarkable universality of the stages of development of intelligence. While not all children go through these stages at the same rate, all children go through them in the same *order*, and the ability to differentiate ends from means always comes relatively late in the sensorimotor intelligence of the infant. We can see here that this must be so. All concepts have their origin in *reflective* judgments, and all such judgments come under the general principle of the formal expedience of Nature. Because we reject the innate ideas of the rationalists, we must conclude that all such concepts must be built up from subjective and purposive (non-objective) grounds, and experience must be gained in order for any manifold of distinct object concepts to be constructed. The act of abstraction and the function of transcendental anticipation are necessary for the possibility of this taking place.

### § 3. Rational Psychology and the Transcendental – Judicial Perspective

Affective perceptions regarded *as* perceptions are objects of inner sense and, as such, come under the metaphysics proper of Rational Psychology. The general Idea of Rational Psychology is: absolute unity of the thinking Subject, i.e. the Idea of the *complete* Subject. The psychological Ideas serve first to remind us that as we build our theory we must at all times pay heed to the fact that we can only regard the division of our two types of representations in sensibility – that is, affective vs. objective perceptions – as a logical division for representing the state of consciousness of the Organized Being.

This first use of the psychological Ideas is a negative use telling us that we are not to look upon affective perception and objective perception as being in some *real* manner observably distinct and separate mental entities of some sort. For example, we must not expect even the most painstaking exploration of the brain to yield definite somatic structures to which we can point and

say, “There! *That* group of neurons makes up an affective perception, and *this other* group over here makes up an intuition.” Rather, we must view affective and objective perceptions as, in a manner of speaking, two sides of the same coin. The logical distinction between affective perceptions and intuitions is that the latter represent what is objective in an appearance, the former what is subjective in one’s consciousness of that representation. There can be no representation of an object of outer sense without, at the same time, an affectivity that places this object in a context with the overall conscious state.

It follows from this that the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment are functions of combination that serve to produce this overall unity in the apprehension and apperception of sensibility. We are not to look upon them as being, by analogy, some sort of “notions of emotion” by which representations of feelings define an emotion as if an emotion were like an “aesthetic concept.” A concept is a rule for the reproduction of an intuition; an affective perception serves no like purpose or function. Affective perceptions are marks of the conscious effect in sensibility on the state of mind, but are not themselves rules *for* reproductive imagination. A better analogy would be to say they are presentations of classifications of conscious states.

These classifications may, of course, come to be *recognizable* as states of being that the Organized Being has experienced before (kinaesthetic feedback). But such recognition is objective (requires a concept) and is not part of the synthesis of *reproductive* imagination inasmuch as imagination cannot summon a feeling from a manifold of feelings previously constructed and combined by aesthetical reflective judgment. Put another way, affective perceptions are not memories that can logically precede sensibility (as concepts can) but marks of conscious state in a singular moment in subjective time. Their character is autistic in the sense of that word as Piaget used it in *The Language and Thought of the Child*, which we briefly described in Chapter 4 (§7.2).

Directed thought, as it develops, is controlled more and more by the laws of experience and of logic in the stricter sense. Autistic thought, on the other hand, obeys a whole system of special laws (laws of symbolism and of immediate satisfaction) which we need not elaborate here.

. . . autism, just because it remains individual, is still tied to imagery, to organic activity, and even to organic movements . . . Now between autism and intelligence there are many degrees, varying with their capacity for being communicated. These intermediate varieties must therefore be subject to a special logic, intermediate too between the logic of autism and that of intelligence [PIAG22: 43-45].

Autistic thought in this sense is not symptomatic of disease or defect. Rather, it is part and parcel of modes of thinking that *every* normal human being clearly exhibits and which somewhat dominates the thinking process in early childhood before the acquisition of much experience. Affective perceptions are thus representations involved in the process of thinking but are

themselves not part of cognition and *this* is what in their logical character justifies our making of a logical division between intuition and affective perception.

There is another logical tripwire in the idea of affective perception that we must take care to step over. We can illustrate this by means of the following example. It was said earlier that the *Verstandes-Actus* of reflexion is based upon the determination of the transcendental place of the *materia ex qua* of sensibility. However, our brief description of the *momenta* of aesthetic Quality carried no explicit reference to transcendental place. Why is this not an error, and where does the idea of transcendental place find representation in our theory?

Transcendental place is the idea of the “position” assigned to a representation as arising either from sensibility (i.e. from receptivity) or from understanding (i.e. from concepts in the spontaneity of reproductive synthesis of imagination). The *making* of a determination of transcendental place falls under what Kant called **transcendental topic** [KANT1a: 371 (B: 324-325)]. By transcendental topic we mean “the titles for all comparison and distinction” in general (“comparison” here is *Vergleichung* rather than *Comparison*). These titles are: sameness and difference, agreement and opposition, the internal and the external, and determinable and determination. These, we note, are ideas aligned with the contrary opposites in our 2LAR of general representation<sup>1</sup>.

Reflexion in regard to transcendental topic makes its representation under the title of agreement and opposition (function of compatibility). Aesthetic reflective *judgment* marks a combination of *materia ex qua* in sensibility – hence acts on the synthesis – and we named the *momenta* of aesthetic Quality in this judgment: (1) pleasure (a transcendental affirmation); (2) sublimity (a transcendental negation); and (3) beauty (a *momentum* of aesthetic subcontrarity which we view as the synthesis of the *momenta* of pleasure and sublimity). In this synthesis, by which aesthetical judgment makes the *materia ex qua* of sensibility into an affective perception, the origins of these presentational elements disappear in the final product. Reflection in general, i.e. *consideration* (*Überlegung*), is always occupied with determination of the *state of mind*, and it is only the conscious state that is presented in an affective perception. But along with the determinable *materia ex qua* of sensibility and the determination of affective perception we must also have a determining factor in this synthesis. This determining factor is part of the *unconscious* state of mind, the idea of which goes to the *process* of judging rather than the judgmental matter.

This is to say that the idea of transcendental place is an idea of a *functional* rather than a conscious factor in the state of mind and is dynamical (for so we must view the state of sensibility between determined moments in time). Thus, the representation of the idea of transcendental

---

<sup>1</sup> We speak only of these pairs from our general 2LAR here, omitting the third in each title, because our discussion is *analytic* (distinguishing the “poles” of each title) rather than synthetic (combining the idea of transcendental topic with that of judgmentation).

place is not found in aesthetic judgments but in the idea of *aesthetical perfection*. Just as truth and certainty do not enter into determinant judgments but rather belong to logical perfection, so too transcendental place belongs to the idea of perfection rather than the idea of representations *per se*. The Object of logical perfection is understanding; that of aesthetical perfection is judging; that of practical perfection is reasoning. These three types of perfection align with the three logical borders we draw in the outer loop of the cycle of thought: aesthetical perfection with the logical border between reflective judgment and the synthesis of sensibility; practical perfection with the border between reflective judgment and Reason; logical perfection with the border between Reason and determining judgment. Hence, as we go on with our discussion below, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are making a theory, and in doing so we must not fail to give proper attention to our transcendental ontology nor to the principles of metaphysics proper in our doctrine of method.

### § 3.1 Aesthetic Quantity

The marking of representations of sensibility brings consciousness of being affected through receptivity. That which is objective in sensibility is perception as intuition; the subjective perception we call affective perception. This is, however, only a logical division in the representations of sensibility since the third psychological Idea, the psychological Idea of Quantity, is the Idea of unconditioned unity in the multiplicity of time. The judgment of that which is subjective in these representations is aesthetical reflective judgment.

*Aesthetic power of judgment* is accordingly that power of judgment which is directed at satisfaction or dissatisfaction in objects insofar as these are objects of my sensuous intuition, just as the logical power of judgment judges the object as such not in intuition but rather through reason alone [KANT19: 480 (29: 1010)].

We do not find affectivity arising separately and independently of cognitive processes. The role of affective perceptions differs from that of intuition, but the two are nonetheless tied together in the processes of the phenomenon of mind. This point is not merely rational presupposition but finds support in empirical fact, as Piaget noted:

In summary, affective states that have no cognitive elements are never seen, nor are behaviors found that are wholly cognitive. This brings up the question of just what the relationship of intelligence to affectivity is. Does affectivity create new structures on the intellectual plane and, reciprocally, does intelligence create new feelings? Or is the relationship between intelligence and affectivity only functional? In the latter case, affectivity would play the role of an energy source on which the functioning but not the structures of intelligence would depend. It would be like gasoline, which activates the motor of an automobile but does not modify its structure. This second thesis is the one we defend throughout this discussion [PIAG16: 5].

Piaget's simile likening affectivity to the automobile's gasoline has its uses as an aid to thinking

about the Nature of aesthetical judgment. When we examined the interaction structures (types I and II interactions) in Chapter 9, we noted affective factors at work in the structuring process, but these factors did not themselves appear in the resulting equilibrated structure.

Kant seems to have also taken note of this peculiar property of affective perceptions. His discussion in *Critique of Judgment* invariably focuses on “the beautiful” or “the sublime” or “the pleasant” etc. rather than turning to beauty, etc. In other words, wherever he discussed aesthetic judgments, there we always find an object to which such judgments are referred. Hence in *Critique of Judgment* we have an “analytic of the beautiful” rather than an “analytic of beauty” and so on. In our deduction of the aesthetic *momenta* of Quantity, we are therefore guided, in conformity with the third psychological Idea, to view these *momenta* in terms of their functional role in uniting the subjective and the objective in perception in the multiplicity of time.

For *Lust* and *Unlust*, satisfaction and dissatisfaction is either objective or subjective. When the ground of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the object agrees with the determined subject, then this is subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This springs from the senses . . . Thus what pleases or displeases according to private grounds of the senses of the subject is subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The satisfaction from private grounds of the senses of a subject is *pleasure*, and the object is pleasant. Dissatisfaction from private grounds of the senses of the subject is *displeasure*<sup>2</sup> or *pain*<sup>3</sup>, and the object is unpleasant . . . *Objective* satisfaction or dissatisfaction subsists in *Lust* or *Unlust* in the object, not in the relationship to particular conditions of the subject but to the universal judgment that has a general validity irrespective of the particular conditions of the subject and holds good for everyone. Therefore, whatever is a universal ground of generally valid satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that is one of *objective* satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This objective satisfaction or dissatisfaction is *two-fold*: something pleases or displeases either according to general sensibility or according to the general power of knowledge [KANT19: 64-65 (28: 248)].

Now at first glance it seems more than a little peculiar to be talking about the affective perception of a satisfaction as a perception that can be in any way universal or general. Such a perception is, after all, how the perceiving Subject is affected, and no amount of general acclaim can make *Tristan and Isolde* pleasing to a man who hates opera. How are we to make sense out of Kant’s remarks above?

Kant dealt with this puzzle in depth in *Critique of Judgment’s* analytic of the beautiful. The key point here is to bear in mind that all aesthetic judgments establish the relationship between perception and the conscious state of mind of the perceiving Subject. What this means is that we are dealing here with *subjective validity* in perception rather than the *objective validity* of that perception. When we spoke earlier in this treatise of the categories of understanding, we spoke of

---

<sup>2</sup> *Mißvergnügen*.

<sup>3</sup> *Schmerz*. This word can be translated as "pain" or as "ache." Kant's context for this term is philosophical, not physiological, and he means "pain" in more or less the same way as the Epicureans used this term. Physical pain is, of course, one affective perception falling under this term. But, like the Epicureans, Kant uses the word in a broader context that takes in, for example, the emotion of grief, the feeling of despair, and so on. For the Epicureans *anything* unpleasant is "pain" and Kant uses the word in the same way.

*logical momenta* of singular, particular, and universal determinant judgments. The validity of these kinds of judgment is objective because the categories, as constitutive rules for concepts (the rules for reproduction of intuitions), pertain to objective perception. When we speak of *aesthetical momenta* of Quantity, on the other hand, if we are to use the terms singular, particular or universal, we must understand the context in which we do so. This context is affective rather than objective, and so to use these terms we must first understand that this context is one of the *subjectively* singular, particular or universal.

Our deduction of the *momenta* of aesthetic Quantity therefore turns on the idea of what we must mean by subjectively singular, subjectively particular, and subjectively universal. These cannot refer to representation of an appearance because such a representation is objective. Neither can these terms refer to sensation or to the matter of affective perception (feeling). When we make abstraction from what is presented (in our philosophical deduction; I do not refer here to the *Verstandes-Actus* of abstraction), all that remains for us to consider are the innate capacities of an Organized Being *for making* representations. In other words, we must take the context of the idea of the subjectively singular, etc. from the *process* of representation rather than from the representation *per se*.

We might have expected we would have to come to grips with such a consideration. Up until now, when we have discussed the making of representations our discussion was more or less along the lines of “this happens, and that happens and the representation results.” What we have not discussed is how “this happens and that happens.” Put another way, it is one thing to say such-and-such a perception results from the synthesis of representations in sensibility. It is something else to speak to the criterion or standard gauge or know-how by which mere information in the data of the senses coalesces as knowledge – why representations caught up in the flux of subjective time should be marked by a moment *in* time to become a perception.

Here the *acroamatic* principle is the principle of the formal expedience of Nature. Our inquiry into the *momenta* of *aesthetical* judgment turns on the question of what “expedience” must mean in the context of *aesthetical* judgment. Now, the expedience of something means in general the congruence of a thing with that property of things that is only possible in accordance with purposes (Chapter 13, §7.3). The word *purpose*, on the other hand, admits to more than one interpretation. One of these interpretations contains the idea of an *end* or *result* materially defined by a specific desire and established objectively through a determination of appetitive power. The Subject knows what he wants and his actions are directed toward the realization of a determined end. Expedience here is regarded as purposiveness, and it is *empirically conditioned*. Purpose in this context is an idea expressive of a ‘because’ in the context of something regarded as a that-for-the-sake-of-which.

A second interpretation of purpose is that which contains the idea of ‘because’ in the role of

an agent or cause. This context is the logical opposite of the previous. Purpose regarded as end necessarily presupposes an already established *Lust* or *Unlust*, the satisfaction of which is *sought* by the determined acts of the Subject. Purpose in the second context presupposes the *absence* of any predetermined *Lust* or *Unlust* and contains in the idea of the purpose the *establishment* of such a *Lust* or *Unlust* where none existed previously. It is an *unanticipated* purpose, and its idea presupposes a *disposition* to *Lust* or *Unlust*.

These two interpretations, when viewed in the context of *nous*, admit to a synthesis that gives rise to a third context for “purpose.” This is the idea of a purpose without a predetermined *Lust* or *Unlust* but which nonetheless contains *an end as a ground for making* a determination of *Lust* or *Unlust a priori*. Such a purpose can be nothing other than *a purpose of pure practical Reason*. As such, it can in no way rely upon any pre-cognition of any object (for such would be an innate idea and there are none). There is only one pure purpose *a priori* and this is the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason, which *commands* equilibration *a priori*.

It is readily seen that these three contexts of the idea of purpose cover all the logically general possibilities. In the first case there is an established conscious desire and the Subject is agent of satisfaction when this purpose is met. In the second there is the arising of conscious desire and the Subject is patient to the circumstantial perception. In the third the Subject is both agent and patient because its mental acts (its agency) serve the *a priori* purpose of equilibration (what we will call, for want of a suitable English word and by analogy to the terms agent and agency, its *patiency*). This last context, in objective terms, is the context of *Self-regulation*.

From these contexts of purpose we arrive at the explanation of aesthetic association in reflective judgment.

**Subjectively Universal:** A state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is subjectively universal when this state subsists in a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* that presents the consciousness of a state of harmony (satisfaction) or disharmony (dissatisfaction) among all three powers of objective representation: imagination, understanding, and reasoning.

**Subjectively Particular:** A state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is subjectively particular when this state subsists in a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* that presents consciousness of a state of sensibility as expedient (satisfaction) or inexpedient (dissatisfaction) for the dispositions of the Subject.

**Subjectively Singular:** A state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is subjectively singular when this state subsists in a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* that presents consciousness of a state of equilibrium (satisfaction) or disturbance (dissatisfaction) in the free play of imagination and understanding.

The subjectively particular *momentum* marks expedience from sensuous grounds of receptivity. The subjectively universal marks expedience from both aesthetic propensities and objective



appetites mediately affecting the representation in sensibility. The subjectively singular likewise marks expedience from both aesthetic and objective grounds in sensibility, but it differs from the subjectively universal in this: The subjectively universal requires a *concept* of an object of desire to be represented in sensibility (because the reasoning capacity must be involved in this type of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), but the subjectively singular requires that no concept of an object of desire be pre-represented in sensibility (since this type of satisfaction or dissatisfaction speaks only to the equilibrium between imagination and determining judgment required by the categorical imperative). The subjectively singular is objective only because from this aesthetic judgment new concepts are born in the synthesis of imagination in re-cognition. On the other hand, subjectively universal association marks the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) born of a relationship between the actual appearance of an object and an anticipation of the representation of its possibility.

Quantity is the form of the matter of representation. The principle of formal expedience of Nature, as an acroamatic principle of *nous*, is a transcendental principle. As such, the principle cannot speak to contingent appearances but, rather, can speak only to what is purely formal in the making of conscious representations. But the *form* of a representation is supplied by the power of representation of *nous*, and the *formal* in the act of representing consists merely in the capacities for representation taking part in the act. The aesthetic Quantity of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* (which is all that aesthetic *momenta* can judge) is only the presentation of what is formal in the act of *composing* the *materia in qua* of sensibility. If, with Kant, we say that Aesthetic is the science of the laws of sensibility, aesthetic Quantity is the presentation in consciousness of the formal powers of composition at work in sensibility.

### § 3.2 Aesthetic Quality

We now turn to the matter of composition in an aesthetical judgment of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*. We named the *momenta* of aesthetic Quality in the previous section; our task here is to elucidate the meaning of compatibility with regard to these *momenta*.

We have described *Lust* as a “motivated wanting.” Similarly, *Unlust* has the character of “not-wanting.” These ideas are clearly descriptive of the Subject’s state of being. In any presentation of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* we must have a matter of composition and it is with the matter of composition of this feeling that Quality in aesthetic judgment is concerned. Presentations of aesthetical judgment are representations of that which in perception is not held to be part of the object of appearance. The acroamatic ground of reflective judgment is the principle of formal expedience of Nature, and for aesthetical reflective judgment this expedience is *subjective* expedience. Kant described this in the following way:

However, the subjective in a representation *which cannot become part of cognition at all* is the *Lust* or *Unlust* combined with it; for through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition. Now the expedience of a thing, so far as it is represented in a perception, is not also characteristic of the Object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be deduced from a cognition of things. Thus the expedience that precedes the cognition of an Object - which moreover is immediately combined with it without wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition - is the subjective that cannot become part of cognition at all. The object is therefore called expedient in this case only because its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of *Lust*; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of expedience . . .

If *Lust* is combined with the mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the form of an object of intuition without reference to a concept to determine a cognition, then the representation is thereby relative not to the Object but solely to the subject and *Lust* can express nothing but its suitability to the faculties of knowledge that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, and so far as they are in play, expresses therefore merely a subjective formal expedience of the Object [KANT5c: 75-76 (5: 189-190)].

We could well call the feeling of subjective expedience the **matter of intent** since it establishes the subjective ground in perception for specific desires and appetites. The matter of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* is the bridgehead for linking cognition to desire, which in turn makes possible appetites and through this the connection to practical Reason. It is not out of place here to note that the idea of “intent” is another of those ideas whose Object seems so self-evident at first brush yet proves rather more difficult to elucidate or define. Santayana wrote<sup>4</sup>:

Intent is one of many evidences that the intellect's essence is practical. Intent is action in the sphere of thought; it corresponds to transition and derivation in the natural world. Analytic psychology is obliged to ignore intent, for it is obliged to regard it merely as a feeling; but while the feeling of intent is a fact like any other, intent itself is an aspiration, a passage, the recognition of an object which not only is not a part of the feeling given but is often incapable of being a feeling or a fact at all. What happened to motion under the Eleatic analysis happens to intent under an anatomizing reflection. The parts do not contain the movement of transition which makes them a whole. Moral experience is not expressible in physical categories, because while you may give place and date for every feeling that something is important or absurd, you cannot so express what these feelings have discovered and have wished to confide in you. The importance and the absurdity have disappeared. Yet it is this pronouncement concerning what things are absurd or important that makes the intent of these judgments. To touch it you have to enter the moral world; that is, you have to bring some sympathetic or hostile judgment to bear on those you are considering and to meet intent, not by noting its existence, but by estimating its value by collating it with your own intent . . .

Feelings and ideas, when plucked and separately considered, do not retain the intent that made them cognitive or living; yet in their native medium something certainly lived and knew. If this ideality or transcendence seems a mystery, it is such only in the same sense in which every initial or typical fact is mysterious. Every category would be unthinkable if it were not actually used . . . The fact that intellect has intent, and does not constitute or contain what it envisages, is like the fact that time flows, that bodies gravitate, that experience is gathered, or that existence is suspended between being and not being . . . The mere image of what is absent constitutes no knowledge of it . . . What renders the image cognitive is the intent that projects it and deposes it to be representative. It is cognitive only in use, when it is the vehicle of an assurance which may be right or wrong, because it

---

<sup>4</sup> George Santayana, "Reason in Science," in *The Life of Reason*, revised ed., Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998, pp. 429-431.

takes something ulterior for its standard . . .

. . . Intent and life are more than analogous. If we use the word life in an ideal sense, the two are coincident, for, as Aristotle says, the act proper to intellect is life.

We do not misrepresent Santayana by noting the *judgmental* character he describes for intent, nor by noting his description of what we can only take to be its subjective character as “the vehicle of an assurance” which nonetheless “does not constitute or contain what it envisages.”

Now if the condition of subjective expedience is the matter of intent, what is there in aesthetical reflective judgment that makes it possible for affective perceptions to serve as *materia in qua* for this? Here we recall the second Idea of Rational Psychology: unconditioned unity of Quality. For cognitions of experience, this Idea tells us that our knowledge can have no objective validity unless objects of experience are all regarded as appearances. What is the consequence of this Idea for affective perceptions and *subjective* validity?

Here we first note that sensibility is representation and perception in general is a conscious representation of sensibility. Although to each of us it seems to be clear that cognitions and affective perceptions are different in kind, the psychological Idea warns us that when we divide perception into objective and affective classes, this division can be regarded as valid only as a logical division. There must remain between the objective and the affective perception some real connection providing a real unity as divided members of the Object we call “perception.”

Now, this real unity cannot subsist in what is represented by these perceptions. The object of intuition is an appearance, but we have said that an affective perception is logically distinguished from intuition precisely by the condition that an affective perception presents something that cannot be part of the representation of the appearance. Rather, affective perception represents how the subjective state of the Organized Being is affected in sensibility. Where they meet in common is that it is their *combination* that makes up, moment by moment, the presentation of a complete *state* of conscious representation. This consists on the one side of attentiveness, on the other of what is attended to.

This brings up a definition issue that has bearing on our discussion. What do we mean by the term “perception”? There are three connotations of this word which, while related to one another, are nonetheless distinctive in meaning. First, we have “perception” in objective terms – consciousness of an appearance. Second, we have “perception” in a more general connotation of the presentation of a conscious state. Third, we can talk about “perception” as a process or act, i.e. the “process of perceiving.” Reber’s *Dictionary of Psychology* gives it this last connotation. According to this definition, perception in general is defined as “those processes that give coherence and unity to sensory input.” Under this definition “perception” is a very broad term and its connotations envelop “nearly every aspect of psychology.” Let us examine this in more detail.

## Perception and Psychology

Modern psychology holds it to be a fact that, in Reber's words, "what is perceived is not uniquely determined by physical stimulation but, rather, is an organized complex, dependent upon a host of other factors." Among these factors he cites:

- 1) *Attention*, which is selective and capable of ignoring some sensory stimuli in favor of "attending to" others;
- 2) *Constancy* – the fact that the perceptual world tends to remain more or less the same despite drastic alterations in sensory inputs;
- 3) *Motivation* – the fact that what is perceived depends upon one's "motivational state";
- 4) *Organization* – the fact that perceptions are organized into coherent wholes;
- 5) *Set* – i.e., mind set, the fact that cognitive and emotional factors strongly affect what is perceived;
- 6) *Distortion and hallucination* – the fact that strong emotion, lack of sleep, emotional stress, drugs, psychosis, and many other factors can produce what psychology likes to call "misperceptions";
- 7) *Illusion* – the fact that what is perceived cannot be easily predicted from an analysis of the physical stimuli; illusion does not denote that there is something wrong with the Subject but, rather, that a number of phenomena (e.g. optical illusions) have been demonstrated wherein every human being can be "fooled" into thinking he or she has perceived one thing when the external object "is actually something else";
- 8) *Learning* – the fact that at least some aspects of perception appear to be influenced by experience and that learning appears to modify perception.

Piaget, of course, was very interested in how perception develops in the course of childhood. He concluded:

. . . perception constitutes a special case of sensori-motor activity. But its special character consists in the fact that it pictures reality in its figurative aspect whereas an action as a whole (and even sensori-motor action) is essentially operative and transforms the real. It is important, therefore, to determine the relative roles of perceptions and actions (and later operations) in the intellectual development of the child [PIAG15: 29].

In Piagetian terminology, "perceptions" are figural or topographical schemata, while sensorimotor actions are operative schemes (in French he distinguished these two with the words *schéma* vs. the word *schème*). Piaget uses the term "perceptions" in a manner that has a rough correlation to our term "objective perception." A Piagetian perception excludes the connotation of

what we here call an affective perception.

All knowledge has to do with structures, while affective life provides the energetics, or more precisely, the economics of action (economics in Janet's sense of the regulation of forces) [PIAG20: 356].

This reference to “the economics of action” has a bearing on our considerations here. Piaget did not himself develop anything like a complete theory of affectivity, but he did not ignore it either. In examining the link between affectivity and intelligence he drew from the work of other notable psychologists, among whom he names Pierre Janet, Edouard Claparède, and Kurt Lewin in particular. His own conclusions make a synthesis of the theories of these and other researchers with his own observations and findings. He thus held that none of the systems put forth by these other researchers told the entire story, but he did find in them some elements and aspects which nonetheless appear to hold true of affective development.

With regard to aesthetic Quality, it is Janet’s theory that has the most direct bearing on our own present considerations. Janet’s theory is a theory of behavioral regulation. His central idea was a vague and somewhat poorly elaborated idea of a “psychological force” that every individual possesses, in varying degrees, and which is drawn upon by the individual to determine the “level of activity” of the person. We will devote no effort in this treatise to criticism of this particular idea since it is of such a vague and transcendent nature that it really explains nothing in a way we can put to use. However, one of Janet’s conclusions – that behavior always tended towards an equilibrium of one kind or another – we can retain and use. Janet saw in behavior certain “primary actions” and was able to distinguish four “phases” that each passes through in a cyclical fashion. These were

latency → triggering → activation → termination → latency → etc.

