

Chapter 12

The Standard Gauge of Perfection**§ 1. The Idea of Perfection and its Role**

The topic of perfection is one that was quite lively in Kant's day but has today dropped almost entirely out of sight except among moral philosophers. How are we to understand the idea of perfection and how, if at all, does this idea have a legitimate scientific use? These are the basic questions with which this textbook on the principles of mental physics draws to its close.

The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy defines "perfect" as an adjective meaning "not lacking in any respect, complete." This connotation of perfection as completion is nearly as old as philosophy itself and, in one form or another, is found in all the major metaphysical systems that have been set forth over the centuries, including Kant's Critical philosophy. We have seen that all the transcendental Ideas are in one way or another Ideas of completeness in the context of *making* something complete. The transcendental Ideas are regulative principles for the organizing, orienting, and regulating of all acts of *nous*. This puts perfection in an active but mediate role, namely that of the direction set by regulation of the acts of the Organized Being under the transcendental Ideas. **Perfection is entire completeness of or in something.**

Getting more specific, the relevant question facing us is, "How does an act of regulation by Reason under the transcendental Ideas lead to more completeness of structure in an Organized Being?" It takes no great flash of insight to recognize that such an ability must require the Organized Being to possess among its capacities some sort of norms with a standard gauge against which progress toward completeness can be assessed. A **norm** is a rule for determination of actions or behaviors. A **standard gauge of pure Reason** is a condition for determining when expedience or inexpedience for the categorical imperative is being presented in the process of judgmentation in general. The primary Critical definition of a **rule** is: an assertion made under a general condition. The possibility of Reason acting to regulate all non-autonomic actions of the Organized Being necessitates the presence within the overall capacities of