The subject’s *reactions* to these primary actions were, from Janet’s point of view, what was important with regard to affectivity. These reactions he called “secondary actions” and they were the *affective regulators* of the primary actions. Piaget noted:

Their role was to increase or decrease the force of behavior and finally to terminate it. Janet carefully demonstrated that a behavior was not sufficient in itself but required either positive or negative regulations in the activation and termination phases. He believed four regulations of this sort could be distinguished [PIAG16: 27].

In this treatise we will arrange Janet’s regulations in two groups. The first of these is the group Janet called *activation regulations*. Janet further divided them into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ secondary actions. The positive type he called *sentiments de pression*, which can be translated

into English somewhat imprecisely as “feeling pressured.” The negative type he called *sentiments de dépression* or (again imprecisely) “feeling unpressured.”<sup>1</sup> The basic idea of Janet’s positive activation regulation is that of a feeling which accelerates or reinforces a primary action. Janet’s prototype example of this he called the “feeling of effort” – the idea being that the feeling or consciousness of the effort being expended and consciousness that more effort *could be* expended tended to lead to this expenditure; in doing so, the primary action becomes “accelerated.” We will not keep with this idea of “the feeling of effort” in this treatise, but we will retain as factual the idea that feelings participate in the maintenance and reinforcement of actions.

The basic idea of Janet’s negative activation regulations is the idea that feelings can act to brake or put a limit to actions. Janet saw the feelings of “fatigue” and “disinterest” as examples of this sort of regulation. Again, we will not keep with the specific “feelings” Janet put forth, but we will retain the idea that feelings can retard, slow down, or discourage the Subject’s actions.

Janet’s second class of “secondary actions” is called the *termination regulation*. Again, these are subdivided into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ termination regulations. In both cases, the regulations bring the action to an end. In the case of positive termination regulation, the Subject has what Janet called a “feeling of elation” marking the successful conclusion of the action. In the negative case, the action is terminated under the regulation of such “feelings” as sadness, anguish, etc. which mark a termination of an unsuccessful action.

This briefly summarizes Janet’s theory [PIAG16: 27-30]. From all of this, we retain only the most general features – namely that: 1) affectivity does in fact play a role that may justly be called activating; and, 2) affectivity also in fact functions in a role that may justly be called terminating. Where we differ from Janet (and from Piaget) is in how we regard these *functions* in relationship to the *momenta* of reflective judgment, which in turn speaks to our *Realerklärung* of these ideas.

### The Idea of a Common Sense

We have so far looked at affective perceptions in the context of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, noted the restrictions placed upon this idea by Rational Psychology, and reviewed the idea of perception from the viewpoint of empirical psychology. Gathering together what has gone before, we can summarize what we have as follows:

- 1) Rational Psychology forbids us to regard the division between affective perception and objective perception as constituting a real division. For every intuition put

---

<sup>1</sup> The problems and issues with these translations have been discussed by Brown and Kaegi in [PIAG16: 27, fn 9].

together in sensibility, there is an accompanying affective perception. In a manner of speaking, we can say that affective perception is the handmaiden of intuition and both are presented in consciousness as a pair;

2) Aesthetic formal expedience is subjective and, unlike intuition, has reference to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*;

3) This character of this reference to *Lust* and *Unlust* in affective perception leads us to call the feeling of subjective expedience the matter of intent;

4) Affective perceptions are perceptions of how the Subject's state-of-being is affected by sensibility;

5) Affective perception and intuition are combined at a moment in subjective time, and thereby present an entire and whole state of consciousness;

6) Empirically, perceiving is a special case of sensorimotor activity, and affective perceptions serve a regulatory role in this activity (in the Piagetian sense), either in activating or terminating activity;

7) Finally, we must also bear in mind that an aesthetic judgment in general is a determination of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* and, therefore, always has a relationship to desire as a mainspring (*Triebfeder*) or determinable factor for the determination of an appetite.

With regard to this last point, Kant commented

One cannot define *Lust* or *Unlust* if one does not presuppose the appetitive power. The faculty of knowledge is combined with the appetitive power through the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* . . . One must name it *facultas complacentia* and *displacentia*.<sup>2</sup> One can properly name this *sensum internum*<sup>3</sup> because it goes to our own state, although no one has properly developed the idea of it yet [KANT19: 258 (29: 890)].

In this role as bridge between cognition and appetite, "all *Lust* or *Unlust* presupposes knowledge of an object, either a cognition of sensation or of intuition or of concepts" [KANT19: 62 (28: 246)]. We have, therefore, an intimate interplay at work among feelings, cognitions, and appetites. Such an interplay must be based on a principle, and Kant named the subjective principle of this interplay **common sense**.

Now this term does not carry the same meaning in the Critical Philosophy as it does in everyday conversation. What people usually call "common sense" is what Kant called **common understanding**. Common understanding means that we judge things through concepts. Common sense, on the other hand, is a principle which holds that there is a general subjective validity in what satisfies or dissatisfies us through feelings. Furthermore, it does not have to do with outer

---

<sup>2</sup> "Faculty of satisfaction and dissatisfaction."

<sup>3</sup> "Internal sense."

sense (e.g. seeing, hearing, etc.) but instead is a principle concerned only with the above-mentioned *interplay* between aesthetic and cognitive processes in sensibility.

Kant expressed this by saying that our representations in sensibility must be **communicable**. By this he does not mean “explainable by one person to another” – such an interpretation is clearly incorrect when we remember that the division between Self and not-Self is somewhat tardy in making its appearance in infants. Rather, he uses the idea of communicability in the much older sense of the Latin word *communicare* – to share, associate, unite, or link one thing to another.<sup>4</sup> This interplay of representations is the subjectively necessary *condition* for the possibility of the phenomenon of recognition and without it “cognition could not arise as an effect” [KANT5c: 123 (5: 238)]. This rather bold statement of Kant’s is, in fact, precisely the finding of fact Greenspan reports from his research on autistic children. As Kant put it,

This<sup>5</sup> actually happens every time when a given object, by means of the senses, brings imagination to the composition of the manifold and this brings understanding into activity for the unity of the same in concepts. But this mood of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the diversity that is given to the Objects [KANT5c: 123 (5: 238)].

Because common sense, in Kant’s usage of the term, means “the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers,” the principle of common sense is the principle that the various types of representations are “communicable” from one to another through the effect each has on the operation of the representing capacities of the Organized Being. What this interplay brings about is the *composition* of perception from this manifold of representations. The role of affective perceptions in this process is seen in their capacity to bring about the subjective condition required for this composition. Accordingly, the *momenta* of aesthetic judgment are *momenta* of the “communicability” of diverse representations.

Kant used the ideas of the pleasant, the beautiful, and the sublime as ideals or “models” for the representation of the subjective qualities or character that the perceiving Subject attaches to the objects of its cognition. In *Critique of Judgment* he tells us [KANT5c: 149-150 (5: 266-267)]:

- 1) The pleasant is a mainspring (*Triebfeder*) for appetites;
- 2) the beautiful “teaches us to pay attention to expedience in the feeling of *Lust*”;
- 3) the sublime “subsists merely in the Relation in which the sensuous in the representation of nature is judged as fit for a possible supersensible use,” i.e., is suitable for the forming of an idea of some *noumenon*.

### The *Momenta* of Aesthetic Quality

This brings us at last to our *Realerklärung* of the *momenta* of aesthetic Quality from the

---

<sup>4</sup> We still use this sense of the word when we say, for example, that someone has been excommunicated.

<sup>5</sup> That is, the interplay among the various capacities of representation.



transcendental-judicial perspective. Feelings have no context if they are divorced from the judicial powers of the Organized Being. Taken as a unified whole, the reflecting power of judgment and the other judicial powers make up what we can call the *power of judgmentation*. Our *momenta* of aesthetic Quality are rules for the aesthetic judgment of the matter of the sensible ground of appetites, yet these rules act merely in the regulation of activity.

**The momentum of pleasure (and displeasure) excites desire as a material sensuous Lust or Unlust.** It is the sensuous element of a determinable factor of an appetite for an object of *sense*. It coalesces the presentation of sensuous affective perception joined to the intuition of an appearance, and thereby acts as an activation function for the determination of a subjective state. In the marking of the intuition in a moment of subjective time, it judges the sensational in the subjective elements of perception and therefore marks the moment in time with the first transcendental schema of Quality, i.e. the schema of sensation persistence in time.

**The momentum of sublimity is likewise an activation but, unlike pleasure, it excites a material intellectual Lust, i.e., it is the basis of an appetite for an object of Reason.** In this case *Lust* precedes the judgment of the *Existenz* of the object. It therefore marks the intuition at a moment in time with the schema of kinematical form in time.

Finally, the *momentum* of beauty is a termination. The feeling of *Lust* (or *Unlust*) it presents is lingering or contemplative, i.e. the Organized Being is disposed to *dwell* upon the state of equilibrium this *momentum* marks. **Beauty is, in other words, the aesthetic judgment of a condition of equilibrium (harmony) in the state of the representative powers.** In marking an intuition in a moment in time it carries the schema of coalition in time.

Much earlier we discussed the transcendental schemata that bridge sensibility and concepts. What we did not cover in that earlier discussion (Chapter 8, §3.2) was the element of representation *responsible* for the schema of Quality in an objective perception. We have now filled in this earlier omission and placed this determination in the aesthetic judgment of Quality.

### § 3.3 Aesthetic Judgments of Composition

Aesthetic Quantity and Quality together make up the composition of the aesthetic reflective judgment marked at a moment in time. Composition, in turn, is the matter of combination and so to properly understand the aesthetic *momenta* of composition, we need to take a look at what the idea of “matter of composition” means for affective perception.

Aesthetic Quantity in judgment judges satisfaction as relationship between the representations in sensibility and the capacities of *nous* for making such representations. This judgment concerns, in other words, the *materia circa quam* of the composition in inner sense. To put this another way, we can describe what is marked by the *momenta* of aesthetic Quantity as the “sense of *x*” where *x* is specified by the particular *momentum* of Quantity in the aesthetic

judgment. Since affective perception is always conscious representation, these “senses” can each generally be called a *sense of knowing*, and so the idea of the *materia circa quam* in this context is the idea of “how” or “in what way” what is perceived by the Subject is known.

The subjectively universal marks the form of composition as containing contributions to the sense of knowing from the expedience for all three principal powers of thinking (imagination, understanding, reasoning) going into the determination of the affective perception. In this case the intuition marked by aesthetic judgment contains *materia in qua* from receptivity, concepts, and a purposive employment of determining judgment by the power of Reason. Subjectively, the affective perception which has such a form of composition we will call a **sense of belief or unbelief** because the harmony of these three cognitive powers is a subjectively sufficient *material* ground for holding-to-be-true that which is contained in the intuition.<sup>6</sup>

An intuition based on the harmony of imagination, understanding, and reasoning is a representation that contains within it representations drawn from more than one object. This is because its *materia in qua* is made up in part of *concepts* re-produced in sensibility through the synthesis of reproductive imagination, and every concept gives the representation of an object. Now, we recall from our earlier discussion (Chapter 8, §3.1) that to be able to represent more than one object within a singular intuition requires a scheme of representation by which the manifold in an intuition can be thought. This, however, is the character of the schema of integration in time. The subjectively universal satisfaction in a sense of belief is the presentation to consciousness of the presence of this manifold in the intuition. It marks the moment in time with that determination of the transcendental schema of Quantity with which we tie the category of totality. Thus, we can illustrate the real context of the *momentum* of the subjectively universal as

sense of belief or unbelief ↔ subjectively universal ↔ schema of integration.

The subjectively singular, on the other hand, marks only the expedience of the representation in imagination on the ground of a harmony in the free play of imagination and understanding. It marks the attainment of a state of comprehension but this comprehension is grounded merely in a sense of order and unity in the manifold of representations of the *materia in qua* of intuition. We can rightly call this satisfaction a **sense of culmination** in the synthesis of the series in time. Such a sense is one that erases any “boundary” between past and present (the “here and now” of a moment in time), and thus marks the moment in time by the schema of unity in time. The

---

<sup>6</sup> We distinguish here between the idea of the *sense of belief*, which is a Quantity of affective perception, and the Modality of aesthetic perfection that determines a *state of belief*. The satisfaction of a sense of belief must be present in affective perception in every belief, but in order for a state of belief to exist the judgment must also have an assertoric Modality of aesthetic perfection.

transcendental schema of Quantity in this determination is that which we tie to the category of unity and which we called the schema of aggregation. We illustrate this as

sense of culmination ↔ subjectively singular ↔ schema of aggregation.

The subjectively particular judges aesthetic expedience in the state of sensibility alone. In this case, the expedience goes to the dispositions of the Subject and marks a sense of apprehension (“mental grasping”) arising from the synthesis of the *materia ex qua* of sensation in the succession in subjective time. When we discussed the pure intuition of time earlier in this treatise we noted that a moment *in* time is merely a marking of representation but that we could not neglect the necessity of regarding each such moment as “growing out of” the previous one. A magnitude is a unity viewed as a multiplicity, and the only magnitude we can ascribe to the pure intuition of time is an *intensive* magnitude. Thus we can say that the subjectively particular marks a sense of *continuity* that perceives *changes* in sensibility against the common substratum of that “sense of aliveness” we call the transcendental *I* of apperception – a sense James called the transitive in the stream of thought. The marking of a moment in time by the subjectively particular carries the schema of change in time, and the transcendental schema of Quantity tied to such a marking is that which we tie to the category of plurality. In diagram form, this is

sense of continuity ↔ subjectively particular ↔ schema of change.

We have described the *momenta* of aesthetic Quantity by using the phrase “sense of” in order to emphasize that these aesthetic *momenta* judge *form* in aesthetic composition. The *momenta* of aesthetic Quality, on the other hand, judge the *matter* of aesthetic composition. Here it is appropriate to use the phrase “feeling of” in describing these *momenta*. The *momenta* of aesthetic Quality are activity-regulating functions in the synthesis of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, and we have described each of them, and their *modi* of subjective time, in the previous section. Gathering together what we have done, we can summarize the judgment of aesthetic composition in the following table.

**Aesthetic Quantity**

subjectively singular	↔	sense of culmination	↔	schema of aggregation
subjectively particular	↔	sense of continuity	↔	schema of change
subjectively universal	↔	sense of belief	↔	schema of integration

### Aesthetic Quality

pleasure	↔	feeling of material sensuous <i>Lust</i>	↔	schema of sensation
sublimity	↔	feeling of material intellectual <i>Lust</i>	↔	schema of kinematical form
beauty	↔	feeling of equilibrium	↔	schema of coalition

(Note that although this table explicitly lists only the feeling of *Lust*, it is to be understood that this is merely an abbreviation for the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*).

We earlier discussed the linkage between aesthetical judgment and the synthetic capacity of the *Verstandes-Actus*. Aesthetic Quantity is functionally linked with the act of comparison (*Comparison*) and the function of association. Aesthetic Quality is linked with the act of reflexion and the function of compatibility. In describing this linkage, however, it is important for us to bear in mind that the *Verstandes-Actus* are not acts of aesthetical judgment (nor of determining judgment) but, rather, “acts of understanding.” Such is our *logical* division in the faculty of *nous*. Aesthetical judgment, in a manner of speaking, *monitors* the synthesis of sensibility in the *Verstandes-Actus*, marks the outcomes of this synthesis, and, through the aesthetic Idea, maintains a relationship between sensible composition and *Lust per se* (*Lust* and *Unlust*) in the Organized Being’s division of *psyche*.

### § 3.4 Aesthetic Relation

In §2.3 we described aesthetic Relation in terms of three judgments of interest. Our explanation of what is meant by the term “interest” was, however, an explanation of this term from the judicial Standpoint. The Object of the idea of interest *per se* is a *noumenon* and we have used this same word in other contexts in this treatise, e.g. an “interest of Reason.” Because of this, we need to flesh out this idea of something we call “interest” in more detail.

Omitting those definitions which have merely legal, social, political, or financial connotations, the dictionary definitions of “interest” are:

**interest**, *n.* [ME. *interest*; OFr. *interest*, interest, concern, prejudice, from L. *interest*, it concerns, it is to the advantage, 3rd pers. sing. of *interesse*, to be between.]

1. (a) a feeling of intentness, concern, or curiosity about something; (b) the power of causing this feeling; (c) something causing this feeling.

2. importance; consequence; as, a matter of little *interest*.

The idea of “interest” in the Critical Philosophy is much more broad than these definitions tend to suggest, although within the scope of this idea the connotations described above are contained. We will begin our examination of this idea from the arena of empirical psychology.

## Piagetian Interest and Value

Piaget makes a close connection between the idea of value and the idea of interest. In particular, Piaget views “interest and valuation” as constituting a second system for the regulation of behaviors which complements Janet’s theory of activation and termination regulations. Commenting on Janet’s theory, Piaget said,

we question whether all affective phenomena can be reduced to the energetic regulations [Janet] describes. There is no doubt about the regulatory role of feelings. It seems, however, that a second regulatory system must be added to Janet's system of secondary actions. This second system would have to do with interest and the evaluation of action . . . According to Janet, the proportionality between the available forces and psychological tension or, in other words, the balancing of the cost of the means needed to achieve some goal with the value of the goal itself was ruled by a principle of subsequent savings . . . We would say, instead, that it is necessary to distinguish between the value of an action and its cost . . . Valuation is not the simple consequence of the economics of behavior.

In order to illustrate this point, let us take the example of a child of thirteen months who tries in vain to bring a slender toy into his playpen by pulling it through the bars in a horizontal position. This is a classic instance of a problem of practical intelligence that is solved by groping. By chance, the child succeeds in turning the toy into the vertical position and in pulling it through the bars. Instead of being content with this success, however, he again puts the toy outside the playpen and recommences his gropings until he has understood the technique.<sup>1</sup> This searching on the baby's part seems to run counter to the principle of economy of action [PIAG16: 30-31].

The idea of value plays a central role in Piaget’s theory. In *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* Piaget listed twelve “categories which intelligence uses to adapt to the external world<sup>2</sup>.” Here we recall that Piaget’s system is based upon two functional invariants – organization and adaptation. His ‘categories’ (each of which he says corresponds to an “aspect of reality” but which he describes from a viewpoint that is quite different from that of Kant’s categories of understanding) are divided into a three-way split corresponding to what he calls regulating functions, implicative functions, and explicative functions. ‘Value’ is one of his four ‘categories’ pertaining to regulating functions of organization. His general idea of value is closely interrelated to his three other ‘categories’ of the regulating function of organization: totality; relationship; and ideal. In brief, his description of these ideas is as follows:

The concept of *totality* expresses the interdependence inherent in every organization, intelligent as well as biological . . . The correlative of the idea of totality is . . . the idea of *relationship*. Relationship is also a fundamental category, inasmuch as it is immanent in all psychic activity and

---

<sup>1</sup> cf. [PIAG1: 308-310], observation 165.

<sup>2</sup> Piaget's "categories" grouped in terms of his three classes of intellectual functions are: {totality and relationship; ideal and value}; {quality and class; quantitative rapport and number}; {object and space; causality and time} [PIAG1: 9]. It is important for us to understand that these "categories" are defined and described by Piaget from the viewpoint of his normative convention and cannot be regarded as *notions* in the sense that we have used in describing the pure notions of understanding.

combines with all other concepts. This is because every totality is a system of relationships just as every relationship is a segment of totality . . . The categories of *ideal* and of *value* express the same function, but in its dynamical aspect. We shall call "ideal" every system of values which constitute a whole, hence every final goal of actions; and we shall call "values" the particular values related to this whole or the means of making it possible to attain this goal. The relations of ideal and value are therefore the same as those of totality and relationship. These ideals or value of every category are only totalities in the process of formation, value only being the expression of desirability at all levels. Desirability is the indication of a rupture in equilibrium or of an uncompleted totality to whose formation some element is lacking and which tends toward this element in order to realize its equilibrium . . . [The] ideal is only the as yet incomplete form of equilibrium between real totalities and values are none other than the relations of means to ends subordinated to this system [PIAG1: 10-11].

This description of the idea of ‘value’ is a rather abstract one and may perhaps even appear a bit circular at first reading, e.g. ‘ideal’ is a “system of values” and ‘values’ are “particulars” within this system. The description of value as “being the expression of desirability” makes the link between value and affectivity somewhat more explicit, while the description of desirability as an “indication of a rupture in equilibrium” brings the role of value in the regulating function of organization into somewhat sharper focus. Piaget expanded upon this idea somewhat in *Intelligence and Affectivity*:

To start with, we define value as a general dimension of affectivity and not as a particular and privileged feeling. The problem is to know when valuation is involved and why . . . At the stage under consideration . . . the distinction between values and energetic regulation is only beginning to appear. Despite this apparent initial fusion, we have argued that values play a distinct role in primary actions and are evident from the moment the subject begins to relate to the external world . . . As early as the sensorimotor level, then, the child draws not only practical knowledge but also confidence in or doubt about himself from previous experience. These feelings are, in a way, analogous to feelings of superiority or inferiority (but with the careful qualification that the self is not yet constituted in the early sensorimotor substages). They will play a large part in determining the finality of action proper and soon will be extended to all of the interpersonal relationships that appear with imitative behaviors. As values attributed to people, the elementary forms of which are liking (*sympathie*) and disliking (*antipathie*), these feelings become the starting point for moral feelings. One sees, therefore, that values, although difficult to discern at first, are organized bit by bit into a system that is broader, more stable, and distinct from the system of energetic regulations [PIAG16: 31-32].

As the word “value” suggests, Piaget’s value system is an affectivity that provides a ground for the possibility of developing goals toward which the Subject’s actions come to be directed and for the establishment of what he called “norms of action” that “last beyond the behaviors of immediate interest to the subject” [PIAG16: 43]. Value, in other words, is tied up with finality, i.e. with determining how the affective energetics (in Janet’s sense of the word) are going to be employed. Value is an idea tied up with feelings of “likes and dislikes” and “confidence or lack of confidence” in given situations. Furthermore, value is to be seen as a *system* in the Piagetian sense (although not as a structure). Piaget goes on to cite other works demonstrating that this

value system is modified by successes and failures. He cites Lewin's work which "demonstrated how previous successes and failures modified the value the child placed on the task by increasing or decreasing his *level of aspiration*" [PIAG16: 35].

Thus Piaget distinguishes two "systems of regulation" – the energetics of Janet and the system of valuation – at work in affectivity. Yet while distinguishable, these systems are not independent of one another, and this is where the idea of 'interest' comes in:

The two systems of which we speak, i.e. valuation and internal regulation, find their juncture in the mechanism of interest. Our first approach to this idea is to study the work of Claparède . . . Claparède defined *interest* as a regulation of energies in a sense very akin to that of Janet. It was, he said, the relation between a need and an object capable of satisfying that need. For Claparède, neither the object nor the need sufficed to determine what behavior a person would undertake. It was necessary to insert a third term, which was the relationship between these two [PIAG16: 32].

Piaget goes on to briefly summarize what is meant by "need." This summary need not occupy us here except for us to note that, in Piaget's words, "need manifested disequilibrium and the satisfaction of a need signified a re-equilibration." Claparède linked every need to some organic structure "whose functioning created new structures in response to certain disequilibria." Other psychologists have different criteria by which they distinguish "needs" from other things such as "drives," but this debate is of no interest to us just now. It is enough to note that the idea of a need and the idea of a disequilibrium go hand-in-hand and that the idea of a need always implies the idea of a behavioral response that seeks, if possible, to satisfy the need, i.e. that has as a goal the achievement of such a satisfaction. Hence, interest is tied up on the one side with activation regulation and on the other side with value.

This preliminary analysis of need was used by Claparède to justify two *laws of interest*. The first of these stated that all behavior was dictated by interest. The second posited that there could be several interests in play at the same instant. According to Claparède's theory, the organism acted in accordance with its greatest interest. He also pointed out that the same object could be used differently according to the interest of the moment. The bottle had interest for the baby to the extent that he was hungry. In cases such as this, rhythms of interest could be distinguished.

Finally, Claparède distinguished two meanings of interest. On the one hand, interest was the "dynamogenerator" of action. Objects of interest liberated energy whereas those of no interest inhibited the expenditure of energy. This was the regulatory aspect of interest. On the other hand, Claparède held that interest was related to the *finality of action* because the choice of objects corresponded to the satisfaction desired. This distinction is important because these two meanings correspond to the two systems we are trying to distinguish. The first has to do with the *intensity of interest*, i.e. its quantitative aspect, and involves the regulation of energy or force. The second has to do with the *content of interest*, i.e. its qualitative aspect. This has to do with the values relative to which means and ends will be distributed [PIAG16: 33-34].

In this treatise we will have little regard for the ideas of affective 'force' and 'energies' other than as sometimes-useful metaphors for describing the fact that individuals can put various

amounts of effort into different behaviors depending on circumstance and past experience – as, e.g., when we make such common observations as “his heart wasn’t in it” or “he is fanatical about succeeding.” Nonetheless, both the Piagetian idea of value and that of interest have bearing on the reflecting power of judgment, and the Piagetian idea that interest serves as a junction point, between feelings as regulation functions (i.e. activation and termination regulations) and judgments that speak to goals (teleological reflective judgment), will be of use to us.

### The Kantian Idea of Interest

In the Critical Philosophy the idea of interest *per se* is the idea of an Object. We cannot obtain a *Realerklärung* of interest by making reference to such ideas as ‘energetics’ or ‘forces’ or other *noumena* borrowed through analogy from physics. Rather, interest must be tied to our model of the Organized Being and, insofar as the idea of interest is to be transcendental, interest must be explained in terms of that which is necessary for the possibility of activities. Furthermore, because interest is an Object of Reason its idea must be the idea of a *principle*.

One can attribute an *interest* to every capacity of the mind, i.e. a principle which contains the condition under which alone the exertion of the same is stimulated. Reason as the faculty [*Vermögen*] of principles determines the interest of all powers [*Kräfte*] of the mind, but determines its own itself. The interest of its speculative employment subsists in the *cognition* of the Object up to the highest *a priori* principles; that of the practical employment subsists in the determination of *will* with respect to the final and complete purpose [KANT4: 100 (5: 119-120)].

The interest of *a specific mental capacity* is a principle that “contains the condition” under which this capacity comes to be exercised (i.e., it is the principle that makes the difference between the mere capacity to perform a function and the power – the actual exercise – of this capacity). The different capacities of *nous* each have their own principles of condition, which is what is meant when Kant refers to the different interests of different capacities. Here it is worthwhile for us to recall our illustration of the synthesis [KANT5c: 82-83 (5: 197fn)]

$$\textit{conditioned} \xrightarrow{\textit{condition}} \textit{union} \quad .$$

Here we may say that it is the capacity that is conditioned, the condition is the factor determining the action, and the action is what is determined (as their union). The principle, i.e. the interest, contains not only the condition for the exercise of the mental capacity but also contains the “compass” for the direction the action is to take.



All interest presupposes need<sup>3</sup> or brings one forth; and as ground of determination of approval it leaves the judgment over the object no longer free [KANT5c: 95 (5: 210)].

The interests of reflective judgment, like those of determining judgment, are subordinated to regulation by the power of Reason. As for interest *per se*, as an Object it is a judicial *function* regarded as a genus. Any specific interest stands as one of the divided members of the general Object. The general function can be seen as none other than unity in an *a priori* ground of the spontaneity of *nous*. To put this another way, the idea of interest contains the idea that every capacity of *nous* responds to a ‘when’ (the condition) and a ‘how’ (the “direction”) in its actual employment (its *Kraft*). Kant offered us some descriptions of particular interests:

The dependence of appetitive power on sensations is called inclination and so this always demonstrates a *need*. However the dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is called an *interest* . . . But even the human will can *take an interest* without therefore *acting from interest*. The first<sup>4</sup> means the *practical* interest in the act, the second<sup>5</sup> the *pathological* interest in the object of the act [KANT3: 30 (4: 413fn)].

Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e. becomes a cause determining will . . . Reason takes an immediate interest in an act only when the universal validity of the maxim of the same is a sufficient ground of determination of will. Only such an interest is pure. But if it can determine will only by means of another Object of desire or under the presupposition of a special feeling of the subject, reason then takes only a mediate interest in the act, and . . . this latter interest would be only empirical and not pure interest of reason. The logical interest of reason (to further its insights) is never immediate but rather presupposes set aims of its employment [KANT3: 70 (4: 459-460fn)].

Here we have a couple of things to note. As we have earlier seen, *will* is choice from a ground of determination in a maxim. However, a maxim is a practical representation of a structure of practical rules. *Cognition* of such a representation must always involve the manifold of concepts. Practical Reason must call upon speculative Reason (ratio-expression) for the cognition of maxims and upon the whole faculty of conscious judgmentation to deliver up consciousness of a maxim in an idea. To say that Reason ‘takes an interest’ means that it *makes* a contingently determined maxim a ground of choice. This implies that an act of reflective judgment has judged a presentation containing this maxim to be expedient under the principle of the formal expedience of Nature and *practical* judgment has ruled that it is ‘lawful.’

Second, we can speak of a pure *special* interest only when the idea of the principle of determination of appetitive power is held-to-be a categorical imperative. Above all else, pure practical Reason rules for equilibration in the direction of an Ideal of perfect equilibration. Now, such an Ideal can only be seen by us as a standard gauge of Reason and not as an innate idea. It is

---

<sup>3</sup> *Bedürfniß*: need, want. This is another idea that psychology wrestles with, and we shall have to come to grips with it in more detail.

<sup>4</sup> i.e., the dependence of will upon a principle of reason.

<sup>5</sup> i.e., the dependence of appetitive power upon inclination.

not required of the processes of judgment that the Organized Being know how this equilibrium *can be* achieved; it is only required that it be able to make judgments of what choice might lead to such a condition of equilibrium. The *practical* formula of the principle may be merely a hypothetical imperative, but for a pure special interest the *idea* of the principle must be *held-to-be* a *theoretically* categorical formula in the Organized Being's recognition of the maxim.

Thus, to say that Reason 'takes an immediate interest' means that the condition of the chosen act has no mainspring other than a categorical imperative, either the practical categorical imperative or a merely theoretical idea of one. The ability of *practical judgment* to make such a determination has an entirely negative character; in other words, we can know when re-equilibration is needed, but not what constitutes *a priori* the actual form of the equilibrium to be sought. All other immediate grounds of determination of choice can stand only in a mediate relationship to the interest of the power of Reason, and hence are to be called empirical interests of Reason because the condition involved in the determination is taken from some other principle of interest. In every case, the idea of an interest can have neither objective nor subjective validity if it is divorced from every principle of some capacity of *nous*.

#### Interest and the *Momenta* of Aesthetic Relation

To speak of "the interest" of the process of aesthetical reflective judgment is to refer to the principle of subjective formal expedience of Nature. Aesthetical reflective judgment makes presentations of affective perceptions, and the condition of all such perceptions must be sought in the subjective expedience of sensibility. As representation, sensibility refers to the mode of affecting the Subject and this is two-sided. On the objective side sensibility produces objective perceptions (intuitions). On the subjective side sensibility produces affective perceptions, and these do not add to the cognition of any object of appearance but, rather, are relationships of sensibility to the state of mind of the Subject. We can speak of such a relationship with real validity only if we do so in terms of acts of the power of judgment.

By the designation "an aesthetic judgment about an Object" it is therefore forthwith indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an Object but that what would be understood in the judgment is not the determination of the Object but of the subject and its feeling. For in the power of judgment understanding and imagination are considered in relationship to one another, and this can, to be sure, first be considered objectively, as belonging to cognition . . . but one can also regard this relationship of two faculties of knowledge merely subjectively, so far as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the *state of mind*, and so as a relationship which is *sensitive* . . . Now although this sensation is no sensuous representation of an Object, still, because it is subjectively combined with the sensualization of the notions of understanding through the power of judgment, it can be reckoned to sensibility, as sensuous representation of the state of the subject who is affected by an act of that capacity, and a judgment can be called aesthetic, i.e. sensuous . . . although judging (that is, objectively) is an act of understanding . . . and not of sensibility [KANT5c: 25-26 (20: 223)].

Consequently, aesthetic expedience is, first and foremost, expedience in sensibility.

But the representation of this expedience is also required to be nothing else than representation of a *formal* expedience (by our transcendental principle of the formal expedience of Nature). Aesthetic Relation consequently can pertain to nothing other than the Relation of sensibility to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* because the *momenta* of aesthetic Relation are functions of the judgment of the form of *nexus*. Aesthetic Quantity and Quality involve the matter of a desire, but aesthetic Relation and Modality speak to the sensible form of a desire. It is therefore appropriate and convenient from the viewpoint of terminology to call the Relation of sensibility to the state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction presented in the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* a *particular presentation* of aesthetic interest. This is what was meant in the earlier quote when Kant said, “the satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the *Existenz* of the object is called interest.”

Piaget spoke of a system of values as being a necessary part of affectivity. However, he also claimed that affectivity does not itself form into a structure but, rather, merely regulates the formation of structures. But if ‘value’ is to be *organized* as a *system*, it is necessary that there be some capacity of judgment (which we could call the capacity of *valuation*) that regulates the laws of transformation he posits as a necessary factor in the very idea of a Piagetian structure. The condition of real validity in any idea of a ‘value system’ necessarily presupposes that a capacity of *connection* be attributed to these laws of transformation. The *form* of such connection is precisely what the *momenta* of aesthetic Relation have as their function. The formal unity in perception brought about through such a connection can be called a **value interest**.

We have, up until now, spoken of perceptions of sensibility (marked at a moment in time) in a manner that might lead one to assume that sensibility represents only one perception between moments in time; however, this assumption is unwarranted because it is intuition that is conditioned by affectivity in an act of aesthetical judgment. But since every intuition is a *singular* representation, if the synthesis of imagination were limited in capacity to only one intuition between moments in time, the only means for connecting diverse perceptions would be the process of determining judgment and in this process *there is no notion of value*. Consequently, it is in sensibility where Relations of interest must be established and this necessarily requires a *manifold in time*. The *momenta* of aesthetic Relation judge the expedience of sensibility *as a form of desire* through forms of connection in affective perception we can call the **senses of interest**:

sense of immanent interest	↔	categorical sense of value	↔	schema of persistence;
sense of transeunt interest	↔	hypothetical sense of value	↔	schema of succession;
sense of reciprocal interest	↔	disjunctive sense of value	↔	schema of coexistence.

From the judicial Standpoint, then, **a value is a form of *nexus* in a desire.**

### § 3.5 Aesthetic Modality

Modality in judgment is a judgment of a judgment. We have seen that aesthetic Quantity, Quality, and Relation have their relationships with the three-fold synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus*. The *momenta* of aesthetic Modality, on the other hand, pertain to the synthesis of apperception and how the aesthetic state is determined in consciousness.

In the transcendental-judicial perspective, the *momenta* of aesthetic Modality fall under the fourth Idea of Rational Psychology from the judicial Standpoint: **unconditioned unity in apperception of all perceptions in the interrelationships of meaning**. We recall that in the transcendental perspective the categories of Modality in determining judgment were notions of signs of expedience that could be made part of the symbolic meaning vested in an intuition. Here we have two terms, signs and symbols, that often appear in the literature of modern-day psychology (and which have a tradition linked to the theories of semantics and linguistics). It is worthwhile to take a minute and briefly summarize how these terms are used in empirical psychology. Our source for this summary is Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology*.

The word "symbol" has several different connotations relevant to our discussion: 1) Most generally, a symbol is anything that represents, signifies or indicates something else. Charles Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of American pragmatism from whom William James took the inspiration for his own version of pragmatism, wrote, "A symbol is a sign which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such." Here we have symbol and sign equated and the usage is patently circular; 2) In linguistics, a symbol is a language form, typically a word, that can be used to represent a thing; 3) In symbolic logic, a symbol is a sign used to represent an operation; 4) A symbol can also be defined to be any action, event, device, or utterance (e.g. a slogan) intended to signify ideas or principles beyond that action, event, etc.; 5) Piaget uses the term symbol to mean an internal, private, endogenous Piagetian representation conceptualized and internally produced by the individual. Among all these dictionary definitions, Piaget's is the only one that distinctly separates the idea of a "symbol" from that of a "sign"; 6) Finally, there are a variety of uses of the word "symbol" in psychoanalytic theory, all of which more or less refer to some conscious image, idea, action, or association that represents some unconscious need, repressed desire, wish, impulse, or conflict. One classic example here is the Freudian slip, e.g., "I don't want to discuss that now because that's another mother" (when intending to say "matter").

As for the term "sign", Reber's *Dictionary* gives several usages for this as well: 1) Most generally, a sign is an indicator, hint, or clue. When the sign is regarded as a characteristic of some thing, it is called a natural sign; when it has an arbitrary social or cultural connotation, it is called a conventional sign; 2) A sign is also regarded as any event or action that serves as a signifier of something with meaning or manifestations beyond itself, e.g., a fever is a sign of

infection. In this usage, symptom and sign are basically synonymous; 3) Any event which, by virtue of temporal or spatial contiguity with some other event, becomes capable of substituting for that event in eliciting a response is also called a sign. One of the most frequent examples of this usage is in psychological conditioning, e.g. Pavlov's experiments where dogs were conditioned to salivate at the ringing of a bell; 4) Any physical gesture used to stand for an idea or word is called a sign, as, e.g., in sign language; 5) In symbolic logic, a sign is a mathematical symbol that stands for a particular operation; 6) In linguistics, a sign is a word considered to be a symbol of a thing. The sign is regarded as a concrete element representing something that is abstract or symbolic; 7) In Piaget's usage, a sign is an arbitrary, publicly-shared representation of something and is distinct from a symbol. For example, a little girl sees a cat and says, "meow" (a sign); the same little girl puts a bag of marbles in a pot and "cooks" these "eggs" (a symbol).

In Kantian terminology, we say that an empirical intuition reproduced from a concept and which has been vested with meaning in the synthesis of apperception is a symbol. A sign, on the other hand, is merely a characteristic or mark *of* a concept (and is itself therefore a concept) that determines the manner in which the concept is used in the process of thinking. When we discussed these ideas earlier (Chapter 8, §6.5), we said that to endow an intuition with meaning requires a reflective judgment of the formal expedience of the intuition. The categories of Modality play a part in this on the side of determining judgment; they are notions of signs of expedience. The *momenta* of aesthetic Modality likewise play a part in this on the side of sensibility. In examining their role in this, we must take into account two perspectives of this function, namely, the transcendental-judicial and the empirical-judicial perspectives. We will address the first in this section; we will address the other in §4.

A transcendental perspective is always a perspective of the relationship of representation to the subjective state of the Organized Being. In *Critique of Judgment's* "Analytic of the Beautiful" Kant tells us that he was "guided by the logical functions of judging" (which we discussed in the logical *momenta* of determinant judgments). His terminology for the *momenta* of aesthetic Modality consequently came out as: 1) subjective possibility; 2) subjective actuality; and 3) subjective necessity. This terminology has the advantage of making clear the connection of the *momenta* of aesthetic Modality to the transcendental schema of Modality, but we will find it better suited to our purposes to augment these rather abstract names with some new terminology of our own that is more directly descriptive of the flavor of these *momenta*. First, however, let us review the transcendental schema of Modality.

### The Transcendental Schema of Modality

Of all the transcendental schema, those of Modality are perhaps the most challenging to grasp:

- 1) Schema of possibility: the harmonization (*Zusammenstimmung*) of the synthesis of various representations with the condition of time in general for the determination of a representation of an object at a moment in time (schema of non-contradiction);
- 2) Schema of actuality: the union of receptivity and reproductive imagination in representing the *Dasein* of an object at a definite moment in time;
- 3) Schema of necessity: coherence of possibility with the sum-total of the actual at every moment in time.

The first schema merely states that the representation in intuition conforms to the condition of the pure intuition of time and is therefore possible to represent in sensibility. We cannot imagine a four-sided triangle because the concept of 'being four-sided' contradicts the concept of 'being a triangle' and therefore no sensible intuition of such a thing is possible.<sup>1</sup> The second schema states that an intuition of an appearance is or was marked at some definite moment in time, thereby presenting the *Dasein* of an object. The third schema requires that all representations of the *Existenz* of an object must be such that the *Dasein* of that object can be presented without contradiction in all of its representations in subjective time. For example, Kant is dead so he does not exist *as a living man* today; but he was actual as a living man in bygone days and the legacy of Kant exists today. Hence we can read, "Kant says this and Kant says that," and we nonetheless understand that we can't invite him out for coffee or go have lunch with him.<sup>2</sup>

All intuitions and all concepts are bound by these formal conditions of time. Subjective time is, as we have said, a pure intuition of inner sense and no representation that fails to cohere with this condition can become a perception. We can go so far as to say that the transcendental schemata of Modality ground the *Realdefinition* of the terms possibility, actuality, and necessity. All specific uses of these terms, such as in modal logic or genetic epistemology, are but limitations of these fundamental schemata, the limitation imposed by the adding of concepts that establish a specific context.

When one reads various theories involving the meaning of possibility, necessity, and actuality (this last term often being called, incorrectly, "reality"), it too often seems to be the case that the attempt to define possibility, necessity, and actuality turns back on itself so that

---

<sup>1</sup> We could always define something else that we chose to call a "four-sided triangle," but in doing so we would mean something other than what is meant by the word "triangle." For example, a tetrahedron - a solid figure composed of four triangular faces - could get called a "four-sided triangle," and a child might do so. But here it is clear that the triangle shape of each face would merely inspire this *naming* of this body.

<sup>2</sup> In *The Closing of the American Mind*, Bloom shares this anecdote: "Alexandre Koyré, the late historian of science, told me that his appreciation for America was great when - in the first course he taught at the University of Chicago, in 1940 at the beginning of his exile - a student spoke in his paper of Mr. Aristotle, unaware that he was not a contemporary. Koyré said that only an American could have the naive profundity to take Aristotle as living thought". To be naively profound can be a great thing and is a marvel of the phenomenon of mind.

possibility is described as what is possible, etc. Aristotle would vigorously disapprove of this. He defined possibility by referring it to necessity:

The impossible is that of which the contrary is of necessity true, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side is impossible, because such a statement is a falsity such that not only is the contrary true but it is *necessary* . . . The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is not necessary that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should be seated is possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity false. - The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means that which is not of necessity false; in another, that which is true; in another, that which is capable of being true [ARIS7: 1610 (1019<sup>b</sup>23-32)].

Necessity for Aristotle then becomes something primal and rooted in the very nature of being *qua* being:

We call the necessary (1) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live, e.g. breathing and food are necessary for an animal . . . (2) The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot get rid or be freed of evil, e.g. drinking the medicine is necessary in order that we may be cured of disease . . . (3) The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes or hinders contrary to impulse and choice; that is why the necessary is painful, as Evenus says: 'For every necessary thing is ever irksome'. And compulsion is a form of necessity, as Sophocles says: 'Force makes this action a necessity'. And necessity is held to be something that cannot be persuaded - and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement which accords with choice and with reasoning. - (4) We say that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily so. And from this sense of necessity all the others are somehow derived . . .

Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, while they are the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one state and another . . . If, then, there are eternal and unmovable things, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them [ARIS7: 1603 (1015<sup>a</sup>20 - 1015<sup>b</sup>15)].

Most of our modern day usages of the terms possibility and necessity more or less follow Aristotle (except for the reference to the metaphysical “simples”) to such an extent that most theorists do not bother to give possibility or necessity a technical definition. The dictionary defines possibility as “the state or quality of being possible,” and defines possible as “that can be; capable of existence.” It defines necessity and necessary in almost Aristotle’s own words in *Metaphysics* except for the substitution of ‘natural law’ and ‘natural causality’ in place of Aristotle’s “simple”.

All these common usages place the point of reference (normative convention) for these words outside the thinking Subject and, therefore, contradict the Copernican hypothesis. In the Critical Philosophy, all our usages of these terms have had some modifier coupled to them, e.g. the *notion* of possibility; the *category* of necessity; *subjective* necessity; etc. These modifiers set the context for the use of the word and thereby establish the limitation of its use in that context. But when we speak of possibility *per se* or necessity *per se* or actuality *per se*, the only ground for our ideas of these as objects is *Realdefinition* as the manner of *coherence* of sensibility in the

pure intuition of time, and such a manner of coherence is a transcendental schema of Modality.

Piaget, while avoiding any direct stab at giving possibility *per se* and necessity *per se* a technical definition, examined the cognitive development of “possibilities” and “necessities” in children. As he put it,

In approaching the problem of necessity we do not intend to study modal logic, but rather to relate necessity, as we did possibility, to the development of the notion of *reality* [PIAG14: 3].

Two comments are in order here. First, Piaget does not use the word “notion” as a technical term and so his “notion of reality” does not refer to Kant’s category of reality. For Piaget, as for most people, ontology is logically prior to epistemology, and he means “reality” in the sense that most people use that term, namely as a synonym for “actuality”. Second, the word “reality” in this quote is indicative of the normative convention Piaget employs in all his psychological work. As we have seen, this convention is contrary to the Copernican hypothesis. If, however, we replace the word “reality” with “experience” we will be able to examine his findings with validity from Kant’s Copernican perspective.

### Piaget’s Findings on Possibility and Necessity

As mentioned above, Piaget and his collaborators studied “possibilities” rather than possibility *per se* and “necessities” rather than necessity *per se*. By “possibility” he means merely the ability of the Subject to conceptualize different ways of doing things, different ways of explaining phenomena, and so on. By “necessities” he means in effect the Subject’s ability to conceptualize models of nature that can then be used to go beyond simple generalization to establish what the Subject comes to view as laws about how things work, actions that must be taken, etc. Possibility and necessity, from this point of view, are terms that designate conceptualization of possibilities and conceptualization of necessities, respectively.

To defend our constructivist epistemology against nativist and empiricist positions, it is not enough to show that new knowledge is always the result of a regulatory process - that is, of equilibration - since it can always be assumed that this regulatory process is itself hereditary (as in the case of organic homeostasis); or, alternatively, that it is the product of learning experiences of varying degrees of complexity. Therefore we decided to approach the problem of the generation of new knowledge from a different angle, focusing on the development of possibilities. Obviously, any idea or action that gets realized must have existed previously as a possibility, and a possibility, once conceived, will generally breed other possibilities. The problem of opening up new possibilities, we believe, is thus of some interest to epistemology [PIAG13: 3].

In short, necessity does not emanate from objective facts, which are by their very nature merely real and of variable generality and therefore subject to necessary laws to a greater or a lesser extent. They only become necessary when integrated within deductive models constructed by the subject.



The necessity of  $p$  can thus not be characterized only as the impossibility of not- $p$ , since new possibilities can always emerge, but must be described in Leibniz's manner as the contradiction of not- $p$ , and this relative to a specific, limited model [PIAG14: 136].

We thus define as necessary those processes the composition  $C$  of which cannot be negated without leading to a contradiction. It is obvious, and this confirms the role of assimilation, that only the subject's own actions (or operations) permit the verification of the contradictory nature of not- $C$ . Reality can only indicate that not- $C$ , in fact, never occurs, which is insufficient to demonstrate its impossibility (the latter can be disproved by modifying the conditions). In particular, the complete integration of the past within the current state, which is a condition for logico-mathematical necessity, can only be inferential in nature, as opposed to other subject activities such as the modification of habits . . .

Being closely allied to integration, necessity thus consists in an auto-organization *causa sui*. It is not an observable datum in the real world. It is a product of systematic compositions that involves a dynamic of necessitating processes rather than being limited to states [PIAG14: 137].

Let us recall from Chapter 9 that Type II interactions differ from Type I structures in that the former contain inferences (*Coord.S* and *Coord.O*) while the latter do not. Among these are inferences of possibility and inferences of necessity, and Piaget's theory is taken more or less with a view to the cognitive aspect of possibility and necessity. Possibility in this view is tied to the capacity to differentiate and to the process of accommodation. Inferences of necessity, on the other hand, are integrative and tied to assimilation. Both types of inferences, moreover, are subject to the law of equilibration, and Piaget *et al.* find that there is a close connection between inferences of possibility and those of necessity. Their study found that in the youngest test subjects neither inferences of possibility nor those of necessity are preformed. Rather, the young subjects tend to fail to clearly distinguish between Piagetian "reality" (young children are naive realists), possibility, and necessity. Their conceptualizations at this stage lead to what an observer would call *pseudopossibility* and *pseudonecessity*.

This last finding points to a conclusion Piaget regards as being of fundamental import for genetic epistemology. It is this: possibility and necessity must both be viewed as essentially *subjective*. What is merely contingent for you or I a child often regards as necessary. What is regarded by an adult as possible is often regarded by a child as impossible. In one of the experiments, children were given three dice and one of three sheets of cardboard (a square, a circle, and a triangle, each large compared to the size of a die) and asked to "put these dice on the cardboard in every way possible." After the children had exhausted their possibilities, they were asked, "which are the best ways to arrange the dice, the most correct, the most interesting, the most difficult" etc. The results were quite interesting. For one thing, the children (even the older ones), tended to arrange the dice in neat, regular arrangements and to avoid irregular arrangements. While an adult might tend to do the same, an adult is also able to realize rather quickly that the number of possibilities for arranging the three dice is enormous. This is not so for

the children, as the following example illustrates.

As in other studies, we found that the children begin to see new possibilities as a result of applying analogical procedures combining small variations with similarities. This kind of behavior is particularly enhanced in the present study, since new configurations can be created by changing the position of a single die . . .

Mar (4; 11): "Place them . . .," etc. He puts the three dice at each of three corners of the square. "And another way?" He moves one die from the lower right to the unoccupied upper right. "And another way . . . ?" He permutes the dice on the diagonal. Then he shifts the die from the upper left to the lower right, and then moves the die from the upper right to the upper left corner. Then, at last, an innovation: he places one of the dice in the center of the square, commenting upon this discovery by saying *This looks like a heart*. "How was it before?" *Like that* (he only remembers what he did first, but not the pattern he had just modified). "How many ways could one do it - 10, 100, 1000?" *Three*. "How many ways have you done?" . . . "Would there be still other ways?" *No*. But he still comes up with a new pattern: the three dice all lined up next to one another. "Good. Do one just a bit different from that one." He moves the right-most die 1 cm to the right. "Now, can you do one that is very different?" He squeezes them along the lower and adjacent border. We proceed to the triangle. Mar declares that he cannot put the dice into the corner *because it is pointed; it only works on the square* (he points to its right angles) . . . When asked to do a "wrong one," he aligns two dice, placing the third one at a 45-degree angle. "Why is that wrong?" *I guessed the wrong one in my head. That one* [the three in a row] *is right*. He also designates as wrong two further irregular patterns. Inside the circle, likewise, the right position are those on the diameter or along the perimeter, and the wrong ones are those with one die *separated from the others* [PIAG13: 9].

It is clear in this example that the child's "sense of possibility" is limited by other subjective restrictions he imposes on himself, e.g. that the arrangement cannot be irregular because the irregular patterns are, for some reason, "wrong". This is an example of what Piaget calls a pseudonecessity. From this and other experiments Piaget concludes:

As we already pointed out . . . the young subject does not begin by considering reality only, constituted by pure observables, and later complete this by constructing possibilities and necessary relations. Rather, the ontological status of the initial state is one of nondifferentiation: reality as perceived or manipulated appears as being necessarily as it is so that it represents the only possibility, except for occasional variations that are accepted as realizable because they have already been observed and are, therefore, part of a particular sector of the same nondifferentiated reality . . . First, the formation of possibilities does not proceed by simple free association but consists rather in real *openings* requiring a liberation from limitations and obstacles of varying strength. Second, these limitations result from the fact that within this initial nondifferentiation, reality, possibility, and necessity (genuine, not pseudonecessity) block one another's development - that is, each hinders the development of the other two complementary modalities. If this is true, to arrive at a harmonious integration into a coherent system (which is an essential condition for the formation of operational structures) the three must become differentiated, following their own respective developmental course distinct and independent of the others [PIAG13: 148-149].

This is part and parcel of Piaget's general finding that "possibility and necessity are the products of subjects' activities." With regard to possibility he writes,

In short, *possibility* in cognition means essentially invention and creation, which is why the study of possibility is of prime importance to constructivist epistemology [PIAG13: 4].

As for necessity, Piaget finds that this, too, undergoes development but is different in kind from possibility. It plays an integrating role and exhibits the flavor of being a kind of *driver* in the subject's development of his world model.

The development of necessity appears to parallel that of possibility. The initial forms consist in simple local necessities that result from elementary compositions observable at the end of the sensorimotor period and further developed in preoperational representation . . . We hypothesize that there are various degrees of strength of necessity, related to what logicians call the *force* of structures. But what can one mean when speaking of the variable strength of different forms of necessity? We do not simply mean the number of necessary relations that a structure contains. We believe that there are also qualitative, *intensional* differences . . . But incorporating more relations is not only a matter of complexity or richness: because it consists in the union of distinct characteristics within a whole, this complexity requires a greater integrating force. In this sense, necessity appears to us as a measure of this integration. Similarly, possibility is an index of the richness of differentiation. This explains the parallelism in the development of the two [PIAG14: 4].

Inferences of necessity, Piaget finds, always involve some sort of world model the Subject has made for himself and which serves to “integrate reality” into objective understanding. It acts to produce a cognitive Piagetian system:

A system is . . . a set of interdependent relationships constituting an entity with stable properties, independently of the possible variations of its elements. A system can thus function via actions or operations, which temporally or successively modify its elements. It further incorporates a *structure* - a non-temporal set of possible transformations - that preserve the holistic characteristics of the system. We shall designate the construction process as *integration* and its final stage as *integrated*. *Necessitation* consists of those successive compositions that render necessary certain relations generated by the integrative process . . . The term *necessity* describes the atemporal status of the result of these compositions, where their negation (or absence) would be contradictory with the laws of the system [PIAG14: 46].

That these findings are congruent with what we said earlier in regard to the transcendental schemata of Modality is, I think, obvious with the single exception of Piaget's use of the term “reality” in place of “actuality” – this difference being a mere facet of Piaget's normative convention. The phenomena of the cognition of “the possible” and of the cognition of “the necessary” is established empirically (that is, by empirical psychology) as factually connected with the processes of accommodation and assimilation, respectively. At least so far as “possibilities” and “necessities” are concerned, this finds against the Aristotelian tradition by which we normally think of these ideas. If “possibilities” and “necessities” – the matters of possibility and necessity *per se* – are subjective, what of possibility and necessity *per se*?

Now it is one thing to establish that “something happens thus”; it is another thing altogether to tie these findings of fact in a system of our own, namely the theory of *nous*. We must go where Piaget did not: to the role of affective perception in this process.

## Subjective Expedience and the Synthesis of Apperception

Psychologically, the ideas of possibility and necessity turn out to be rather meaningless if they are divorced from the Subject who holds something to be possible or necessary. Piaget himself seems to have taken some delight in pointing out that the history of science contains numerous illustrations of cases where science held something to be necessary only to discover later that this was not so and that it was only the theory that *made a necessity* of it. When the theory fell, so did the necessity.

In actual fact, the laws of nature . . . are only what they are, even though they are general and may be eternal. If one wished to find some form of necessity in them, one would have to try to reconstitute their history - that is, the processes of integration and progressive necessitation, assimilating the universe to an immense animal in the process of evolution; however, the universe is already completely integrated and ready to be necessitated (= interpreted as necessary). Possibility and necessity are, effectively, instruments of cognitive organization. They are operative in elementary behaviors of living organisms up to the most evolved forms of thought. They are not properties of what is only datum, however general it may be. Necessity cannot be found in nature [PIAG14: 33].

Piaget's research into the question of possibility and necessity led him to conclude:

The principal results of the present research can be summarized in the following three points: (1) Necessity pertains to the compositions carried out by the subject and is not an observable datum inherent in objects; (2) it is not an isolated and definitive state, but the results of a process (necessitation); and (3) it is directly related to the constituting of possibilities that generate differentiations, whereas necessity is related to integration - hence, the two formations are in equilibrium [PIAG14: 135].

What is to be learned from these situations is rather obvious: there exists no more an absolute beginning in the development of possibilities than one can determine an absolute end to necessity. Any necessity remains conditional and will need to be transcended. Thus, there do not exist any apodictic judgments that are intrinsically necessary [PIAG14: 143].

Nature is nothing else than the world model one constructs which taken in total is the grand idea of the Object we call "the universe". On the cognitive side, understanding is driven to equilibrate this model through regulation by the transcendental Ideas. On the affective side and from the judicial Standpoint, the role of reflective judgment pertains to inferences of judgment - that is, to inferences of ideation, induction and analogy. We will discuss this in the next section. From the transcendental-judicial perspective, which is the perspective we take at present, the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment are to be understood in terms of their role in the determination of the subjective state, and we have seen that the first three titles of aesthetical judgment concern the synthesis of imagination in the *Verstandes-Actus*. What remains is the title of Modality in relationship to the synthesis of apperception.

Baldwin wrote, “Apperception is the essential mental act in the three great stages of mental generalization: perception, conception, and judgment.” The dictionary defines apperception as:

**apperception**, n. [from L. *ad percipere*, to perceive.]

1. perception.
2. consciousness by the mind of its own consciousness; self-reflective perception applied to metaphysical ends.
3. the interpretation of new ideas by past experience.

We have defined perception as conscious representation, so it will not do to say that apperception *is* perception. Nor can we define apperception as consciousness *per se*. Instead, we must view transcendental apperception in terms of the relationship of the Subject’s representations to unity of the *Existenz* of the Subject. In *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant pointed out that this relationship is, on the side of cognition, the “*I think*” that must be attached to any determination (cognition) of the process of thinking. All cognitions *x*, to be fully presented, must be presented as “*I think x*.”

In a like manner, affective perceptions must similarly be placed in relationship to the *I* of transcendental apperception. To the “*I think x*” of determining judgment, we must add an “*I feel y*” and an “*I desire z*” for reflective judgment, where this *y* must be presented as a sensible affective perception and this *z* must be presented in terms of a factor for a possible determination by appetitive power of an appetite. In this it is relatively easy to see a relationship between these three representations of apperception and Kant’s triad of the interests of Reason: *what can I know*, *what should I do*, and *what may I hope?* It is with the synthesis of apperception in the “*I feel y*” that we are presently concerned.

Although the *I* of transcendental apperception is the most special of all *noumena*, it is still nonetheless a *noumenon*, and if we are to make sense of the Modality of aesthetical judgment we must tie this Modality to *Existenz* rather than to the *Dasein* of this *I*. To do so, let us revisit some ideas from our earlier discussions of the faculty of pure consciousness and the sensorimotor idea.

Beginning with the faculty of pure consciousness, the ideas of Quantity in our 2LAR are: assimilation; accommodation; equilibration. Piaget’s study has shown that the employment of these processes is connected with the development of inferences of necessity (assimilation) and possibility (accommodation), both under the regulation of the demands of equilibration. As these are functional mental acts of the Organized Being, the formal expedience of aesthetical judgments of Modality for these functions is clearly suggested. The ideas of Relation in this 2LAR are the processes of judgment, and as we are here considering the process of reflective judgment, this relationship to the faculty of consciousness is likewise clear.

The ideas of Quality in the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness are the powers of receptivity, spontaneity, and feeling. Receptivity is the capacity for being affected through the data of the senses; spontaneity is the power of *nous* to be the agent for originating perceptions.

Both these powers pertain to the synthesis of imagination rather than to reflective judgment. However, the power of feeling, which we regard in terms of spontaneity viewed as receptivity, is the power of *nous* to produce affective perceptions in sensibility. It is the power of mind to produce what Palmquist calls “non-cognitive cognitions.” It is with this power that we see the most direct tie between aesthetical judgment and the composition of consciousness.

It is when we turn to the ideas of Modality in the 2LAR of the faculty of consciousness that we see the matter of expedience (in the transcendental-judicial perspective of the *momenta* of aesthetic Modality) in the clearest relationship between subjective formal expedience and the synthesis of apperception. The idea of the determinable in the 2LAR of consciousness was described in Chapter 5 as representation that has no context prior to that representation being determined. It is an idea in which we view the unconscious as representation that pertains to the possibility of perception; we called this the power of the potential for perception. This idea is the idea that gives context to the *momentum* of subjective possibility.

The idea of determination is an idea of a power of presenting the form of perception, i.e. the idea of representation made into perception. We earlier (Chapter 5) described particular representations as state variables – the idea of the matter of the state-of-being. The power of conscious representation (the idea of determination in the Modality of the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness) we described as the *enérgeia* or action of the power of perception, and we named this the actualizing of perception. As the idea of this power is the idea of making an *actual* perception, this idea gives the context for the *momentum* of subjective actuality.

Finally, the idea of the determining factor in the 2LAR of consciousness is the idea of the power to legislate the form of the *nexus* in the manifold of all representations, and to regulate the selection of the logical place occupied by the specific determinables within this selection. This idea we named the idea of the power of pure Reason insofar as Reason stands in relationship to the synthesis of apperception. Now, this regulative role is very much like what Piaget described as the role of necessities in the development of thought. Piaget concluded the mind constructs models that regulate the transformations in and the structure of the system of mental organization. The *momentum* of subjective necessity is the aesthetic function of expedience that stands in context with this idea of self-regulating transformations in the synthesis of apperception.

Summarizing this: the ideas of Modality in the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness are the ideas from which we take the context in viewing the expedience of subjective possibility, subjective actuality, and subjective necessity as the functions of Modality in aesthetical judgment. This expedience is subjective and *formal* because the context is one of Self-organization of representations in conscious relationships. This context does not speak to the particulars of how such representations stand in relationship to appearances.

Given how we are accustomed to thinking about the ideas of feelings and affectivity, there

may seem something cold and even too purely logical in the foregoing discussion of the relationship of aesthetic Modality to the synthesis of apperception. In the context of the Modality of the faculty of pure consciousness, it may seem that we are missing something vital, namely any reference to feelings in terms of the state of satisfaction or the relationship of aesthetical judgment to the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. If we carry our explanation no farther than what is presented above, we would be ignoring the primary role of what Greenspan calls “emotions and feelings” in the cognitive development of human beings.

We would also be ignoring what Kant had to say in this regard as well:

Of every representation I can say: it is at least *possible* that it (as cognition) be combined with a *Lust*. Of that which I call *pleasant* I say that it *actually* produces *Lust* in me. Of the *beautiful*, however, one thinks that it has a necessary reference to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be recognized *a priori* that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me; nor a practical necessity where, through ideas of a pure rational will fit for rules for freely-acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one by all means (without a further aim) ought to take action in a certain way. On the contrary, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*, i.e. a necessity of the assent of *everyone* to a judgment that is esteemed as an example of a universal rule that one cannot state. Since an aesthetic judgment is no objective and cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determined concepts and is therefore not apodictic. Much less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a prevailing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly procure much covering hereto, but itself permits no concept grounded on empirical judgment of the necessity of these judgments [KANT5c: 121 (5: 236-237)].

When Kant speaks of “the beautiful” he is referring to a special and in many ways peculiar human capacity for coming to opinions regarding objects that he calls **taste**. This term has nothing to do with the gustatory sense (one of Aristotle’s well-known five senses); rather, the connotation is one of such things as good taste in art, manners and so on. Such judgments of opinion are commonplace, and Kant notes that while some such opinions are held by the individual to be merely a private liking or disliking, others are held much more strongly and to such an extent that the individual regards anyone who holds a different opinion on the matter to have something wrong with him (i.e., “he has poor taste”). As an example, some people regard the use of vulgar language (swearing) as behavior that is universally bad, indicative of “low breeding” or lack of intelligence or education.

These, however, are clearly and obviously personal opinions. The interesting question is: how is it possible that such opinions can come to be held in such a rigid manner by those who hold them? There is clearly nothing in sensible experience that *demand*s such a viewpoint; hearing a cuss-word does not carry in the data of auditory sensation a little buzzer that rasps, “Vulgar! Vulgar!” The phenomenon of “taste” illustrates that there is something in affectivity –

and therefore in the synthesis of apperception – that exerts a powerful influence on the meaning to be vested in particular objects (including event-objects). Not infrequently, disagreements between individuals over “matters of taste” can even take on a moral tone and often can be accompanied by strong emotions.

How, then, shall we view the phenomenon of taste? Kant provided a topical definition: Taste is the capacity for judgmentation<sup>1</sup> of the beautiful [KANT5c: 89fn (5: 203fn)]. Kant expanded on the operational explanation of this idea in several places in *Critique of Judgment*:

Taste is the capacity for judgmentation<sup>2</sup> of an object or a manner of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest [KANT5c: 96 (5: 211)].

[A] judgment of taste<sup>3</sup> . . . is only an order of reason in such a way to bring forth unanimity of the mode of sense, and that "ought to," i.e. the objective necessity of the consolidation of the feelings of everyone with the particular feelings of each, means only the possibility to become in concord herein [KANT5c: 124 (5: 240)].

Taste is thus the capacity to judge<sup>4</sup> *a priori* the communicableness of feelings which are combined with given representations (without mediation of a concept) [KANT5c: 176 (5: 296)].

Each of these explanatory remarks contains an idea we need to examine. First, the phenomenon of taste is linked to the feeling of a state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction “without any interest” *in the object of cognition*, i.e. this feeling does not involve a *Lust* of desire for the object as an objective appetite. The relationship of such a feeling to the principle of happiness is wholly subjective, i.e. the state of happiness conveyed is representative of a state of equilibrium that can be regarded as neither “forward-looking” (appetite) nor “backward-looking” (e.g. any “sense of accomplishment”). Second, the phenomenon of taste is grounded solely in an “order of reason” that shows itself only insofar as it involves a feeling of “unanimity of the mode of sense” – i.e. a feeling of sensible equilibrium. Third, the phenomenon of taste is grounded in the communicability of feelings combined immediately with representation as sensibility. This has no reference to the transcendental object of appearance (no reference to the concept of the object as a phenomenon); it speaks only to what we earlier called the idea of a *common sense*.

It is with this last point where the synthesis of apperception has a reference to the sensorimotor idea, i.e. illustrates a relationship between pure *nous* and *psyche* in the faculty of an

---

<sup>1</sup> *Beurtheilung*. The prefix *be-* in German denotes a subtle shift in the meaning of a word. Often it conveys a connotation of the word taken in an “all around” or “overall” sense, e.g. *bemuttern* (“to mother,” as in “to mother the students”). When a judge renders a legal finding or opinion, this is a judgmentation in the sense of *Beurtheilung*. When we speak of the power of a process of judgment, e.g. determining judgment or reflective judgment, Kant’s word is *Urtheilskraft*.

<sup>2</sup> *Beurtheilungsvermögen*.

<sup>3</sup> *Geschmacksurtheil*.

<sup>4</sup> *zu beurtheilen*, to judge in an overall or all-around context.



Organized Being. Recall from Chapter 6 that the sensorimotor idea falls under the division of *psyche* in the Organized Being. Under its idea of emergent properties, presentations of aesthetical judgment must have their counterparts in the representations of *soma*. The common factor in this dual representation is the idea of information. For a representation to have meaning there must take place some conversion of information to knowledge (in-forming). Sensorimotor meaning (an idea of sensorimotor Modality) can pertain to meanings of noetic representations only insofar as these representations pertain to appearances of accidents of *Existenz* of the Self.

In sensorimotor Modality the determining factor (sensorimotor meaning) is the *materia circa quam* of connection of the data of the senses in the synthesis of apperception, and aesthetic necessity is a notion of something necessarily *in-formative* represented in the data of the senses. Aesthetic possibility is a notion of expedience for determining the state of satisfaction (the determinable in the 2LAR of the sensorimotor idea). Aesthetic actuality is a notion of expedience in a coherent determination of the senses as internal, interior, or outer (determination in the 2LAR of the sensorimotor idea).

The matter of composition, on the other hand, is expressed in the ideas of sensorimotor Quality: the condition of state, moving powers, and seeming. The idea of power (*Kraft*) is the idea of the ability of a substance to cause accidents of *Existenz* insofar as the substance contains the ground of the accident. A moving power is the power to be a cause of change in an object's external relationships and, for the case of the somatic counterparts of the representations of aesthetical judgment, the change of which we speak is change in the somatic condition of state.

It is well established in neuroscience that psychological phenomena, particularly "emotions", are accompanied by measurable changes in body state. But, as we have mentioned several times, the question, "what is emotion?" is one for which modern psychology has no common answer. Kant described emotion as "sensation where pleasantness is occasioned simply by means of momentary checking and following after that stronger gushing forth of the vital power" [KANT5: 62 (5: 226)]. We may compare this description with the English word's Latin root *emovere*, to move out. We discussed earlier the role of aesthetical judgment in terms of "energetics"; the affection of somatic state (and, reciprocally, its effect on noetic state) through aesthetical judgment has precisely this flavor of "moving" (effecting a change of state in) the Subject in the manner we describe with the term 'moving power'. Finally, the idea of seeming is the idea of a condition of state in which the representations of sensibility contain the possibility of perception under the principle of expedience.

In short, although our discussion of aesthetic Modality in terms of the synthesis of apperception may seem a cold and unfeeling explanation inconsistent with our objectified concepts of "feelings", this apparent discrepancy is due only to the character of the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness in its logical construction. That which conveys feeling in sensibility

is, as it must be, tied to the relationship between aesthetical judgment and the data of the senses, and this relationship belongs to the division of *psyche* and not of *nous*. There is more that we must say regarding this relationship, but here is not the place for that. We will take up this discussion again in the next chapter.

### The Aesthetic *Momenta* of Modality in Transcendental-Judicial Perspective

In the discussion just concluded we have set the context for our *Realdefinition* of subjective possibility, subjective actuality, and subjective necessity from the transcendental-judicial perspective. We can, at last, turn to the aesthetic functions themselves.

Subjective possibility takes its context from the Modality of the faculty of consciousness we call the power of the potential for perception. Now, this context is one of “unconscious” – or, in Kant’s terminology, obscure – representation. Yet aesthetical judgment marks sensibility as an affective *perception*. How, then, can this pairing be anything other than an outright contradiction? The answer to this puzzle is found by considering this *momentum*’s transcendental schema, the schema of possibility. This schema, recall, is that of harmonization with the condition of time in general. The subjective *possibility* of intuition hinges on the ability of the synthesis of imagination to bring about a sensible representation in the pure intuition of time.

Now, every aesthetical judgment has some reference to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*. The *momentum* of subjective possibility does not judge the matter of composition but, rather, the *determinability* of sensibility in the production of an intuition. To put it another way, it functions as a *feeling* of the determinability of the determinable in sensible representation. William James provided us with a nice description of and an appropriate name for such a feeling: He called it the **feeling of tendency**.

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mold. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might necessarily seem to be when described as gaps . . .

Again, what is the strange difference between an experience tasted for the first time and the same experience recognized by us as familiar, as having been enjoyed before, though we cannot name it or say where or when? A tune, an odor, a flavor sometimes carry this inarticulate feeling of their familiarity so deep into our consciousness that we are fairly shaken by its mysterious emotional power. But strong and characteristic as this psychosis is . . . the only name we have for all its shadings is "sense of familiarity."

Now what I contend for, and accumulate examples to show, is that "tendencies" are not only descriptions from without, but that they are among the *objects* of the stream [of thought], which is thus aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure constituted of *feelings of tendency*, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all. It is, in short, the re-

instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention [JAME2: 163-165].

James' examples make striking illustrations of the character of the *momentum* of subjective possibility. Freud viewed "the unconscious" as the great yet unperceived system upon which was perched, like the tip of an iceberg, "the conscious mind." Now, whether representations in the synthesis of sensibility are immediately presented as conscious or they remain unconscious representations, they all must *enter* the synthesis in the same condition – i.e. as determinables. If we posit the former and say that some representations come immediately into consciousness while others do not, there is no ground for this other than to assume that something (perhaps 'information') in the representation *placed* it so. But this is merely the copy-of-reality hypothesis coming forth once again. We must therefore posit the contrary, i.e. that we require a subjective ground for the possibility of some but not all sensible determinables coming to consciousness. (Attention is *selective*). This is what the *momentum* of subjective possibility provides. It is a feeling of tendency, an awareness of a "gap" and consciousness of the process of equilibration in the cycle of thought acting to either close that gap or else go on to cycle rupture (ignorance).

When we described Type I interactions in Chapter 9 (§2.2C), we discussed Piaget's awareness observable, otherwise known as "function *a*" in the Type I interaction structure. This was the "feedback function" that moved from the "external" *Obs.O* back to the Subject's "internal" observable, *Obs.S*. We said there that function *a* serves to bring to the Subject's conscious attention some scheme. The *form* of such a connection is given through the *momenta* of Relation (interest); the *matter* of such a connection, on the other hand, is the judgment given in subjective possibility in "raising awareness of" the awareness observable through the feeling of tendency.

The *momentum* of subjective actuality takes its context from the power for the actualization of perception in the faculty of pure consciousness. Its transcendental schema is the schema of actuality, the fixing of a determination of a *Dasein* at a definite moment in time. It is a "pulse of consciousness" (in James' words) giving birth to full-grown apperception with an appearance exhibited in an empirical intuition ready to be made into a new concept. Piaget spoke of a given "reality" (as he was required to do by adopting his normative convention of taking as a reference "nature as science describes her"). But Reality is not presented to the Subject because it is the supersensible Object of Rational Theology. What *is* presented in the apperception of the Subject is what we can term a **feeling of presentment** – subjective actuality.

Finally we come to subjective necessity. The context of this *momentum* is taken from the idea of the determining factor in the faculty of pure consciousness. Its transcendental schema is

the schema of necessity: the *presentment* of the *Dasein* of an object *in harmony with all its possible accidents* of *Existenz* at every moment in time. There is but one subjective expedience that can stand in relationship with this schema and the determining factor of pure Reason, and this is the expedience for the unconditional equilibrium dictated by the categorical imperative. Perception either stands in accord with the condition of general equilibrium or it stands in discord with it, and so the *momentum* of subjective necessity can be explained as a general feeling of either equilibrium or disturbance in the connection of perceptions in the *nexus* of all perceptions. We can perhaps do no better than to call this *momentum* of aesthetical judgment ***the feeling of accord or discord***.

In Chapter 9 we described Piaget’s anticipatory observable, function *b* in the Type I interaction structure, as a “valuation function.” Its role was specifically that of bringing to consciousness the state of accord or discord between the anticipations of the Subject’s activity and the actuality realized in *Obs.O*. The process of equilibration, which is a law of transformation in cognitive Piagetian structures, can take its objective validity from nothing empirical (because it is part of the *a priori* functioning central to Piaget’s theory), and this leaves only equilibration “for its own sake” as the ground and moving power of its possibility. But this ground in the transcendental-judicial perspective is the expedience of a representation of what we could term a judicial “legislation” suitable within the practical structure of rules approved under the formula of the categorical imperative. Hence, the feeling of accord or discord is the judgment of this expedience.

In closing this section, we have one final note to make. By naming the first two *momenta* the feeling of tendency and the feeling of presentment, we in no way intend to imply that these feelings are “one-sided” or “unidirectional.” The feeling of tendency can be either a feeling of “tending towards” or “tending away from” pending completion in the synthesis of imagination. The first case maintains the cycle of thought, the second can lead to its rupture.

In like fashion, the feeling of presentment can be either a feeling of closure in the cycle of thought – a presentment of a harmonious state of being expedient to happiness – or a feeling of the presentment of an abrupt disruption or disturbance in this cycle – a presentment of a hindered state of being inexpedient to happiness, hence expedient to unhappiness. Both are immediate norms for the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*.

In summary, then, we may diagram the transcendental-judicial *momenta* as follows:

subjective possibility	↔	feeling of tendency	↔	schema of possibility;
subjective actuality	↔	feeling of presentment	↔	schema of actuality;
subjective necessity	↔	feeling of accord or discord	↔	schema of necessity.

#### § 4. Aesthetic Judgment in Empirical - Judicial Perspective

From the perspective of Rational Psychology, affective perceptions are objects of inner sense and our explanation of the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment has to be cast in terms of the general Idea of Rational Psychology, namely the Idea of absolute unity of the thinking Subject. Rational Psychology and its transcendental - judicial perspective regard the aesthetic *momenta* as functions of representation by which are formed the affective perceptions. Seen in this way, these perceptions go to the determination of the affective state of being of the Subject.

Rational Psychology demands that our theory provide for absolute unity of the thinking Subject, and the Idea of this unity must take in that which is cognitive in the overall organization of the Subject. To put it another way, if there were no links between affective and objective perception there would be no possibility of the Subject possessing the unity that the general psychological Idea demands. It is the peculiar nature of the metaphysics proper of Rational Psychology to hold up this requirement for our viewing without telling us how this subjective unity is to be possible. The requirement is articulated, but the means for fulfilling the requirement are not. To complete this picture, we require not merely affective perceptions but, in addition, the aesthetic Idea. Up to now, we have invoked the aesthetic Idea in somewhat vague terms and without getting down to a *Realerklärung* of what we mean by this idea. This we shall soon remedy.

Now, an empirical idea is a representation of a supersensible object. It might therefore seem that Aesthetics – which deals with sensibility and the relationship of sensibility to the affective state of the Organized Being – would be incapable of presenting ideas. This is perfectly true insofar as the *cognitive* representation of objects is concerned. However, the cognitive is not the same as the conscious, and if we speak of a conscious representation (perception) that is nonetheless non-cognitive (presents with no representation in intuition of the appearance of an object) then this representation is likewise an idea in the strictest sense of that term. The aesthetic Idea is such a representation. We get the flavor of such a representation when we speak of “having a gut feel” for something – a description that is not infrequently used when one is faced with making a decision about something in the absence of “cold, hard facts” that would permit the decision to be made in a logical, deductive fashion. I think it is fair to say that all of us, at one time or another, have had the experience of having to make decisions of this sort.

In our Critical metaphysics proper, the aesthetic Idea viewed as an Object is an Object of Reason. What we must then ask is whether it belongs to Rational Cosmology or to Rational Theology. This question is easy to decide. Rational Cosmology takes Nature as its Object, and the aesthetic Idea is not a representation of Nature since it refers to no object in Nature. Rational Theology, on the other hand, takes Reality as its Object, and the phenomenal experience of such

things as “acting from gut feel” points to something that does indeed belong to Reality. An aesthetic Idea, as conscious representation, does not address the real in Nature but, rather, *how we come to regard* the appearances of cognitive representations *as* real objects. Before the categories of understanding can be applied to the construction of concepts, we must first have empirical intuitions to feed the synthesis of re-cognition (from which all concepts are originally presented to determining judgment for objective determination). Here we have two considerations.

The first consideration involves merely the possibility of concepts of any sort. The raw condition of this possibility is that concepts (which are rules for the re-presentation of intuitions) must conform to the condition of subjective time in general. Fulfillment of this condition takes place by means of the transcendental schemata (the bridge between sensibility and determining judgment). To review, since we discussed the transcendental schemata rather a long way back in this treatise (Chapter 8, §3), let us briefly recapitulate these schemata. The transcendental schemata are transcendental time-determinations, and we break them into our four general titles of representation as: 1) determinations of time-series (Quantity); 2) determinations of time-content (Quality); 3) determinations of time-order (Relation); and, 4) determinations of time-quintessence (Modality). Breaking this down further, we have the following.

**Schemata of Quantity:** The schemata of Quantity are the conditions for the generation (i.e. the synthesis) of successive apprehension of an object. Kant was fond of saying that these schemata “beget time itself,” but we take this to mean nothing other than that through the building up of successive apprehensions in intuition (putting a series of intuitions together) we eventually come to have an idea of an object we call time. Kant lumped all three of our general ideas of Quantity (identification, differentiation, and integration) under the general term “schema of number” (= the unity of the synthesis of a homogeneous intuition in general). A “number” is “a representation integrating the successive addition of unit to (homogeneous) unit.” In the somewhat more poetic terminology of philosophical tradition, we can describe the three subdivisions of this schema as “the one, the many, and the many taken as one.” In Kant’s epistemology-based terminology we have

- 1) the schema of integration = the condition for what persists in time;
- 2) the schema of change = the condition for distinguishing between representations in time;
- 3) the schema of aggregation = the condition for the putting together of different representations as a combination of homogeneous parts.

The mathematical ideas of addition and of extensive magnitude depend on these three schemata for their possibility.

**Schemata of Quality:** The schemata of Quality are the schemata for the synthesis of sensation and form-of-sensation as the representation of time-content. Kant liked to describe this as ‘time filled’ and ‘time empty.’ In terms of our general ideas of agreement, opposition, and subcontrarity, this breaks down as

- 1) the schema of sensation = sensation as the persistent matter in time;
- 2) the schema of kinematical form = the variable in the combination of sensations;
- 3) the schema of perception = the schema of the coalition of matter (sensation) and form (the kinematical element) in an intuition.

The first schema ties sensation to the synthesis of apprehension. The second pertains to form, which differs from moment to moment as time-content undergoes *change*, and which pertains to the representation of the *Existenz* of appearances. Because the kinematical form is the non-sensational element in perception, it is described as that in a perception which does not ‘fill’ time. The last schema is the schema of the synthesis that holds sensational matter and kinematical form together throughout the *a priori* synthesis in subjective time.

**Schemata of Relation:** We come to know time by its *modi* of persistence, succession, and coexistence. The schemata of Relation are the schemata of connection in what Bergson called the “flux” of time, and these schemata are the *Realdefinitions* of these *modi*, i.e.,

- 1) The schema for persistence: *Dasein* throughout time;
- 2) The schema for succession: continuity in time; and,
- 3) The schema for coexistence: co-*Existenz* of *Dasein* at a moment in time.

**Schemata of Modality:** These are the schemata of time-quintessence, a term by which Kant meant “time itself as the correlate of the determination of an object and how it belongs to time.” In human understanding all objects must exist in subjective time, and time-quintessence is the schema of the matter of time-*nexus*, i.e. what constitutes the manifold in which objects are connected in *Existenz*. We discussed these schemata at length earlier, and so we will merely summarize them here:

- 1) The schema of possibility = harmonization of representations in time;
- 2) The schema of actuality = the schema of the *Dasein* of an object at a determined moment in time; and,
- 3) The schema of necessity = the schema of the condition that the *Dasein* of the object be representable at all moments in time.

Determining judgment must take as a condition that this synthesis of an intuition is carried out for it in the synthesis of apprehension/comprehension. A transcendental schema in general is, to quote Kant, “the formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the notion of understanding is restricted.” Schematism means “the procedure of understanding with these schemata” [KANT1a: 273 (B: 179)]. Thus, from the theoretical Standpoint, sensibility is not judgment. However, from the transcendental-judicial perspective sensibility is tied to judgment, namely reflective judgment. We saw in the previous section that the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment are determinations of the transcendental schemata that give time-form (i.e. the form of the inner sense) to an intuition.

These conditions – that is, this time-determination – are sufficient for the possibility of concepts of sensible objects. However, we must also address the possibility of representations of

supersensible objects (*noumena*). Because such objects can *never* be *presented* to us by being given through the raw data of the outer senses, the synthesis of sensibility must contain something by which ideas may be *exhibited* in intuition. As all intuitions require aesthetical judgment, and because we may regard aesthetic judgments as **rules for the organization of sensibility**, our exposition of the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment is not complete until we address the ground of the possibility of exhibiting an idea in an intuition.

In Chapter 9 we discussed the role of the transcendental Ideas as schemata of reasoning. As schemata, the transcendental Ideas are regulative principles for the employment of the categories by the process of determining judgment. However, in that discussion we were taking the theoretical Standpoint and the theory presented there did not take in the synthesis of sensibility. This was illustrated in the cycle of thought (Figure 9.3.1), where we placed an arrow representing regulatory orientation to denote ratio-expression by speculative Reason running to the process of determining judgment. This arrow did not touch upon sensibility. But the synthesis of sensibility requires no less that it be governed through pure regulative principles for the employment of the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment in the determination of an intuition. This is our second consideration in the possibility of concepts, this time for the *possibility of empirical ideas*.

Cognition (objective perception) is a representation of the appearance of an object. But there is in this representing something we do not properly regard as being part of any object of appearance, and this something goes by the name **knowledge**. Knowledge *qua* knowledge is not something we regard as a property *of* an object of appearance but, rather, as something that belongs to the Organized Being and subsists in the entirety of the representing of the object. Here we make an important distinction between that which in one's representations belongs to the object and that which in this same phenomenon of representation belongs to the Subject yet is tied to the objective in representation without being part of the appearance. A conscious representation that can never be part of an object of appearance is an *affective perception*. Whereas the original possibility for representation of an object of sense is laid to the power of receptivity in outer sense (*soma* → *nous*), that of a supersensible object is laid to the capacity of interior sense (*nous* → *nous*) through spontaneity in presentation by means of affective perceptions.

#### § 4.1 The Power of Designation and Symbolism

In §3.5 we began a discussion of symbols and signs, looking at various usages given these terms in psychology, symbolic logic, semantics, and so on. We said then that our discussion of these ideas, particularly that of the symbol, would have two parts, the one transcendental-judicial and the other empirical-judicial. It is time for us to take up that second part.

The empirical-judicial perspective is the perspective from which we may speak of empirical knowledge insofar as knowledge stands in relationship to sensible representation. Now, the object



of the idea of knowledge is a *noumenon* but the *exhibitions* in which we say knowledge is *presented* are specific instantiations – examples – and all of these exhibitions representable as appearances are *phenomena*. Note well that we do not say these exhibitions are *representations of* knowledge *per se*; we say they are *presentations* of instances where we say knowledge is presented even though Knowledge regarded as it is in itself (*Wissen an sich selbst*) is not the cognition regarded as it is in itself (*Erkenntnis an sich selbst*). The logical essence of an aesthetic Idea is presentation (*Darstellung*), not representation (*Vorstellung*). A word has come down to us from the Greeks that speaks well to the relationship between these two; the word is hypotyposis<sup>1</sup>:

All *hypotyposis* (presentation, *subjectio sub adspectum*<sup>2</sup>) as sensualization is twofold: either *schematic* where the corresponding intuition for a concept that understanding grasped is given *a priori*; or *symbolic* where the corresponding intuition is imputed to an idea that only reason can think, and to which no sensuous intuition can be suitable, with which the procedure of the power of judgment that it observes in schematization is merely analogous, i.e., with it merely the rule of this procedure, not the intuition itself, comes to agreement - consequently, according to merely the form of reflexion, not the content [KANT5c: 225 (5: 351)].

By “given *a priori*” Kant only means that there are rules of sensibility for representation in an intuition; the rules, not the intuition, are what are given *a priori*. Recall that schematism refers to the *procedure*, not to that procedure’s outcome. In this sense the outcome (intuition) is schematic.

*Symbolic* hypotyposis, on the other hand, applies the same procedure used for making the intuition of an object of the senses to the construction of an intuition of a different sort of object, one that has not been given previously as an object of sense. The procedure (schematism) is the same; the content of the representation differs. The making of such a symbolic *presentation* of an idea we call an *inference of judgment*, the species of which are inferences of ideation, inferences of induction and inferences of analogy. These belong to the process of reflective judgment.

All intuitions that one imputes to concepts *a priori* are thus either *schemata* or *symbols*, concerning which the first contains direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept. The first do this demonstratively, the second do this by means of an analogy (in which one also uses empirical intuitions) in which the power of judgment performs a double business: first to make use of the concept for the object of a sensuous intuition and then, second, to make use of the mere rule of reflexion over that intuition for an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol [KANT5c: 226 (5: 352)].

The comment that schemata make demonstrative presentations might seem, upon a quick first reading of this quote, to imply that induction is based upon schemata rather than upon

---

<sup>1</sup> Literally, the word means a sketch, outline, model, or pattern. A representation is an "outline" of what is *being presented* (i.e., the object). In modern English, this word has taken up more specialized meanings in rhetoric and in scientific writings (where it means a concise outline of the subject-matter), but we use the word in the older sense described here.

<sup>2</sup> "Placing under observation."

symbols. If so, induction would carry the sort of demonstrative certainty that mathematics and modern symbolic logic claim it to hold. However, this is not what Kant is saying or implying here.

Every inference of reason must give necessity. *Induction and analogy* are therefore not inferences of reason but only logical *presumptions* or empirical inferences; and through induction one obtains, to be sure, general but not universal laws.

The said inferences of the power of judgment are useful and indispensable for the benefit of the enlargement of our empirical knowledge. But since they give only empirical assurance, we must make use of them with care and caution [KANT8: 137 (9: 133)].

Induction holds no more real certainty for us than does analogy (the shortcomings of which have been denounced by logicians and mathematicians for centuries, particularly since Bacon). If you are a mathematician, I think it is possible you may find yourself a bit riled up by this claim; if you are not a mathematician, you're probably wondering why this is an important point. Let us digress momentarily for an example of the use of induction.

One of the simplest and best-known examples of induction is the inference of mathematical infinity obtained from simple counting: 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . to  $\infty$ . The symbol for infinity ( $\infty$ ) for most of us denotes or indicates that we can imagine no end to this process. Prior to the rise of symbolic logic and its coupling with mathematics, this infinity was regarded by philosophers as an idea of 'becoming' (as Poincaré noted). Mathematics formalizes this by defining this counting procedure in terms of two primitive cardinal numbers (0 and 1) and the axiom that if  $n$  is an element of the set of numbers then so is  $n + 1$  (0 is used to start things off). This is, indeed, the prototype example of mathematical induction.

Things changed in a most fundamental fashion with Cantor and the development of Cantorian set theory. Using an inductive procedure similar to that above (known as the diagonal proof), Cantor "proved" that there were at least two different 'grades' of infinity, to which we give the symbols  $\aleph_0$  (aleph-nought) and  $\aleph_1$  (aleph-one). The first of these is the "infinity" that "counts" the "natural numbers" and is called "countable infinite"; the second designates an "uncountable infinity" – an idea by which mathematicians mean that an "uncountable infinite" set cannot be placed (by induction) in a one-to-one relationship with the natural numbers. In a manner of speaking,  $\aleph_1$  is a 'bigger' infinity than  $\aleph_0$ . Whether there is any "grade of infinity" in between these two is still an open question for which mathematics has no answer (i.e., no proof) to this day so far as I have heard.

Now, the point here is that while the counting procedure is schematic, the *projection* in which we turn "infinity" into a kind of "number" (albeit a very strange kind of number) is not schematic but, rather, *symbolic* and is accomplished through an inference of induction. (Induction infers through the principle of generalization: what holds for many things in a genus holds for all

things in that genus). The Cantorian ideas of “infinity” have come to hold fundamental importance in the modern-day practice of mathematics; but what kind of “reality” can we attach to these ideas? In mathematics, “infinity” holds its place by virtue of being made *axiomatic*. In other words, “infinity exists” in mathematics because mathematics *put it there* as part of the rules that govern all the rest of mathematics.

From time to time, some very famous mathematicians have attempted proofs of the “actual existence” of infinity. All of these proofs are based, in one way or another, upon inferences of induction. One of the more famous (and, to my way of thinking, one of the most specious) of these proofs was offered by the great mathematician Richard Dedekind<sup>3</sup>:

Theorem: There exist infinite systems.

Proof: My own realm of thoughts, i.e., the totality  $S$  of all things which can be objects of my thought, is infinite. For if  $s$  signifies an element of  $S$ , then the thought  $s'$ , that  $s$  can be object of my thought, is itself an element of  $S$ . If we regard this as transform  $\phi(s)$  of the element  $s$  then the transformation  $\phi$  of  $S$  has thus determined the property that the transform  $S'$  is part of  $S$ ; and  $S'$  is certainly proper part of  $S$  because there are elements in  $S$  (e.g. my own ego) which are different from such thought  $s'$  and therefore are not contained in  $S'$ . Finally, it is clear that if  $a, b$  are different elements of  $S$ , their transforms  $a', b'$  are also different, that therefore the transformation  $\phi$  is a distinct (similar) transformation. Hence  $S$  is infinite, which was to be proved.

Mathematics is, in Kant’s words, “knowledge through the *construction* of ideas.” Under the Copernican hypothesis, mathematics involves and relies upon intuition – a position that many, perhaps most, present-day mathematicians are taught to reject. (It has been said that “a typical mathematician is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sunday”)<sup>4</sup>. The point of contention seems to turn on whether we regard symbolism as having a *subjective* ground or an *objective* one, and thus the definition of what we mean by the term “symbol” comes into play. Kant leaves no doubt about on which side of the question he stands.

It is an incorrect use of the word *symbolic*, accepted of course by the newer logicians but sensibly turned upside down<sup>5</sup>, if one opposes it to the intuitive manner of representation; for the symbolic is only a class of the intuitive. The latter (the intuitive) can be divided up, namely into the *schematic* and the *symbolic* manner of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e. presentation (*exhibitiones*) not mere *characterizations*, i.e. indications of concepts through accompanying sensuous signs, which

<sup>3</sup> *The Nature and Meaning of Numbers*, Richard Dedekind, theorem 66 (1893).

<sup>4</sup> Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh [DAVI: 321].

<sup>5</sup> It is unclear to whom Kant refers with the phrase “newer logicians.” It is possible that he means the men who pioneered what would much later become mathematical logic [KANT8a: 257 (24: 796)]. If this is so, it is a group that would most likely include Johann Heinrich Lambert, Leonhard Euler (both of whom shared correspondence with Kant), Leibniz, Wolff, and possibly Johann Bernoulli [KANT8a: 25 (24: 38)]. All these men wrote or corresponded on logic as well as mathematics, although they are not particularly important figures (with the exception of Leibniz and Euler) in the history of logic. It is also possible that he means the followers of the tradition of the *Port Royal Logic* of Arnauld and Nicole, but I think this is less likely since Kant never mentions these men in his lectures on logic.

contain nothing at all of appurtenance to the intuition of the Object but only serve them according to the laws of association of the power of imagination, hence in subjective aim to the method of reproduction [KANT5c: 226 (5: 351-352)].

The intuitive in cognition must be set against the discursive (not the symbolic). The former is now either *schematic* through *demonstration* or *symbolic* as representation according to a mere analogy [KANT5c: 226fn (5: 352fn)].

Analogy, of course, is symbolism as simile. The symbolism produced in induction, as an inference of judgment, is no less subjective but merely differs in kind from that of analogy, i.e. the former follows a law of generalization, the latter a law of specification. Both are essential for the presentation of knowledge, although science – and mathematics especially – has learned to distrust analogy; however, science has not succeeded in doing away with it. As for induction, it has a more honored place and modern mathematicians especially tend to regard induction as being objective and discursive rather than subjective and aesthetic. The most fundamental proofs of mathematics cannot be carried out without the use of induction – what Poincaré called the “rule of reasoning by recurrence”:

We cannot therefore escape the conclusion that the rule of reasoning by recurrence is irreducible to the principle of contradiction. Nor can this rule come to us from experiment . . . This rule, inaccessible to analytical proof and to experiment, is the exact type of the *a priori* synthetic intuition . . .

Why then is this view imposed upon us with such an irresistible weight of evidence? It is because it is only the affirmation of the power of the mind which knows it can conceive of the indefinite repetition of the same act, when the act is once possible. The mind has a direct intuition of this power, and experiment can only be for it an opportunity of using it, and thereby of becoming conscious of it [POIN1: 12-13].

Unlike Russell, Hilbert, and most mathematicians of today, Poincaré was willing to concede a role for the aesthetic character of inductive symbolism. Indeed, he went so far as to say that this aesthetic character is indispensable in mathematics. The fact that a mathematician’s “intuition” may sometimes betray him does not, in Poincaré’s view, make this any less true.

What, in fact, is mathematical discovery? It does not consist in making new combinations with mathematical entities that are already known. That can be done by anyone, and the combinations that could be so formed would be infinite in number, and the greater part of them would be absolutely devoid of interest. Discovery consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations, but in constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. Discovery is discernment, selection . . .

Discovery, as I have said, is selection. But this is perhaps not quite the right word. It suggests a purchaser who has been shown a large number of samples, and examines them one after another to make his selection. In our case the samples would be so numerous that a whole life would not give sufficient time to examine them. Things do not happen in this way. Unfruitful combinations do not so much as present themselves to the mind of the discoverer. In the field of his consciousness there never appear any but really useful combinations, and some that he rejects, which, however, partake to some extent of the character of useful combinations. Everything happens as if the discoverer were a secondary examiner who only had to interrogate candidates declared eligible after passing a preliminary test [POIN2: 50-52].

It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in connexion with mathematical demonstrations, which, it would seem, can only interest the intellect. But not if we bear in mind the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and of geometric elegance. It is a real aesthetic feeling that all true mathematicians recognize, and this is truly sensibility.

Now, what are the mathematical entities to which we attribute this character of beauty and elegance, which are capable of developing in us a kind of aesthetic emotion? Those whose elements are harmoniously arranged so that the mind can, without effort, take in the whole without neglecting the details. This harmony is at once a satisfaction to our aesthetic requirements, and an assistance to the mind which it supports and guides. At the same time, by setting before our eyes a well-ordered whole, it gives us a presentiment of a mathematical law. Now, as I have said above, the only mathematical facts worthy of retaining our attention and capable of being useful are those which can make us acquainted with a mathematical law. Accordingly we arrive at the following conclusion. The useful combinations are precisely the most beautiful, I mean those that can most charm that special sensibility that all mathematicians know, but of which laymen are so ignorant that they are often tempted to smile at it [POIN2: 59].

Plato held that this power of discovery – this ability to grasp knowledge that no one else has taught us – is no discovery at all but merely the dim recollection of the Platonic Ideas we learned when our souls inhabited the world of truth. Poincaré held that the power of discovery is within us. Kant tells us that we make our own truths, not capriciously or arbitrarily but as a consequence of *a priori* laws of the phenomenon of mind and grounded in a principle of a common sense. To put it another way, things are as they are to us because our knowledge of their appearances must come to be in that way. If the copy-of-reality hypothesis were true, there should be no differences of opinion. If the Copernican hypothesis is true, agreement *and* diversity of opinion should coexist among people.

To make an intuition into a symbol is to attribute a meaning to that intuition, and this is what we call the presentment of knowledge. This act is an act of what Kant called the power of designation. This power of designation is the power for knowledge of the present to be a means for the connection of the representation of what is foreseen with that of the past. The act of effecting this connection is what we call designation, and intuitions are symbols insofar as they are the forms that serve as a means of representation through concepts (thinking). Symbols are indirect means of understanding – through inference of analogy or inference of induction – whereby concepts can be applied in the synthesis of intuitions so that through the presentation of the object the symbol obtains its meaning. The formation of symbolic meaning (designation) belongs to the synthesis of apperception, but the matter of meaning is the matter of the form of this symbolism, and its *presentment* requires an aesthetic Idea.

#### § 4.2 The Presentment of Reality

No object is real to me unless I have a concept of it connected with other concepts that give it a coherent context and a connection with sensation. Any thing is real to me *in its context* if this condition is satisfied. The theoretical Standpoint of the Critical Philosophy speaks to the ‘mental

mechanics' of this connection, but it is in the empirical-judicial perspective where we find the grounds of the possibility of the presentment in Reality of the object of this representation. For the principles of this presentment, we turn to the empirical branch of metaphysics proper: Rational Theology.

The general Idea of Rational Theology is: absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thinking in general. The four special Ideas of the titles of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality are, respectively, the Ideas of *entis realissimi*, *ens originarium*, *ens summum*, and *ens entium*. As schemata of reasoning these Ideas are the regulative principles of a standard gauge of pure speculative Reason – a “compass” for the direction taken by Reason’s employment of one’s capacity for understanding (which capacity includes the process of reflective judgment).

*Entis realissimi* (“most real of being”) is the Idea of what is to be looked for as an essential characteristic in a representation that *signifies* the object is to be thought as thing-like. The characteristic concepts of “being a thing” are combined in understanding under a notion of oneness (unity). In the empirical-judicial perspective, we must examine the consequences of the Idea of *entis realissimi* in terms of *expedience* for the form of the presentation of sensibility in order for a representation of intuition to carry a designation of an object of appearance. Seen in this Standpoint, the Idea is one of a synthesis of possible aesthetic ‘predications’ for happiness.

From the theoretical Standpoint the Idea of *ens originarium* (“original being”) is the principle that representation in thought as the representation of a thing must contain in the concept of that thing a fundamental notion of the real in appearance standing in agreement with that which is designated as essential for the oneness of a thing. This agreement is what we call the Quality of thinghood. In the empirical-judicial perspective, we examine this Idea in terms of what in the form of sensibility is necessary for originating such a presentation of an *Existenz* in Reality. Original Quality in *this* context is judicial happiness (in which desires are mere limitations).

*Ens summum* is the Idea of the principle of regulative structure in the Piagetian sense of that word. From the theoretical Standpoint, the representation of a thing must contain a notion of substance and accident and be connected in a series of the condition to the conditioned. It is this connection in the manifold of concepts that delimits the possible predicates by which the thing is determined as an object *in* Nature. The Reality of Nature is not derived from the reality of its parts – the things in Nature – but, on the contrary, the realities of these parts are derived from the Idea of Nature as the highest reality. When we turn to the empirical-judicial Standpoint, we inquire into the *aesthetic* context necessary for the presentation in sensibility of a designation of the place-in-Reality of the object; here the principle is the expedience of a manifold of desires.

The Idea of *ens entium* (“essence of all essence”) is the Idea of Modality in the matter of *nexus* in that world model we call Nature. From the theoretical Standpoint, *ens entium* is the Idea of the necessity for anchoring objects in something real. It is, in other words, the Idea of the

principle of coherence in Reality. In the empirical-judicial perspective, this anchor of coherence is perfection of a judicial Ideal of happiness (expedience in coherence of satisfaction and desire).

In what I have just said above, notions of ‘necessary’ and ‘necessity’ are implicit in the description of each of these transcendental Ideas. Now, in the previous section we discussed at length the *fundamentally subjective* nature of judgments of necessity. Yet all transcendental knowledge *a priori* is predicated on the theme of “that which is necessary for the possibility of experience.” Here we have all the ingredients for the appearance of a vicious circle in the doctrine of method in the Critical Philosophy. We must deal with this issue straight-away.

If it is true, as Piaget says, that “there do not exist any apodictic judgments that are intrinsically necessary”, does this not mean that our entire Critical structure stands upon a foundation of clouds? If so, we are open to the satirical charge the Greek playwright Aristophanes leveled against Socrates:

'Tis known that in their Schools they keep two Logics,  
The Worse, Zeus save the mark, the Worse and the Better.  
This second Logic then, I mean the Worse one,  
They teach to talk unjustly and prevail.<sup>1</sup>

To address this issue, let us first bear in mind that the subjectivity of necessity is inferred as a consequence of the fact that the thinking Subject formulates a “model of reality” (in Piaget’s words) and that necessity is then predicated as a consequence of this model. Put another way, judgments of necessity are the results of a **process of necessitation** (i.e., the judgment is *made necessary* in service of equilibration). Looked at from Piaget’s normative convention (which stands on the fence line between the Organized Being and the environment) this conclusion itself carries at least a stigma of self-contradiction that could be phrased as follows: “Because judgments of necessity are necessitated it is *necessarily* true that there do not exist any apodictic judgments that are intrinsically necessary.”

Now, in every scientific doctrine anything that is held to be a *fact* carries assertoric logical Modality. Every hypothesis proposed as a possible general explanation of a body of facts carries problematic logical Modality. But every hypothesis esteemed as a general *law* and accepted as a principle that welds the scientific doctrine together as a system is a ground of the theory and is taken to be **truth**<sup>2</sup>. Everything derived from this law then carries apodictic logical Modality. When Piaget says that a judgment is necessitated, he means that this judgment is held-to-be-true on subjective rather than objective grounds and, therefore, is only *contingently* true. It is the *contingency of the law* (the model) that deprives its apodictic consequences of *intrinsic* necessity.

In the Critical Philosophy it is the Copernican hypothesis that stands as the governing first

---

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, *The Clouds*.

<sup>2</sup> By virtue of the congruence of the phenomena with the representation of the law.

principle of metaphysics. Piaget's normative convention is a standpoint that invests the idea of "reality" with a meaning grounded in something apart from and independent of the thinking Subject who judges this "reality." It follows from this standpoint that "knowledge of reality" is to be viewed as both empirically *and* rationally contingent, and this is how the paradox arises. But the idea of "reality" taken in this "realist standpoint" can only be justified by a resort to the copy-of-reality hypothesis, and with this hypothesis comes the sort of metaphysical thinghood we examined and rejected in our discussion of objects, Objects, and things. In other words, this standpoint cannot avoid merging the idea of "reality" with the idea of "being" in the Greek sense – Margenau's "verb inflated into a most independent noun." In the Critical Philosophy, "being" is not a real predicate and the copy-of-reality hypothesis is deemed false. Piaget's "reality" should instead be called "actuality."

What is at issue here is the distinction between the making of judgments of reality in *appearances* and Reality as the necessary substratum in thinking and the ground of all such judgments. The realist's "reality" is a transcendent, not a transcendental, idea. Paradox arises when our reasoning pushes our ideas past the boundary of the objective validity of the categories of understanding. *Transcendental* necessity – a pure *a priori* notion of understanding – is altogether different from the deductive necessity predicated of ideas. The very idea of the Piagetian "model", from which the subjectivity of *empirical* necessity in judgments is deduced, depends for *its* deduction on the *transcendental* notion of necessity. This notion, from the empirical-theoretical perspective, is a notion that predicates *the manner of systematic coherence in Reality* under the principle of the transcendental Ideal of *ens entium*. All that Piaget's psychological study of necessities and possibilities has done merely establishes empirical facts supporting Kant's finding that judgments of appearances are contingent, and this is all that is meant or can be meant when we say "there do not exist any apodictic judgments that are intrinsically necessary." Put another way, the data of the senses do not carry any intrinsic necessity; the idea of necessity in deductions can be objectively valid only when viewed from the Copernican perspective and in relationship with the categories of understanding. Transcendental necessity *defines what it means to be necessary*. Deductive necessity predicated of judgments of appearances is *made* necessary (necessitated) by the *a priori* laws of the faculty (organization) of understanding. In speaking of the transcendental Ideas of Rational Theology earlier, we use the word "necessary" in the context of *transcendental* necessity. It is this context that requires us to be simultaneously transcendental idealists *and* empirical realists.

From the theoretical Standpoint the regulation of determining judgment by the theological Ideas is a ground establishing the objective validity of Piaget's cognitive structures. From the judicial Standpoint the theological Ideas are the ground for the presentation of knowledge of



Reality in sensibility. Aesthetical judgment is seen from the empirical-judicial perspective as the judgment which composes the organization of sensibility, which in turn makes possible the *symbolic* representation of an intuition. The categories of understanding from the empirical-theoretical perspective are notions of objective coherence in a cognitive structure. The aesthetic *momenta* from the empirical-judicial perspective must be regarded as functions for judgment of aesthetic coherence. As the categories link objective representation to understanding, the aesthetic *momenta* have reference to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, and in this way they also make possible the connection of the feeling of desire with an object of desire.

Earlier we described consciousness as “the representation that a representation is in me.” To be conscious of a representation is to *acknowledge* that representation. The *sine qua non* of this act is presentment in Reality. Our exposition of aesthetical judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective concerns how this presentation is possible. The theological Ideas are dynamical Ideas, and so this exposition will speak to the process and procedure of this presentation insofar as imagination and understanding, and their relationship to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, are concerned.

### Aesthetic Sense

We use the word “sense” in several different ways. One is when we refer to outer sense (seeing, hearing, etc.). Another is when we speak of the form of inner sense (time). Yet another was used in §3 when we referred to the aesthetic *momenta* of Quantity and Relation as “senses of” one kind or another. In most usages, “sense” carries a connotation of awareness of some sort and this connotation bears closer examination. When we speak of “aesthetic sense” we do not refer to the perception of something as sensuous; the word sensuous better denotes here a sensation. Rather, our normative reference must stem from the principle of formal expedience in aesthetical judgment.

If, then, the form of a given Object in empirical intuition stands thus that the *apprehension* of its manifold in imagination comes to agreement with the *presentation* of a concept of understanding (indeterminate of which concept), then in the mere reflexion understanding and imagination so mutually harmonize for the advancement of their business, and the object will be perceived as expedient merely for the power of judgment, hence the expedience itself will be regarded as merely subjective; for which, further, no determinate concept of the Object is at all required nor is one thereby produced, and the judgment itself is no judgment of cognition. - Such a judgment is called an **aesthetic judgment of reflexion** [KANT5c: 23 (20: 220-221)].

It is not required of the phenomenon of perception that all perceptions deliver up the distinct presentation of the appearance of an object. We can experience, for example, a “sense of foreboding” without knowing precisely what it is that troubles us. In a case such as this we can say that we are experiencing something yet nonetheless have no cognitive judgment of what it is

that we experience.

With the perception of an object the concept of an Object in general can be immediately combined, for which the former contains the empirical predicates for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced . . . However, a perception can also be immediately combined with a feeling of *Lust* (or *Unlust*) and a satisfaction which accompanies the representation of the Object and serves it instead of a predicate, and thus an aesthetic judgment, which is not a judgment of cognition, can arise [KANT5c: 168 (5: 287-288)].

Although the representation of an object always implies at least an intuition, the presentation of an Object may be merely subjectively perceived without a synthesis of re-cognition. Such is possible in what we have called a judgment of taste. Kant put it this way:

If it is admitted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with the mere judgmentation of its form, then it is nothing other than the subjective expedience of the same for the power of judgment which we sense combined with the representation of the object in the mind. Now since the power of judgment in regard to the formal rules of judgmentation, without any matter (neither sensuous sensation nor concept), can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the employment of the power of judgment in general (which is restrained neither to the particular kind of sense nor to a particular notion of understanding) and thus to that Subjective which one can presuppose in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognitions in general)<sup>3</sup>, the congruence of a representation with these conditions of the power of judgment can be assumed valid *a priori* for everyone [KANT5c: 170 (5: 289-290)].

This *a priori* validity of the idea of congruence of a representation with the *conditions* of judgment is what we earlier described as the communicability of feelings and sensations. It is the idea of a *common sense* that takes its ground from the principle of formal expedience.

That human beings do in fact experience such objectless consciousness from time to time is a commonplace occurrence. Worry, stress, a sense of well-being and other such descriptions are examples (or at least symptoms) of this phenomenon. It is from this sort of purely subjective experience that we call perceptions of this sort “senses.”

One often gives the name of a sense to the power of judgment when what is noticed is not so much its reflexion as merely its result, and speaks of a sense of truth, a sense for propriety, for justice, etc., although one surely knows - or at least properly ought to know - that it is not a sense in which these ideas have their seat and that this even less could have the least faculty<sup>4</sup> for the pronouncement of universal rules; but rather that a representation of truth, decency, beauty, or justice could never in this way come into our thoughts if we could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher faculty of knowledge [KANT5c: 173 (5: 293)].

It is neither sensation nor sensuous feeling that we mean by the use of “sense” in this manner. It is this perception of a presentment, preceding objective cognition, that constitutes such a “sense.”

---

<sup>3</sup> By “that Subjective” Kant is referring to *Lust* regarded as subjective expedience for the relationship of the faculty of knowledge in judgmentation to a sensuous object in general [KANT5c: 170 (5: 290)].

<sup>4</sup> *Fähigkeit*.

Common sense, then, is to be regarded as “the effect of a mere reflexion on the mind” and the “sense” *per se* is nothing other than a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* combined in sensibility, even though the object of sensibility may be yet undetermined in the synthesis of imagination. In such a case, the formal expedience is merely expedience for judgment, and this expedience has its ground in the free play of imagination and understanding:

Only where imagination in its freedom arouses understanding, and this, without concepts, sets imagination into a regular play, only then representation imparts itself, not as a thought but as the inner feeling of an expedient state of mind [KANT5c: 175-176 (5: 296)].

This, then, is the first factor in presentation: an aesthetic sense arising out of the synthesis in time (apprehension) that foreshadows objective cognition. We said before that one moment in time must be viewed as ‘growing out of’ the previous; one’s first awareness that “a representation is in me” likewise grows out of the presentment of subjective formal expedience in the free play of imagination and understanding. This “growing sense” bespeaks of James’ transitive part of the stream of thought, where judgmentation in understanding does not necessarily include acts of determining judgment (e.g. as in sensorimotor intelligence in the newborn infant).

### Imagination, Understanding, and Aesthetic Idea

In Chapter 8 we defined imagination as “the ability to present<sup>5</sup> an object in intuition, even without its presence.” Because imagination is capable of performing this function even in the absence of the transcendental object affecting sensuous representation as an appearance, the power of imagination must be regarded as not being determined by the data of the senses but, rather, as determining the data of the senses. This is precisely the condition under which we said that a power of mind is a *free* power in our earlier discussions. However, imagination makes no *judgments* and knows no concepts. Its procedure is merely a procedure of schematization in the synthesis of apprehension.

This does not mean that the freedom of imagination is freedom from all interaction with the other ‘organs’ in our anatomy of mind. The cognitive product of imagination – intuition – is a necessary element of cognition and the synthesis of imagination is indispensable to understanding. We earlier drew the distinction between understanding and determining judgment and described understanding from the theoretical Standpoint as “the unity of apperception in regard to the synthesis of imagination” (Chapter 10 §4.2). Understanding is the faculty (i.e. the

---

<sup>5</sup> Kant’s word here was *vorzustellen*, which is “presenting” in the sense of “handing over” a representation. This differs from the idea of *Darstellung*, which is presentation to consciousness. The connotation of the latter is that of representing that a representation is in me; the former denotes the representation that is in me. Imagination “hands over” what it “presents” to determining judgment. Apperception “hands it over” to consciousness.

organizing power) of rules, and these rules ultimately go to the thinking Subject's system of empirical laws that weld together its world-model (Nature). The integrity of this organization depends upon the maintenance of equilibrium in this cognitive structure (and its re-equilibration after a disturbance), and the maintenance of this integrity is called **the principle of conformity to law**.

If the synthesis of imagination worked at cross-purposes to this principle of conformity to law, the end product of such a synthesis would be at odds with the ideal of equilibrium that is commanded by the categorical imperative of pure Reason. As this is the only pure formal purpose of Reason, the principle of formal expedience of Nature (which is the fundamental acroam of reflective judgment) is for imagination a principle of constraint against utter caprice in its representations. If we were building a machine (an "artificial intellect"), we could easily prevent the possibility of such caprice merely by restricting the synthesis of imagination to schematic procedures that could never be capable of coming up with "fantastic" representations not vouched-safe by directly-given data of the senses. This would be little more than Locke's view of human understanding with some gentle mixing in of Leibniz' model (minus any innate ideas of rationalism).

However, if the human mind were so constituted we would be missing one of the most obvious and wondrous properties of imagination: **creativity**. Furthermore, since all *ideas* are to some degree "creative" (because the object of an idea is a *noumenon*), and since it is beyond any doubt that human beings *do* come up with ideas, the phenomenon of creativity is clearly one of the defining properties of the phenomenon of mind. This brings us to an important question: How is creativity possible?

Creativity is a difficult and presently unsolved problem for artificial intelligence research (as well as for the other branches of the field known generally as computational intelligence research). Not the least of the problems faced in this field revolves around the question: What *is* creativity? The dictionary offers the following string of definitions.

**creativity**, *n.*, the state or quality of being creative.

**creative**, *a.*, having the power to create; pertaining to creation; inventive; productive (of); as, a *creative* mind.

**create**, *v.t.*, [L. *creatus*, pp. of *creare*, to make, create; Gr. *krainein*, to accomplish.]

1. to originate; to bring into being from nothing; to cause to exist.
2. to produce; to cause; to bring about; to give rise to; as, hurry *creates* confusion.
3. to invest with new rank, function, etc.; as, to *create* one peer or baron.
4. to portray (a character) effectively for the first time: said of an actor.

**Syn.** - constitute, form, make, occasion, originate, produce, generate.

Many AI (artificial intelligence) researchers focus on the second connotation of the first

definition of “create” given above. Noted AI researcher Margaret Boden regards creativity *per se* as a philosophical issue and as such “not a scientific query.” Boden’s work focuses instead on machine attributes that are capable of behavioral definition and which give the appearance (to someone who is not involved with AI research and who does not know how the machine does it) of “creative activity” by the machine.<sup>6</sup> This is an understandable tactic for AI research, although one thoroughly laced with positivism. As Boden commented:

Creativity is mysterious for another reason: the very concept is seemingly paradoxical. If we take seriously the dictionary definition of creation, "to bring into being or form out of nothing," creativity seems to be not only beyond any scientific understanding, but even impossible. It is hardly surprising that some people have "explained" it in terms of divine inspiration, and many others in terms of some romantic intuition, or insight.<sup>7</sup>

Like Boden, we will leave the idea of “bringing into being or form out of nothing” to the theologians, Leibniz, and the Big-Bang theorists. Any definition of creativity, if it is to have real objective validity, must start from the Copernican hypothesis. Many people draw a distinction between “mere novelty” and “true creativity.” Is such a distinction valid? That is, do novelty and creativity differ in kind? Or is the difference merely one of degree? If any person can be said to be highly and undoubtedly creative in the extreme, it would be the person we commonly call a “genius.” What is a genius? Kant often wrote and lectured on this question.

From this one sees that genius 1) is a *talent* for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a skillful aptitude for that which can be learned according to some rule, consequently that *originality* must be its first property. 2) That since it likewise can give original nonsense, its products must be at the same time models, i.e. *exemplary*; hence, while not themselves arising through imitation, they must yet serve others in that way, i.e., as a standard-gauge or a rule for judgmentation. 3) That it cannot itself describe or register scientifically how it brings off its products, but rather that it gives the rule as *nature*, and hence the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how he finds the Ideas for it, and also does not have it in his control to think up such things at discretion or according to a plan, and to pass on to others such instructions that would put them in a position to produce similar products . . . 4) That by means of genius nature does not prescribe the rule to science but to art, and even to the latter only insofar as it is to be beautiful art.

Everyone agrees that genius is entirely set against the *spirit of imitation*. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, even the greatest aptitude for learning, teachability (capacity) as teachability, still does not count as genius. But even if one thinks or composes for himself, and does not merely take up what others have thought, yes even if he invents a great deal for art and science, this is still not the right ground to call such a great mind a *genius* (in contrast to someone who, because he can never do more than merely learn and imitate, is called a numskull), because even that *could* also have been learned, and thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and contemplation according to rules, and is not specifically distinct from what can be acquired through effort by means of

---

<sup>6</sup> Margaret Boden, "Could a robot be creative - and would we know?" in *Android Epistemology*, K. Ford, C. Glymour, and P. Hayes (eds.), Menlo Park, CA: The MIT Press, 1995, pp. 51-72.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, pg. 52.

imitation. Thus everything that Newton expounded in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy, no matter how great a thinker it took to discover it, can still be learned; but one cannot learn to write gifted poetry, however exhaustive all the instructions of the art of poetry, and however excellent the models for it may be [KANT5c: 186-187 (5: 307-309)].

Kant's description of a genius parallels Boden's description of creativity on several points. But does this description – no matter how much it may seem to so imply at first glance – relegate genius (or creativity) to the mists of the mystical and unexplainable? No. To see why, we must take Kant's argument apart piece by piece and look at it.

The first attribute of genius is originality, a trait that also applies to novelty. By originality Kant simply means that what is produced can not be produced according to a given "determinate rule." This is a key point. The determinate rule of procedure to which he refers is a *maxim* of some sort: First do *this*, then do *that*, then do the next thing and you have it. What Kant is saying is that originality follows no pre-set formula. Such a formula can be represented in the manifold of concepts and put together through the free play of the processes of determining judgment and imagination. Therefore originality involves a cognition that requires more than determining judgment.

Kant's second point is that what is produced is not simple nonsense (e.g., "ghosts are disembodied spirits"). Rather, the end result can be expressed to others (instantiated) and is taken to serve as the basis for imitation by others. It is something that can serve as a standard for comparison, even if the process by which it was produced cannot be so exemplified. In describing Richard Feynman, mathematician Mark Kac once said,

There are two kinds of geniuses, the "ordinary" and the "magicians." An ordinary genius is a fellow that you and I would be just as good as, if we were only many times better. There is no mystery as to how his mind works. Once we understand what they have done, we feel certain that we, too, could have done it. It is different with the magicians. They are, to use mathematical jargon, in the orthogonal complement of where we are and the working of their minds is for all intents and purposes incomprehensible. Even after we understand what they have done, the process by which they have done it is completely dark . . . Richard Feynman is a magician of the highest caliber.<sup>8</sup>

In Kant's description, as in Kac's, the final product – the instantiated model – is still missing something insofar as our ability to dissect and analyze the product to learn how it was produced is concerned.

Kant's third point further bears this out: the genius himself cannot tell us how he did it; that is, he cannot describe for us any algorithm or procedure by which he himself deduced what he has done. Whatever process of judgmentation is involved, there is something in it that is non-cognitive. But that factor we call reflective judgment.

---

<sup>8</sup> James Gleick, *Genius*, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992, pp. 10-11.

This brings us to a point where I think there is a risk of misunderstanding what Kant is trying to say, namely his comment that “nature prescribes the rule.” If we take this too literally – i.e. from a non-Copernican perspective – it sounds as if Kant is owning up to some mystical force or entity outside us that “touches” or “brings enlightenment” to the mind. We imply something very much like this when we speak of having an “inspired flash of insight” into something. By now, however, we should have learned enough about the method of the Critical Philosophy to realize that Kant can mean no such thing.

Nature is the world model one builds in experience. If Nature “prescribes the rule,” this can mean nothing else than that it is the process of understanding *by which we construct Nature* that gives or produces the rule by which a mental act results in a cognition and the Subject’s actions bring this creative product into actuality. The source of this mental act cannot be an inference of induction or of analogy merely. Instead it must be viewed as the ability to bring together diverse representations in an act of synthesis in imagination. One is cognizant only of the final outcome (the cognition of an object) and the synthetic *process* is not made a part of this objective consciousness. We are speaking, of course, to that part of the cycle of thought which is objectively *unconscious*. Freud would have cause to smile here.

Here we would do well to recall our earlier distinction between *clear* and *obscure* representations (Chapter 5 §4.4). An obscure representation is one of which we are not immediately conscious but can become conscious through inferences. A clear representation is one of which we are conscious through apperception. The missing factor – the absence of which in the cognitive product is the basis for our declaring an idea to be “creative” – can be nothing other than an obscure representation arising in the free play of imagination and understanding. This obscure representation requires what Kant, and we, call an aesthetic Idea.

In a word, the aesthetic Idea is a representation of imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in its free use that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows thinking in a concept much that is unnamable, the feeling of which animates the faculty of knowledge, and with language, as the mere letter, binds up spirit<sup>1</sup> [KANT5c: 194 (5: 316)].

Kant goes on to say that genius displays itself through the exposition or expression of aesthetic Ideas [KANT5c: 194-195 (5: 316-318)]. The free play of imagination is bound to no rules *of determining judgment* and this is what Kant means when he says that genius neither follows rules nor imitates a model. From the Copernican perspective an *original object* (a creative idea) can arise in no other way than through an immediate synthesis of previously disconnected partial representations in an *original intuition*. Such an intuition is not the product of an inference of

---

<sup>1</sup> Recall that Kant uses the word “spirit” to mean an animating principle of mind. This principle, in turn, he calls the principle of the capacity for presenting aesthetic Ideas [KANT5c: 192 (5: 313-314)].

analogy (since this inference requires previous object concepts), nor is it the product of an inference of induction (since induction follows a procedure or maxim). Kant gives no name to this act of synthetic judgmentation, but we will call it by the name **ideation**.

How is such a creative act possible? We have previously spoken of representations of imagination in terms of *materia in qua*, *materia ex qua*, and *materia circa quam* in sensibility. As a general class, these *materia* can be called sensations only if the Subject is aware of them and can *strictly* be called sensations only if they are matter in intuition (otherwise we call them feelings to tie them to affective perceptions). In the synthesis in the pure intuition of time, between moments in time marked by reflective judgment, we have no specific name for them other than matter of sensibility. Not all such representations of imagination do or can belong to an intuition, and such representations are not grasped in objective cognition. Nonetheless, there is a role for them.

Now if to a concept were imputed a representation of imagination that appertains to its presentation, but which by itself gives rise to so much to think that it can never be concentrated in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way, then here imagination is creative and brings the capacity for intellectual Ideas (reason) into motion, to wit: at the instigation of a representation it gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be sure, appertain to the concept of the object).

We call those forms which do not make up the presentation of a given concept itself, but only express, as supporting representations of imagination, the consequences connected with it and the affinity of it with others, (aesthetical) attributes of an object whose idea, as an Idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented . . . They . . . give occasion for imagination to spread itself over a multitude of kindred representations . . . and give an *aesthetic Idea*, which serves that Idea of reason in place of logical presentation, although really only to animate the mind by opening up for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of kindred representations [KANT5c: 193 (5: 314-315)].

Here, then, is the ground of the possibility of creative ideation. Synthesis is a dynamical process, and such a process obviously requires representational *materia ex qua* from which its final output is constituted, *materia in qua* of this final output, and *materia circa quam* around which the synthesis nucleates in: 1) representation in an intuition; and 2) presentation in affective perception. When we discussed the categories of understanding in the transcendental-theoretical perspective, we said that these pure notions contain a link to sensibility by which concepts can be summoned into the synthesis of reproductive imagination to take part in the production of an intuition. If they are summoned, something must do the summoning, and this catalyst does not itself become part of the final *materia in qua* of intuition. There is required, in other words, that an *affective* link to the manifold of concepts be possible. This is what the obscure representations of imagination accomplish by serving in the cycle of thought. An aesthetic Idea is a catalyst. We may therefore set down the following *Realerklärung*: **Creativity is the power of the aesthetic Idea to stimulate the process of thinking by summoning concepts from the manifold of concepts into the synthesis of reproductive imagination in such a way that these concepts**



**become partial representations and *materia ex qua* for the synthesis of *productive imagination*.**

It is important for us to note that concepts reproduced in sensibility lose their previous references to phenomena (although not to appearance; the concepts of course remain in the manifold of concepts and retain their previous combinations of determining judgment; it is their re-presentations by imagination that are disassociated from phenomena). This is a process of **analytic judgment**: the breaking down of comparates into parts to let cognitions be made *distinct* through recombination of comparete *materia*. This act does not belong to determining judgment (the functions of which – the categories – are synthetic); it belongs to the dynamical process of the *Gestaltung* of sensibility under aesthetical judgment. *What we view as an analytic judgment from the theoretical Standpoint is the prelude to a synthetic act of reflective judgment* (marking an intuition) *from the judicial Standpoint*. To use a chemistry metaphor, the ‘bonds’ binding the *materia* of reproduced comparates (from prior concepts) are dissolved in the *catalyzing function* of the aesthetic Idea so that a new coalition can be formed in the synthesis of comprehension. Since this re-coalition is a mark of harmony among the processes in perception, the act of analytic judgment (in the empirical-judicial perspective) can be called *the gap-filling function of taste*.

The judgment of taste differs from the logical in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the Object, but the former does not subsume under a concept at all, because otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. All the same, however, it is similar to the latter in that it professes a universality and necessity, though not according to concepts of the Object and hence a merely subjective one. Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (that which pertains to the cognition of the Object), but the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts, it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general . . . This, employed with respect to a representation through which an object is given, requires the harmonization of two powers of representation: namely of imagination (for the intuition and composition of its manifold), and of understanding (for the concept as representation of the unity of this composition). Now since no concept of the Object is here the ground of the judgment, it can subsist only in the subsumption of imagination itself (in the case of a representation through which an object is given) under the condition that understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts. I.e., because the freedom of imagination subsists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating power of imagination in its *freedom* and understanding with its *conformity to law*, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged according to the expedience of the representation (through which an object is given) for the promotion of the faculty of knowledge in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under *concepts* but rather of the power of intuitions or presentations (i.e. of imagination) under the capacity for concepts (i.e. understanding) so far as the former in *its freedom* is in harmony with the latter in *its conformity to law* [KANT5c: 167-168 (5: 286-287)].

To use a biological metaphor, Kant’s idea of taste is a principle of *noetic homeostasis*. Judgments of taste are presentations of an equilibrium between sensibility and the state of understanding, and these presentations are entirely affective presentations. Where the state of the synthesis is

presented as being not in equilibrium (a mental gap, i.e. disharmony between the representing processes), the animating power of the aesthetic Idea serves the pure purpose of Reason, which demands a re-equilibration must be undertaken. This is how the principle of formal expedience is made manifest as this principle applies to *Gestaltung* in sensibility.

### The Function of Aesthetic Idea

Sense, imagination, and apperception are the three subjective sources of knowledge. Now, from what we have just seen above it is clear that the aesthetic Idea must play some role as a factor by which one's knowledge arises. But what objectively valid idea can we have of the aesthetic Idea as such? An aesthetic Idea does not belong to the power of imagination because while it quickens (catalyzes) the synthesis of imagination it is merely a product of imagination. (For this same reason it likewise does not belong to reflective judgment). The aesthetic Idea stimulates obscure representations and therefore cannot belong to apperception because we are unconscious of the aesthetic Idea and its *immediate* effects. This leaves only a place in sense for the aesthetic Idea as a source of knowledge.

Yet this, too, seems a strange placement, for it implies we are to think of an aesthetic Idea as sense that cannot be sensed. We can place the aesthetic Idea in regard to Modality in the faculty of pure consciousness because the aesthetic Idea attaches to the potential for perception. But if it is sense that cannot be sensed, what real validity can be ascribed to it?

The answer is: *practical validity as a function*. Recall that Kant's definition of a function is "the unity of the act of ordering different representations under a common one" (Chapter 8 §2) [KANT1a: 205 (B: 93)]. We have said the synthesis of imagination is bound by the principle of formal expedience to produce intuitions that are expedient for Reason. The judgment of subjective expedience, however, belongs to the process of reflective judgment, and aesthetical judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective pertains to the presentment of Reality in the synthesis of apperception. Unity in apperception is understanding, but both imagination and aesthetical judgment make conscious representation (imagination) and presentation (judgment) at a moment in time. If there is to be unity in apperception, then singular moments in time must have *continuity of connection*. The pure form of the connection is the pure intuition of time. But continuity requires a matter of composition in addition to the form of connection (since there can be no representation without both matter and form; this is our fundamental ILAR of representation we discussed in Chapter 3). An aesthetic Idea is the common representation (matter) that brings unity through the continuity of sensible representations in time, and thus belongs to sense (the capacity to present sensations) as a *material function*.

The synthesis of apperception through aesthetical judgment and the synthesis of imagination

through the *Verstandes-Actus* are quite separate processes when viewed as processes in a merely *logical* division of our mental physiology. But, as this division is merely logical and not a real division, in making this logical structure in *nous* we still require real relationship between these powers of *nous*. The aesthetic Idea as a function serves this role. We can perhaps best illustrate this relationship by employing Kant's classification of the functions of unity in judgment. We presented these functions earlier in this treatise, from the theoretical Standpoint, when we viewed them as logical *momenta* in regard to determining judgment. Now we will look at them again, this time from the judicial Standpoint, as functions of subjective unity in the cycle of thought. Similarly to the case in our earlier discussion, where as logical *momenta* they were functions of *structure* for the manifold of concepts, here the functions of unity in judgment will be functions of the *structural unity* of sense, imagination, and apperception.

We represent the structural unity of the subjective sources of knowledge in 2LAR form as:

**Quantity** (in the form of presentation):

singular	↔	synthetic aggregation	↔	identification
particular	↔	analytic aggregation	↔	differentiation
universal	↔	anasynthetic aggregation	↔	integration

**Quality** (in the matter of presentation):

affirmative	↔	coalition in apperception	↔	agreement
negative	↔	quickenings	↔	opposition
infinite	↔	coalition in thinghood	↔	subcontrarity

**Relation** (in the form of presenting):

categorical	↔	objective perception	↔	the internal as appearance
hypothetical	↔	affective perception	↔	the external Relation in judgment
disjunctive	↔	harmonization	↔	the transitive in thinking

**Modality** (in the matter of presenting):

problematic	↔	awareness without an Object	↔	general idea of the determinable
assertoric	↔	awareness of an Object	↔	general idea of the determination
apodictic	↔	awareness in Reality	↔	general idea of determining factor

We will call this 2LAR **the representation of the presentment of Reality**. Imagination, aesthetical judgment, and the aesthetic Idea, in terms of these empirical-judicial functions of structure, combine in synthesis to make the presentment of Reality, in a first-level synthetic representation (1LSR) form, as:

- 1) imagination = {singular, infinite, categorical, assertoric};
- 2) aesthetical judgment = {universal, affirmative, hypothetical, apodictic};
- 3) aesthetic Idea = {particular, negative, disjunctive, problematic}.

All combination is represented in matter as composition and in form as connection (*nexus*) [Chapter 8, §5.1]. Composition, in turn, is either aggregation (form of the matter) or coalition (matter of the matter); connection is either physical (Relation) or metaphysical (Modality). Let us

see how this general structure of representation is applied to our three sources of knowledge.

In Quantity, imagination as a function is singular because its function is subjective unity in sensibility, i.e. the making of an intuition. Every intuition has extensive magnitude, and the function of imagination here is **synthetic aggregation** – the synthesis of a manifold of elements that do not necessarily belong to each other (the unity in an intuition therefore being necessitated through the synthesis itself and not because of something in the multiplicity of parts that makes them combine necessarily). In Quality, imagination is infinite because the productive imagination, working through the three-step process of the *Verstandes-Actus*, makes a representation of an undetermined object of appearance. This representation in effect is one in which the outcome (intuition) is synthesized by rejection of some of the *materia ex qua* of sensation and the retention of others for the *materia in qua* of the resulting intuition. This *materia in qua*, with the form given it through the pure *a priori* form of sensibility (subjective space and time), coalesces in the representation of an undetermined object of appearance, and this representation symbolizes the object as thing-like. Hence we call this function **coalition in thinghood**. In Relation, imagination's function is categorical: it makes an objective perception that declares the *Existenz* of a transcendental Object. Finally, in Modality imagination is assertoric because in consciousness its representation is awareness of the Object.

The Quantity of aesthetical judgment is universal because it judges the aggregation of sensible representations *a priori* under the principle of formal expedience of Nature and marks the expedient state of representation in Reality (the Idea of Reality being universal) at a moment in time. This is an integrating function of anasynthetic aggregation (the *materia ex qua* from the synthesis of the reproductive imagination is summoned into the process as an analytic judgment; it is recombined in a synthetic judgment). In Quality it is affirmative because it represents as a coalition in agreement with the principle of subjective formal expedience. Aesthetical judgment is hypothetical because in affective perception the connection it makes is not to the represented object but, rather, to desire in the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. In Modality it is apodictic because its connection to consciousness is not awareness of a given object but instead is general apperception in the subjective state, and this connection must be viewed as a necessary real awareness of the *I feel y*.

Finally, sense as aesthetic Idea carries the Quantity of **analytic aggregation**, which is differentiation and thus the particular function. An aesthetic Idea provides the *causatum* for summoning representations from the manifold of concepts, and this act we see as a *rule of recollection*. In Quality the aesthetic Idea is the negative function because the aesthetic Idea is an obscure representation and its role in the intensive magnitude of the composition of sensibility is kinematical. The aesthetic Idea serves for **quickenning** (animating) the cycle of thought and not for contributing directly in a perception. In Relation the aesthetic Idea is the idea of the transitive

in Relation; it connects moments in time through **harmonization** of the faculty of perceptions. Its Modality is problematic because the awareness it brings into being is an awareness without any Object of awareness. Rather, its function here is merely the function of the general idea of the determinable, and the sole expedience of its function is in serving to bring forth determinables possibly suitable for the formal expedience of Nature.

The 2LAR of presentment of Reality thus describes imagination, aesthetical judgment, and the aesthetic Idea as the functions of Reality from the empirical-judicial perspective (the unity of the acts ordering diverse representations under a common one). **Imagination is the function of apprehension of an Object in Reality; aesthetical judgment is the function of apperception of Reality; the aesthetic Idea is the function of continuity in thinking Reality.** The power of imagination presents the *real thing* through the representation of the undetermined appearance of the *Existenz* of the Object. The process of aesthetical judgment presents the *Existenz* of the transcendental Subject. The aesthetic Idea is the continuity function of sense.

Now, the aesthetic Idea is an obscure representation and so is a representation logically prior to yet necessary for the possibility of perception. As was the case previously in our discussion of the validity of the idea of the causality of freedom, we can look for objective validity in the theory of an aesthetic Idea only by grounding the exposition of this idea in the observable phenomena of the Subject. Freud quite explicitly made this point when he first posited “the unconscious”. We looked in brief at some of his arguments in Chapter 5. To these earlier comments we may here add the following:

When all our latent memories are taken into consideration, it becomes totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be gainsaid. We then encounter the objection that these latent recollections can no longer be described as *mental processes*, but that they correspond to residues of somatic processes from which something mental can once more proceed. The obvious answer to this should be that a latent memory is, on the contrary, indubitably a residuum of a mental process. But it is more important to make clear to our own minds that this objection is based on the identification - not, it is true, explicitly stated, but regarded as axiomatic - of conscious and mental. This identification is either a *petitio principii* and begs the question whether all that is mental is also necessarily conscious, or else it is a matter of convention, of nomenclature. In this latter case, it is, of course, no more open to refutation than any other convention. The only question that remains is whether it proves so useful that we must needs adopt it. To this we may reply that the conventional identification of the mental with the conscious is thoroughly unpractical. It breaks up all mental continuity, plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psychophysical parallelism, is open to the reproach that without any manifest grounds it overestimates the part played by consciousness, and finally it forces us to retire from the territory of psychological research without being able to offer us any compensation for it elsewhere.

At any rate, it is clear that the question - whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as unconscious mental states or as physical ones - threatens to resolve itself into a war of words. We shall, therefore, be better advised to give prominence to what we know with certainty of the nature of these debatable states. Now, as far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: no physiological conception nor chemical processes can give us any notion of their nature. On the other hand, we know for certain that they have abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes; on being submitted to a

certain method of operation they may be transformed into or replaced by conscious processes, and all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so forth, can be applied to them. Indeed, of many of these latent states we have to assert that the only point in which they differ from states which are conscious is just in the lack of consciousness of them. So we shall not hesitate to treat them as objects of psychological research, and that in the most intimate connection with conscious mental acts [FREU3: 428-429].

In this lengthy quote Freud – the positivist – makes the argument that “the unconscious” cannot be banished from our model of *conscious* mental processes because without the unconscious the continuity of consciousness falls apart. Since Freud came to this conclusion on the basis of observable phenomena – the behaviors and neuroses of his patients – the grounding of the idea of “the unconscious” (which is, in our current discussion, the same as the grounding of the aesthetic Idea) possesses the necessary objective grounds required for the practical validity of positing the *Dasein* of aesthetic Ideas.

Furthermore, Freud did not leave “emotions” and “feelings” out of these considerations.

We limited the foregoing discussion to ideas and may now raise a new question, the answer to which must contribute to the elucidation of our theoretical position. We said that there were conscious and unconscious ideas; but are there also unconscious instinctual impulses, emotions, and feelings, or are such constructions in this instance devoid of any meaning?

I am indeed of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious does not hold for impulses. An impulse can never be an object of consciousness - only the idea that represents the impulse. Even in the unconscious, moreover, it can only be represented by the idea. If the impulse did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it . . .

We should expect the answer to the question about unconscious feelings, emotions, and affects to be just as easily given. It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness. So for emotions, feelings, and affects to be unconscious would be quite out of the question. But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, *unconscious consciousness of guilt*, or a paradoxical *unconscious anxiety*. Is there more meaning in the use of these terms than there is in speaking of *unconscious impulses*?

The two cases are really not on all fours. To begin with, it may happen that an affect or an emotion is perceived, but misconstrued. By the repression of its proper presentation, it is forced to become connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the expression of this other idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affect *unconscious*, although the affect was never unconscious but its ideational presentation had undergone repression . . . We know that an affect may be subjected to three different viscidities: either it remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different charge of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e., its development is hindered altogether . . . We know, too, that to suppress the development of an affect is the true aim of repression and that its work does not terminate if this aim is not achieved . . . So that, strictly speaking, although no fault can be found with the mode of expression in question, there are no unconscious affects in the sense in which there are unconscious ideas. But there may very well be in system *Ucs*<sup>2</sup> affect-formations which, like others, come into consciousness. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes . . . whilst affects and emotions correspond with processes of discharge, the final expression of which is perceived as feeling. In the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions, we cannot express this difference more clearly [FREU3: 432-433].

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ucs* is Freud’s acronym for “the unconscious.”

There is much here that is important for our exposition of the function of the aesthetic Idea. We must, of course, make allowances for Freud's ill-defined and rather vague terms (ideas, affects, emotions, etc.) since his terminology is not Kant's nor that of this treatise. However, his description still has a direct bearing on the presentment of Reality in the following ways. First, we can see in Freud's distinction between "affects" as conscious representations and his idea of "unconscious ideas" a similarity with our portrayal of the distinction between affective perceptions (which are products of reflective judgment) and the aesthetic Idea in its functional role in the presentment of Reality. Perception *per se*, whether objective or affective, can be applied to sensible representation only at a distinct moment in time. If we replace Freud's "unconscious idea" with our term "representation" and his "emotions and affects" with our term "affective perceptions" the idea being expressed by Freud is congruent with our theory.

But now let us look at Freud's "affect-formations in system *Ucs*" (*Ucs* being Freud's abbreviation for the unconscious). Freud speaks of "ideas" being connected to "affects" and holds that this attachment can take place in a number of ways, one of which is through repression of the "true idea" to which the "affect" has its "true connection" – an expression that we can suppose Freud to have intended to have mean "that to which the affect would have attached if the idea had not been repressed." Whatever arguments we might raise for or against Freud's theory in its particulars, the fundamental idea presupposed in this description is: for any connection of an affective perception with any objective perception to be possible, the unconscious formation must logically antecede the conscious combination of representations. Furthermore, in the synthesis of conscious perception (both affective and objective) we must likewise presume some rule or some schematization through which this perception comes about. This is, of course, precisely the function of the aesthetic Idea in its four moments of representation: recollection in Quantity (analytic aggregation); quickening (animation of the cycle of thought) in Quality; harmonization of the representing powers in Relation; and problematic expedience in Modality (awareness without an Object).

Freud himself comes close to saying this explicitly:

To deal with the positive aspects, we now assert on the findings of psycho-analysis that a mental act commonly goes through two phases, between which is interposed some kind of testing process (censorship). In the first phase, the mental act is unconscious and belongs to the system *Ucs*; if upon the scrutiny of the censorship it is rejected, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be *repressed* and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this scrutiny, it enters upon the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we call the *Cs*. But the fact that it so belongs does not unequivocally determine its relation to consciousness. It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly *capable of entering consciousness*, according to J. Breuer's expression; that is, it can now, without any special resistance and given certain conditions, become the object of consciousness. In consideration of this capacity to become conscious, we also call the system *Cs* the *preconscious*. If it should turn out that a certain censorship also determines whether the preconscious becomes conscious, we shall discriminate more sharply between the systems *Pcs* and *Cs* [FREU3: 431].

What Freud in effect says here is nothing rules out the possibility that *not all* of this unconsciously constructed affect-formation will necessarily come to consciousness. His “testing” or “censorship” process we may recognize as the process of aesthetical judgment, and the “scrutiny” to which this process subjects the unconscious representation can be, under the Copernican hypothesis, none other than judgment according to the principle of formal expedience. The final act of the *Verstandes-Actus* is abstraction; but abstraction only means the *materia ex qua* of sensibility that does not pass muster with the representation of formal expedience is not made part of intuition. Abstraction in no way implies that this rejected *materia ex qua* must necessarily vanish from the process. Indeed, something about this *materia* must have been expedient enough to allow these representations to enter into the three-step synthesis of comparison, reflexion, and abstraction in the first place and to serve it either as *materia ex qua* (comparates) for intuition or as *materia circa quam* of the synthesis itself. But this is precisely what we require of any representation capable of maintaining material unity of representation between moments in time.

#### The Schematic Function of an Aesthetic Idea

Any attempt at a description of the schematizing process of sensibility between moments in time is handicapped by the unobservability (in conscious perception) of this process. James alluded to this in his discussion of the transitive part of the stream of thought. We likewise touched upon this difficulty in Chapter 8 when we discussed the transcendental schemata (especially in our discussion of the schemata of Quality in §3.2). Our exposition of this schematization has only our previous descriptions of the synthesis of imagination through the *Verstandes-Actus* and the rational schematism of the transcendental Ideas to guide us. Consequently, what we present here can only be an operational (practical) picture of the function of the aesthetic Idea.

We must take as the starting point for our exposition some particular moment in time. Reflective judgment has marked this moment and determined the transcendental schemata for the intuition. This determination has set the immediate time-context for the categories of understanding that apply in the determinant judgment of the concept following after the synthesis of re-cognition. The intuition at this moment has extensive and intensive magnitude. The multiplicity in this intuition is composed of those compare representations that have been made *materia in qua* of the intuition.

However, we must also posit the presence of other representations in sensibility (the remaining *materia ex qua* and the *materia circa quam* of the synthesis) that are still part of the matter in the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of apperception. These representations are merely an aggregate and give no representation of an appearance or of a feeling. Now, the



role of the aesthetic Idea is to hold together the synthesis in time between moments and to animate thinking. We cannot say the synthesis of apprehension ceases at the marking of a moment in time, and so we must also allow that additional data of the senses and re-presentations of concepts from the synthesis of reproduction continue to enter in to sensibility as additional *materia* in the aggregation of sense.

The representational *materia circa quam* that holds the synthesis of sensibility together in apprehension can be none other than the matter for the *Gestaltung* of the pure intuition of space<sup>1</sup> while for the synthesis of apperception it is matter for the *Gestaltung* of aesthetical judgment's composition of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, which is an affective perception of the form

{associated satisfaction, coalescence of feeling, interest, *Lust* connection}.

The function of the aesthetic Idea is the maintenance of continuity in the synthesis of sensibility. Its functioning "fills time" but is no time-determination. It is the task of aesthetical judgment, not the aesthetic Idea, to mark a time-determination from the schematism of imagination. Aesthetical judgment acts, in Freud's words, as the "censorship function" in seeing to it that all such time-determinations are expedient to Reason under the principle of formal expedience.

In the continuing synthesis of apprehension, the aesthetic Idea 'grows sense out of' the previous moment in time. As the function of continuity perception, its task is to associate the objective representational matter with the subjective matter. Because this association is not a perception the only means to carry out this function is if the aesthetic Idea acts as to bias the synthesis of apprehension in the direction of the formal expedience judged in the affective perception of the last moment in time. This it must do even if receptivity were to bring in representations of a wholly disjoint and disturbing content (e.g., James' 'thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-abolishing-it' example). Without this function we could have no sense of continuity in time because time, as the pure form of inner sense, is not an object of any possible perception.

If, then, the aesthetic Idea serves to bias the synthesis of apprehension, its function is a schematic function. Because a schematism is necessary for the possibility of experience, it can have no ground in the data of the senses (no copy of reality hypothesis); thus, the schematic function must have a pure and *a priori* ground. This ground we find nowhere else than in the schema of the transcendental Ideas. In regard to the aesthetic Idea as an object of the empirical-judicial perspective, the relevant transcendental Ideas are those of Rational Theology.

**A. Analytic Aggregation and *Entis Realissimi*:** In Quantity, the direction taken by the synthesis of apprehension is that of a search for the Ideal Quantity of the thing-like. Here we

---

<sup>1</sup> We will discuss the pure intuition of space and the synthesis of its formation in Chapter 17.

have three possible directions: direction in favor of identification of an appearance; direction in favor of understanding an object; or direction in favor of complete knowledge in an Object in Nature. For an appearance the process aims at perfecting the clarity of the representation of the intuition, and so tilts toward improvement of aesthetical perfection. For an object, the process aims to understand the intuition as a phenomenon, and so we can say that the bias of the aesthetic Idea in this case tilts toward improvement of logical perfection. In the case of an Object, the process aims at understanding the manifold of phenomena in the totality of an idea. Because an idea serves the power of Reason, and since Reason is fundamentally *practical*, we say that the process is biased toward the improvement of practical perfection.

We have couched this description in terms of what the process ‘aims’ to accomplish. Such an ‘aim’ can be guided only according to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, by which reference we tie the synthesis of imagination to aesthetical judgment. We cannot regard this ‘aim’ as being directed toward some specific thing in Nature; to do so would be to introduce innate ideas into our theory and this is not permitted. Rather, this ‘aim’ has real validity only in terms of satisfaction defined by subjective formal expedience in the representations of the synthesis. *Entis realissimi* from the judicial Standpoint is the Idea of synthesis of all possible *aesthetical* predicates of expedience for happiness (the material purpose of dispositions).

As for the aesthetic Idea, this function affects the synthesis of reproduction as a catalyst for the aggregation of concepts in the *materia ex qua* of the synthesis of sensibility. Metaphorically speaking, the representation in an aesthetic Idea biases imagination by setting up a ‘gateway’ for the synthesis of reproduction through which this synthesis receives the sensible reproduction of concepts, from the manifold of concepts, whose composition of Quantity in this manifold matches this gateway. (Recall that the categories of Quantity are notions of association). The analytic aggregation of an aesthetic Idea is the function of *recollection*, and the process of recollection (real analytic judgment) is a process in the association of representations. Analytic aggregation serves aesthetical perfection of clarity, distinction, or comprehension.

**B. Quickening and *Ens Originarium*:** The Idea of *ens originarium* requires that the thing-like representation of an object contain a notion of the real in appearance (the category of reality) in agreement with a notion of the oneness of an object (category of unity). However, the categories belong to the process of determining judgment and not the synthesis of imagination. The direction set for this synthesis by the aesthetic Idea is in the sorting of the multiplicity in sensible representation according to compatibility with an Ideal of the Quality of thinghood. Now, between moments in time we have no representation of appearance and so compatibility with the real in appearance can be based only upon a standard that accords with the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. Three possibilities are presented here: *Lust* in the materially sensuous; *Lust* in the

materially intellectual; or simply *Lust* in the feeling of satisfaction that attaches solely to the accidental equilibrium in the free play of imagination and understanding. The categories of Quality are notions of compatibility (sensuous in reality, intellective in negation, and equilibrating in limitation), and so the gateway function of quickening favors in the synthesis of reproduction the re-presentation of concepts compatible with the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* according to the Ideal of the original Quality of happiness under *ens originarium*.

It likewise favors the coalition of sensational *materia ex qua* compares in accordance with this same compatibility with feeling. We can describe coalition here as *signification*, which we define as: the representation of that composition of the sensational matter of objective partial representations and aesthetic feeling as matter of desire (*Begehren*) which makes possible the production of other representations. This function underlies the power of designation, although only as aesthetic Quality (not characterization through concepts).

*Facultas characteristic*<sup>2</sup> is the ability to give an example of understanding with certain symbols or to associate representations so that the one becomes the means of the reproduction of the other, and is also called *Facultas signandi*<sup>3</sup>. It is mechanical, *viz.* without effort of power and likewise involuntary [KANT19: 255-256 (29: 887)].

As aesthetic symbolism, the Quality of the aesthetic Idea in relationship to the process of thinking is of the sort that has the flavor of what some psychologists, e.g. Piaget, call “autistic” thought. It is generally accepted in modern day psychology that emotion plays a role in cognition, and this has even led some researchers to talk seriously about “emotional intelligence.” As an example we may quote Salovey, *et al.*

Today great emphasis is placed on the psychological importance of emotion, and it is generally accepted that emotions augment rather than interfere with other cognitive capacities. Emotions certainly have the signaling function identified by Darwin (e.g. Keman, 1984). Moreover, there is wide agreement that emotions are the primary source of motivation - they arouse, sustain, and direct human action (e.g. Izard, 1971; Leeper, 1948; Tomkins, 1962). Finally, many emotion researchers have adopted a broad affect-as-information view, according to which internal emotional experiences provide individuals with important information about their environment and situation. This information shapes the individuals' judgments, decisions, priorities, and actions (e.g. Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).<sup>4</sup>

Neither the aesthetic Idea nor the affective perception of aesthetic judgment is an “emotion” as that term tends to be used in psychology. However, the Quality of an aesthetic Idea is a coalition of sensation that stands as an *aesthetic symbol* for the sensational content of intuitions and concepts in the quickening of the cycle of thought in the synthesis of apperception.

---

<sup>2</sup> Characteristic faculty.

<sup>3</sup> Designating faculty.

<sup>4</sup> P. Salovey, B. T. Bedell, J. B. Detweiler, and J.D. Mayer, "Current directions in emotional intelligence research," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (eds.), N.Y.: The Guilford Press, 2000, pp. 505-506.

**C. Harmonization and *Ens Summum*:** *Ens summum* is the Idea of aesthetic context from the judicial Standpoint. Now, in the synthesis of time-determination sensibility is taking shape, but there are three ways in which sensibility can come to harmonize with the judicial Ideal of happiness according to the Relation among the processes of *nous* as a function of value and interest.

The purpose of all aesthetic perfection is: to bring everything to intuition and to bring these to liveliness. Yet in both cases order and harmonization in an Idea are still necessary [AK16: 133].

Perfection subsists in general in congruence with universal laws (what universally necessarily pleases). . . What sets our powers of mind into a light and strong play is pleasant. What sets them into a harmonious play is beautiful. What at the same time sets the higher powers into a play in tune with sensibility is good [AK16: 135].

We will call the immanent interest presented through the aesthetic Idea the *harmonization in the pleasant* since this is the interest of sense alone. Here we may regard Relation in an aesthetic Idea as harmonization of context in apperception and harmonization of context in apprehension/comprehension. The value interest (in an aesthetic judgment) sets the form of anticipation in sensibility.

The transeunt interest is that which relates the higher powers of *nous* through sensibility, and we may call the function of the aesthetic Idea in this case the *harmonization in the good* in order to recognize by this name the harmonization of the expedience for happiness in aesthetics with expedience for pure Reason in practical actions. The bias this Relation lends to the synthesis of imagination might well be called *the value of good feelings*.

Finally, the reciprocal interest of the aesthetic Idea subsists in the community of this special function with the interests of consciousness in representation, i.e. harmony in perception.

What is essential to beauty subsists in congruence with concepts or at least with the reference to common concepts. Harmony of sensations; hence agreement with understanding. For this is the principle of the unity of all our representations [AK15: 424].

Beauty is the harmony of sensations [AK16: 131].

Beauty is the characteristic of an object or cognition through which the faculty of knowledge is set into a harmonious mood [AK16: 138].

The congruence of sensibility with understanding in a cognition is beauty. Beauty does not rest on sensation, charm, and emotion, for they contribute nothing to cognition. . . The feeling of this harmony of both powers of knowledge constitutes the satisfaction in the beautiful [AK16: 160-161].

This Relation we will call *harmonization in the beautiful*.

**D. Modal Awareness and *Ens Entium*:** Modality in the aesthetic Idea pertains to the “metaphysical direction” taken in the synthesis. By metaphysical direction we mean here the arousal of attention as an effect of the presentment of Reality in the synthesis of sensibility so far

as apprehension and apperception are concerned. Here the Idea of *ens entium* can subsist in nothing other than the general *coherence* in Reality of the sensible representations. We may again regard the synthesis of reproduction in terms of a “gateway” and, like the case in Quality, the biasing function of the aesthetic Idea is based upon reference to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*. In this case, however, the connection of coherence does not pertain to the matter of the synthesis but, rather, to formal expedience in general *viz.* of satisfaction, desire, and happiness.

There is only one formal pure *a priori* purpose of Reason. But, on the other hand, human choices are not pure choices; thus Reason can have a purpose which, while still practical, is not a pure purpose. We must therefore regard modal purposiveness in terms of the transcendental Ideal of Reality. *Ens entium* from the judicial Standpoint is the Idea of perfection of the judicial Ideal of happiness through coherence. Thus, the direction taken by the synthesis is either:

- 1) direction serving the perfection of satisfaction (problematic direction);
- 2) direction serving the perfection of understanding (assertoric direction); or,
- 3) direction serving practical perfection (apodictic direction).

These three orientations speak, respectively, to the *Lust* for aesthetical perfection, logical perfection, and practical perfection. In the cycle of thought the Modality of the aesthetic Idea is the problematic function in perceptions of the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*.

### § 4.3 The *Momenta* of Aesthetic Judgment in Empirical - Judicial Perspective

The aesthetic Idea serves in a kind of “go-between” role as a function in the general synthesis of perceptions. Judgment in apprehension belongs to aesthetical judgment. Our deduction of the *momenta* of aesthetical judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective is aided by a general description Kant provided of the process of imagination.

The unity of apperception in relationship to the capacity of the power of imagination is understanding. Rules.

The unity is analytic in relationship to the reproductive capacity, synthetic in relationship to the productive capacity. The synthetic unity of apperception in relationship to the transcendental capacity of imagination is pure understanding. This transcendental capacity is that which is *a priori* valid generally of all appearances in general determined in regard to time according to rules.

The transcendental synthesis of imagination grounds all our concepts of understanding.

The empirical employment of imagination rests on the synthesis of apprehension of empirical intuitions which likewise can be reproduced or of those which can be made according to analogy to one another. The latter case is productive imagination.

Productive imagination is: 1. empirical in apprehension; 2. pure yet sensuous in regard to an object of pure sensuous intuition; 3. transcendental in regard to an object in general . . . the first set ahead of the second and the second ahead of the third.

The pure synthesis of the power of imagination is the ground of the possibility of the empirical in apprehension, thus likewise of perception. It is possible *a priori* and brings forth nothing but *Gestalten*. The transcendental synthesis of imagination goes merely to the unity of apperception in

the synthesis of the manifold in general through the power of imagination. In this way is thought a concept of an object in general according to the different manners of the transcendental synthesis. The synthesis takes place in time [AK23: 18].

It is easy to misread this handwritten note<sup>5</sup> and assume Kant is saying that the synthesis of imagination is somehow responsible not only for apprehension but for apperception as well. However, this is not the case (as is made evident in *Critique of Pure Reason*). Productive imagination serves apperception only insofar as it produces via intuition the matter of the manifold of concepts put together in the process of determining judgment. Imagination makes no judgments, hence its product – intuition – is a *Gestalt*<sup>6</sup> and the transcendental object represented in this objective perception remains undetermined. Unity in apperception requires not only the *I think* of cognitive consciousness but also the *I feel* of affective perception. As the sole power of judgment at work in the synthesis of sensibility, reflective judgments are also necessary for the possibility of understanding. This is what we will examine in this section.

### Rational Theology and the Transcendental Ideal

We first introduced the metaphysics proper of Rational Theology in Chapter 2 (§7.2) and discussed it further from the theoretical Standpoint in Chapter 4 (§5.1). Because Rational Theology is the title of metaphysics proper that pertains to empirical perspectives, a short discussion of it from the *judicial* Standpoint is in order here.

For Aristotle “theology” meant “the science of that which is eternal, immovable, and separable.” In the Critical Philosophy, Rational Theology is the matter of the form of metaphysics proper and its Object is Reality. As we said in Chapter 2, it is concerned with *a priori* principles for the regulation of mental structuring which, among other things, make possible the mental ability to construct what Piaget calls a “system of values.” It concerns the Idea of a *necessary* natural order in cognitions of Nature, although this Idea is only that of a regulative principle and not an innate idea of what this natural order is to be prior to experience. It provides a compass for Reason in the employment of the powers of understanding, and we call this compass the *transcendental Ideal*. Because the transcendental Ideal is not an innate idea (rationalism) nor can it be completely exhibited in sensibility, its objective validity is tied to the process of perfection in general.

---

<sup>5</sup> The Academy vol. 23 contains Kant's *handschriftlicher Nachlaß* or "handwritten remains." It is a publication of various loose notes left behind by Kant and published after his death.

<sup>6</sup> The word *Gestalt* has no exact English equivalent, which is why Gestalt psychology prefers to use the German word rather than an "inadequate" translation. *Gestalt* primarily implies a unified whole, or a complete structure, or a totality of some sort. English words that are sometimes used to render it include form, configuration, shape, essence, and manner. It is a tenet of Gestalt psychology that "the whole (i.e. the *Gestalt*) is different from the sum of its parts." Kant, of course, predates Gestalt psychology by more than a century.

In speculative Reason the principles of Rational Theology regulate the processes of reasoning in the direction of attempting to reach absolutely unconditioned knowledge. We said earlier that this regulative direction is exhibited in the phenomena of curiosity and “the drive to know.” The principle of Rational Theology pertains to the possibility of thinking about objects in a manner congruent with Reason’s appointed task of seeking the unconditioned in representation. This principle is a principle of the thoroughgoing determination of objects by their concepts, and this is a pure principle of Reason. This thoroughgoing determination involves the making of transcendental affirmations and negations of the content of representations. The former denotes ‘being something’ while the latter denotes ‘not-being something.’ The transcendental substratum of this principle is the Idea of all possible predicates that could be made of an object. Reality in general is the Idea of an All of Reality or *omnitudo realitatis*.

From the theoretical Standpoint, the transcendental Ideal is the standard gauge of pure Reason for the employment of our powers of understanding. It is an Ideal of the *perfection* of knowledge. The theological Ideas provide the theoretical representation of the transcendental Ideal (in terms of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality). If, however, the transcendental Ideal is the Ideal of perfection of knowledge from the theoretical Standpoint, what is it from the other two Standpoints? To understand this, let us recall Kant’s three interests of pure Reason. These are: 1) What can I know? 2) What should I do? and 3) What may I hope? These interests align with the theoretical, practical, and judicial Standpoints, respectively.

We briefly discussed the ideas of hope and hoping in Chapter 10 (§2, 3). We said there that hoping is directed at happiness and that the idea of hope is tied to the idea of an aim or purpose, i.e. tied to an outcome which is “hoped for.” This, in its turn, ties the idea of happiness to the principle of formal expedience of Nature, this time with expedience taking up a close association with an idea of “purposiveness.” The transcendental Ideal from the theoretical Standpoint is an Ideal of perfect knowledge; from the judicial Standpoint, and with respect to reflective judgment in particular, the transcendental Ideal is an Ideal of perfect *happiness*. It is in this context that we must examine the theological Ideas in the judicial Standpoint.<sup>1</sup>

From the judicial Standpoint happiness is “the consciousness of a rational being of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole *Dasein*” (Chapter 13, §7.2). With regard to practical acts of the Organized Being, the practical Standpoint takes in the idea of happiness only through the principle of happiness: An Organized Being’s disposition to act on the basis of the matter of desire is a principle of practical Reason. With regard to the judicial

---

<sup>1</sup> In a similar fashion, when we look at the transcendental Ideal from the practical Standpoint, it is an Ideal that pertains to the law of pure practical Reason, i.e. the categorical imperative. Thus, from the practical Standpoint the transcendental Ideal is the Ideal of perfect *realization* of the requirements of the categorical imperative.

Standpoint, the transcendental Ideal is a standard for the determining of the manifold of Desires in relationship to appetite, and happiness is a judicial Ideal. However, a manifold of Desires requires matters of desire, the presentation of which is the job of aesthetical judgment. It is in this context that we apply the theological Ideas in the empirical-judicial perspective.

### The Theological Ideas and Aesthetic *Momenta* of Judgment

**A. *Entis Realissimi* and Aesthetic Quantity:** The term *entis realissimi* translates literally as “most real of being.” In the Critical Philosophy ‘being’ is not a real predicate and does not denote the thing-like. Rather, ‘being’ is a verb and signifies a particular state of *Existenz*. To be real requires a concept of the object in combinations with other concepts that provide context and a link to the-real-of-sensation. The Idea of *entis realissimi* is the Idea of how we must answer the question: What does it mean to make a predication “to be X”? *Entis realissimi* is the Idea that all real objects must have some “essential structure.” This applies to both the concepts that *represent* them and to the affective perceptions that *present* them.

Now, we must exercise a certain caution in how we regard the term “structure” in the context of the empirical-judicial perspective. For example, Piaget’s theory holds that “affectivity” does not form structures, and in the correspondence between our theory and Piaget’s theory, affective perceptions must surely correspond in some fashion to Piagetian affectivity. The latter, we recall, was described by Piaget as “a term that includes feelings, properly so-called, as well as the various drives or tendencies including ‘higher tendencies’ such as the will.” Piagetian affectivity is closely tied to observable behaviors and is regarded as serving a functional role, e.g. as an “energetic.” A Piagetian structure, on the other hand, is a system of self-regulating transformations whose laws preserve the totality of this system even as the system is altered by accommodation and grows through assimilation.

The property of “essential structure” contained in the Idea of *entis realissimi* is an idea of “structure” used in a different sense than that of Piaget. With regard to cognitions and the theoretical Standpoint, the Piagetian structure is analogous to the Kantian Object. Affective perceptions are non-cognitive (which means among other things that these perceptions have no object that they represent) and in this sense we can agree with Piaget that affective perceptions are not Piagetian structures. Nonetheless, affective perceptions are judgments made in the process of reflective judgment and, as such, they do make *combinations*. They unite sensibility and apperception, and this uniting is a *conjunctio*<sup>2</sup> in the general sense of that word. Thus aesthetic

---

<sup>2</sup> Kant paired the German word *Verbindung* (combination) with the Latin word *conjunctio* (which means “the act of joining together” and from which we get our English word “conjunction”). The word *conjunctio* also is used to refer to the “union” or “bonding” formed by this “joining together.”



combination does *have a structure* in the sense that our representation of an aesthetic judgment has Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality.

Aesthetic judgments are not “predications” in the manner in which that term is used in formal logic, nor in the sense in which we use that term in the transcendental logic of the theoretical Standpoint. However, in the older sense of the word – *prædico*: to proclaim to be; to designate as – we can say that affective perceptions *are like* predications inasmuch as for acts of aesthetical judgment they stand in the place of logical predicates. Kant alluded to this, as we saw earlier, when he commented that an affective perception “serves as a predicate” for aesthetical judgment. Aesthetic judgments present the subsumption of imagination under the *condition* of understanding (i.e. the condition that cognition must advance from intuition to concepts). From the empirical-judicial perspective, *entis realissimi* is the Idea of what is “essential” for expedience in this subsumption of imagination under the condition of understanding.

Now, what is “essential” here must be something that “gets to the essence” of the *quantitative* expedience of the representations of sensibility for the condition of understanding. Expedience in aesthetic judgment is expedience for *happiness* insofar as the presentation made to empirical apperception is the presentation of the matter of desire (*Begehren*), and this presentation as Quantity has nothing else to which it can pertain other than to the form of what is being sensibly represented. In terms of transcendental topic (identification, differentiation, and integration) and the functions of Quantity, this gives us:

**The subjectively singular** in the mere perceiving, i.e. the *private satisfaction* in the sensation;

**The subjectively particular** in the intuition, presented as the *particular satisfaction* combined with an object of desire; and,

**The subjectively universal** in the satisfaction presented in the general state of *Existenz*, which we may call the sense of *general satisfaction*.

These are the aesthetic *momenta* of Quantity in aesthetic judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective. They present the form of satisfaction or dissatisfaction attributed to representations of sensibility. To give *empirical* names to these *momenta*, we will call them, respectively, **private satisfaction**, **particular satisfaction**, and **general satisfaction**. (It is to be understood that these satisfactions can also be perceived negatively as *dissatisfactions*).

**B. *Ens Originarium* and Aesthetic Quality:** *Ens originarium*, as the Idea of the Quality of thinghood, is that transcendental Idea which regards all real things as limitations set out against the background of an unlimited Reality that Reason must presuppose as a ground for the reality of

all specific things. The individual thing-in-Reality is defined by transcendental affirmations of what-the-thing-is combined with transcendental denials of what-the-thing-isn't. We discussed this in Chapter 9 (§5.2) when we discussed the *orientation* of thinking. Here we recall Kant's comment,

Because reason needs to presuppose reality as given for the possibility of all things, and regards differences in things only as limits through negations attached to them, it sees itself necessitated to lay as a primitive ground one single possibility, namely that of an unlimited essence, and to regard all others as derived [KANT12a: 11fn (8: 137-138fn)].

The Ideal of this primitive ground – that is, the Idea of this “one single possibility” to which is referred the *Dasein* of every thing – is a transcendental Ideal. *Ens originarium* is the Idea of the matter of the matter (Quality) of this Ideal.

We applied the principle of *ens originarium* to the *Realdefinition* of the categories when we considered *ens originarium* from the empirical-theoretical perspective. When we turn to the empirical-judicial perspective, our orientation shifts from notions of real objects to the ground of the merely subjective in aesthetic judgments of the expedience of sensibility, with the difference that now, instead of judging the Quality of Reality in appearances as objects, we are concerned with the presentation of the *Existenz* of the Organized Being's state of happiness (the original Quality in affective state-of-being). The feeling of expedience for happiness – what we call the feeling of desire – is necessary even for any specific act of exercising of the power of thinking.

Reason feels not; it realizes its lack and effects through the impulse for knowledge the feeling of a need [KANT12a: 12fn (8: 139fn)].

The *momenta* of Quality in aesthetical judgment are the functions for what is subjective in a presentation of *Existenz* in Reality. In terms of transcendental topic (agreement, opposition, subcontrarity) and the functions of unity in subjective Quality, this gives us:

**The subjectively affirmative:** transcendental affirmation of sensation as expedient for happiness (as *Lust*) or expedience for unhappiness (as *Unlust*);

**The subjectively negative:** transcendental denial of expedience for happiness, i.e. the presentation of a *lack* (*Lust*) or a *need* (*Unlust*);

**The subjectively infinite:** affirmation (*Lust*) or denial (*Unlust*) of a non-lack, i.e. the feeling of real satisfaction (*Wohlgefallen*) or dissatisfaction (*Mißfallen*).

The subjectively infinite requires a further comment. Kant's *Wohlgefallen* is “satisfaction” in a peculiar and limited sense. The connotation of *Wohlgefallen* is not a flat affirmation, e.g. “I feel satisfied.” Rather, its connotation is that which in English we express as, e.g., “Oh, this is not-

bad.” *Wohlgefallen* thus carries the connotation of the infinite function because this function is the synthesis of the affirmative ( $x$  is  $y$ ) and the negative ( $x$  is-not  $y$ ). Subcontrarity is the expression of “ $x$  is not- $y$ ” and this is precisely the flavor of *Wohlgefallen*. We similarly describe the flavor of *Mißfallen* as, “Oh, this is not-good.”

Happiness is the feeling of the promotion of (mental) life; unhappiness is the feeling of a hindrance or impediment to life. Thus, when the Quality of aesthetic judgment is negatively perceived (i.e. when it is combined as the feeling of *Unlust* rather than that of *Lust*), the subjectively affirmative is the feeling of expedience for unhappiness (which is inexpedience for happiness) in sensation. The subjectively negative in the case of *Unlust* is felt not so much as a mere lack but, rather, the feeling of an unfilled *need*. (Kant’s word, *Mangel*, can have either of these connotations, lack or need, depending on context. Need *per se* is *Bedürfnis*, but the feeling of this need is *Mangel* in the context of the feeling of *Unlust*).

**C. *Ens Summum* and Aesthetic Relation:** *Ens summum* is the Idea of absolute unity of context in Reality. Every thing is known through transcendental affirmations and denials that delimit the thing in its relationships in Nature. From the theoretical Standpoint unity of context is achieved through the series of conditions. From the judicial Standpoint cognitive context is accompanied by presentation in affective perception. The empirical-judicial perspective of *ens summum* is a regulative principle of reflective judgment that states: unity of context in affective perception is presented as a feeling of desire (*Begehren*) under the condition that this perception be connected in a manifold of Desires, thereby giving it **aesthetic context**.

In Chapter 12 (§2.3) we described desire as the presentation of the state of a possible satisfaction or dissatisfaction connected as a condition for acting to produce this satisfaction in actuality. From the practical Standpoint, Desire (*Begehren* + *Begehrung*) is the representation of affective perception as a possible determination of appetitive power. *Begehren* (desire) is the composition in aesthetical judgment that stands as the anticipation of a connection between feelings and objects.

Such a presentation of association is Relation under the regulation of *ens summum*. In terms of transcendental topic (the internal, the external, and the transitive Relations) and the functions of subjective Relation we have:

**The subjectively categorical:** desire (*Begehren*) as *Sache*-desire, i.e. a sense of desire symbolized by anticipation of the *Existenz* of a *Sache*-thing;

**The subjectively hypothetical:** desire as *Unsache*-desire, i.e. a desire *to take action*;

**The subjectively disjunctive:** desire for a state of being (*Existenz*) expedient to a *general* state of happiness; this *momentum* we will call sense of Ideal-desire.

The third *momentum* is the synthesis of the first two and presents desire simultaneously in terms of both the recognizable act and the object of that act. *Sache*-desire makes an object a symbol for a possible appetite. *Unsache*-desire presents an action as the symbol for a possible appetite. Ideal-desire presents the affective harmonization of object and act united as the symbol for a possible appetite. *Sache*-desire symbolizes desire in a *Sache*-thing; *Unsache*-desire symbolizes it in a scheme of action; Ideal-desire symbolizes it *in an idea of a tenet of Reason*.

**D. *Ens Entium* and Aesthetic Modality:** *Ens entium* is the Idea of complete coherence in Reality. In empirical-theoretical perspective, this is coherence in the manifold of appearances. In empirical-judicial perspective it is coherence in the judicial Ideal. The Idea of *ens entium* in empirical-judicial perspective, as the regulative principle for the matter of the form of the judicial Ideal, is the standard for perfection of happiness. *Ens entium* in any perspective is the Idea of anchoring representations in Reality, but in the judicial Standpoint these representations are affective perceptions and for these the anchor in Reality is subjective formal expedience viewed *purposively* in terms of happiness. Thus perfection of the Ideal of happiness is coherence of satisfaction, expedience, desire, and the binding of these in the Ideal. The *momenta* of judgment under this standard are:

**Subjectively problematic** as the feeling of a desire, the symbolized object of which *might be* expedient for happiness;

**Subjectively assertoric** as the feeling that the symbolized object of desire *is* expedient for happiness; or

**Subjectively apodictic** as the feeling that the symbolized object of desire is *necessary* for happiness.

The symbolism in aesthetic judgments from the empirical-judicial perspective constitutes an **objectivity function** insofar as coherence and context with regard to the state of happiness for the Organized Being is presupposed in the idea of an object of desire. The apodictic *momentum* can therefore be called **the feeling of rightness or wrongness**. The assertoric *momentum* can be called **the feeling of liking or disliking**. The problematic *momentum* can be called **the feeling of hope or hopelessness**.

It is worth re-emphasizing that the aesthetical *momenta* are not cognitions. They are only functions for affective judgment. Thus, when we refer to the feeling of rightness or wrongness, we are not implying a conscious *thought*, e.g., “This is wrong.” We are referring to merely and only the perception of a feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* in the determination of the matter in a possible appetite. Affective perceptions do “color” the apperception of an object of intuition, but they are

not made part of this intuition.

## § 5. Summary of the Functions of Aesthetic Judgment

We have examined the *momenta* of aesthetical reflective judgment from both the transcendental-judicial and the empirical-judicial perspectives. The first perspective deals with the relationship of affective perception to the Subject and does so in terms of affect insofar as the noetic faculty is concerned. In particular, the transcendental-judicial perspective deals with what we might call the “mechanics” of perception. Aesthetical judgment in this perspective is viewed in terms of the determination of the transcendental schemata of imagination, which set how an intuition will be conceptualized for determining judgment. This perspective also speaks to the “energetics” and “values” (in Piaget’s terminology) of affectivity, and these ideas point to the *form of attention* aroused in the presentations of sensibility. We may here recall James’ view of attention as the mental phenomenon concerned with selectivity, interest, and concentration; the transcendental-judicial perspective deals with the ground of the possibility of this phenomenon.

The empirical-judicial perspective concerns the *possibility of symbolism*. The objective perception of an intuition is *made symbolic* by the four-fold form of the judgment (Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality) of affective perception that accompanies it. The symbolism vested in the intuition by the *nexus* in aesthetical judgment is nothing else than the *objectivity function* for intuition, and this investment is represented by the form of the *I feel y* judged by aesthetical reflective judgment. Objectivity in general under the Copernican hypothesis can take its *Realerklärung* only from the context and coherence-in-the-context of noetic representations. The starting point of all relationships of objectivity can begin nowhere else but in the process of perception, and aesthetical judgment is above all else the power of *nous* to make *perceptions* from the mere representations of sensibility.

We summarize the *momenta* of aesthetic judgment in the following table.

### Quantity:

The **subjectively singular** *momentum* is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of culmination in perception, which is the presentation of a state of equilibrium in the free play of imagination and understanding in the synthesis of apprehension;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the sense of a private satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the mere sensation of the affective perception.

The **subjectively particular** *momentum* is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of continuity in the synthesis of apprehension, which presents the state of sensibility with regard to expedience for the dispositions of the Subject;

- from the empirical-judicial perspective the presentation of a particular satisfaction combined with an object of desire.

The **subjectively universal momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of belief or unbelief, which is the affective perception of a state of harmony (or disharmony) among all three powers of objective representation (imagination, understanding, and reasoning);
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the presentation of a general satisfaction in the Subject's entire state of *Existenz*.

### Quality:

The **subjectively affirmative momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of material sensuous *Lust* or *Unlust* as the sensuous element of desire, which we call the feeling of pleasure or displeasure;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the transcendental affirmation of a feeling of sensuous expedience for happiness.

The **subjectively negative momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of material intellectual *Lust* as the intellectual element of desire, which we call the feeling of sublimity;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the transcendental denial of expedience for happiness as the presentation of a lack or need.

The **subjectively infinite momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of a state of equilibrium as the harmony in the state of the representative powers, which we call the feeling of beauty;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the unanticipated presentation of a feeling of real satisfaction or dissatisfaction (*Wohlgefallen* or *Mißfallen*) through negation of *Lust per se*.

### Relation:

The **subjectively categorical momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of immanent interest as a sense of value vested in an object subjectively judged as formally expedient in itself for a pure purpose of Reason;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective a *Sache*-desire symbolized by anticipation of the *Existenz* of a *Sache*-thing.

The **subjectively hypothetical momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of transeunt interest as value vested in the form of connection of the manifold in sensibility in succession in time and subjectively judged as formally expedient in the realization of a desire;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the sense of *Unsache*-desire symbolized by an action anticipated to realize a satisfaction in an aesthetic context.

The **subjectively disjunctive momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the sense of reciprocal interest as value vested in a form of the manifold of sensibility insofar as this manifold is subjectively judged as formally expedient in coexistence with the Subject's affective state as matter for an empirical purpose of Reason;

- from the empirical-judicial an Ideal-desire as a state of being (*Existenz*) expedient to a general state of happiness symbolized in an idea of a tenet of Reason.

**Modality:**

The **subjectively problematic momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of tendency as presentment of the possibility of a satisfaction of the condition of formal subjective expedience;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the feeling of hope/hopelessness, the symbolized object of which is judged possibly expedient for happiness.

The **subjectively assertoric momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of presentment as the focus (*Lust*) or ignorance (*Unlust*) in apperception of an actual perception;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the feeling of liking/disliking for a symbolized object of desire judged actually expedient to happiness.

The **subjectively apodictic momentum** is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective the feeling of accord or discord with the general conditions of equilibrium;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective the feeling of rightness/wrongness for a symbolized object of desire judged necessarily expedient for happiness.

These *momenta* are the functions of subjective perception for conscious presentation. Before drawing this Chapter to a close, we have only a few loose ends to tie up.

The first of these concerns what might seem to be the dual nature of these *momenta*. Each of these functions can present either as a feeling of *Lust* or as a feeling of *Unlust*, yet the *Realerklärung* given above contains no rule for determining which case it is to be. To understand this, we must bear in mind that these *momenta* speak merely to combination in the presentation of affective perception and not the matter *in* sensibility. The matter *in* any affective perception is *feeling*, and it is *in* the specific affective perception wherein the sensuous relationship between perception and *psyche* (the power of *Lust* and *Unlust*) subsists. The situation here is analogous to that which we encounter with an intuition. For example, the intuition of the appearance of green grass differs from that of brown grass only in the sensation of the color. In a like manner, a pleasant perception one might enjoy from being in the sunlight differs from an unpleasant perception of the same (e.g. when one is experiencing sunburn) merely in the matter of what one feels. The *material* unity in presentation subsists in its relationship to *psyche's Lust* and *Unlust*.

Sensation as the idea of a general Object is *a priori* only inasmuch as every representation requires matter as well as form. However, knowledge of any *specific* matter of sensation can be discovered only in experience and its study belongs to realm of empirical science rather than to the realm of metaphysics. We call sensation in an affective perception *feeling in the narrow sense*, although Kant might have better named this “affective sensation” (in distinction from objective sensation). In *Critique of Judgment* Kant wrote:

In the above explanation, however, we understand by the word "sensation" an objective representation of the senses; and in order to not always run the risk of being misinterpreted, we will call that which must always remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot make up a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of "feeling." The green color of the meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but the pleasantness of the same belongs to *subjective* sensation, through which no object is represented: i.e. to feeling, through which the object is regarded as an Object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it) [KANT5c: 92 (5: 206)].

When referring to the matter of sensuous representations, we will adopt the convention of distinguishing the matter of an affective perception from that of an objective perception by calling the former "affective sensation" and the latter merely "sensation" when the context is clear, and "objective sensation" when the context is not so clear. Thus, affective sensation is feeling in the narrow sense" of the word "feeling."

The effect of affective sensation on the state of the Subject is tied to our earlier idea that the Subject possesses particular innate dispositions. In Chapter 13 (§8.2) we described innate disposition as *elateres animi* (drivers of mind), an idea by which we mean that we must presuppose the *Dasein* of a rule through which affective sensation can be a ground of determination of the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. (The term "innate disposition" we borrow from Damasio, whose theory of innate dispositions arises from his empirical research). Because we can discover the nature of *specific* affective sensations and their corresponding rules of disposition only through experimental science (neuroscience and neuropsychology) and yet we must connect these empirical discoveries with the organization of *nous* in order to view them in terms of mental physics, the topic of affective sensation and disposition belongs to that part of our Organized Being model we call *psyche*, which is the bridge between *soma* and *nous*. Here we can say that some affective sensations correspond to a rule of disposition under which the affective perception is positively perceived (i.e. is perceived as a feeling of well-being), while others are negatively perceived (i.e. perceived as a feeling of ill-being). We will have more to say on this subject in Chapter 15.

Another loose end we must tie off here is this: we have delivered up our *Realerklärung* of aesthetical reflective judgment only in terms of two of the four branches of our metaphysics proper. Our examination here has been carried out under the perspectives of Rational Psychology and Rational Theology. What about Rational Physics and Rational Cosmology?

Here we must bear in mind that aesthetical judgment and teleological judgment are distinguished merely as the two logical divisions of one power of judgment, namely *reflective* judgment. Like Janus, reflective judgment has two faces. One looks toward sensibility and the representation and presentation of affective perceptions. Affective perception is the presentation of the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*, and the affectivity of these perceptions is that which we call



desire in the context of *Begehren*. Rational Psychology is the matter of the matter of Critical metaphysics proper and concerns objects of inner sense. Rational Theology is the matter of the form of Critical metaphysics proper and concerns objects of Reason insofar as these objects are merely metaphysical objects (ideas of *noumena* in the context of *pure* reasoning). Between these two branches of metaphysics proper, we completely cover the theory of desire as matter for the principle of happiness.

When we turn to the topic of teleological reflective judgment, we move from the matter of desire (*Begehren*) to the form (*Begehrung*), i.e. **desiration**. Desiration is the idea of the form of a possible determination of appetitive power. Here again we find two types of objects. The first type consists of objects of outer sense. But because the process of teleological judgment “faces toward” practical Reason and is not immediately concerned with the representation of objects in cognition, the object of outer sense falling under teleological reflective judgment is *soma*. Rational Physics in the context of reflective judgment is the metaphysics proper of this relationship insofar as reflective judgment and the *psyche* of Organized Being are combined.

The second type of object consists of objects of the connection of reflective judgment to the practical power of *nous*. All ideas of *noumena* (and objects such as ‘motivation’ are *noumena*) ground the objective validity of their *Dasein* in the practical. Reflective judgment, as the bridge between sensibility and practical Reason, is a process that can be viewed on the side of practical Reason only in terms of the possibility of the *practical* in the connection of sensibility with Reason and this only in terms of the pure *form* of this *nexus*. Rational Cosmology is the form of the form of Critical metaphysics proper, and thus what it addresses in reflective judgment is its teleological character.

Aesthetical judgment is the *matter* of the process of reflective judgment. Our analysis of the reflecting power of judgment in this Chapter has netted us a 2LAR of aesthetical judgment. Teleological judgment is the *form* of reflective judgment. We may anticipate now that our analysis of teleological judgment will likewise culminate in a 2LAR of this process of judgment. But reflective judgment as a whole consists of both parts, and so we can likewise anticipate that *its* analytic representation will be a three-level representation (a 3LAR<sup>1</sup>). The task which lies immediately ahead of us in the next Chapter is to elucidate the *transition* from sensibly oriented aesthetical reflective judgment to practically oriented teleological reflective judgment. To make this transition, we must come to grips with an idea we have been making heavy usage of but have not yet adequately explained. We must ask and answer: What is *Lust*?

---

<sup>1</sup> Palmquist has also proposed an analytic structure which he calls a 3LAR [PALM3: 402-404]. Our use of this term differs from his.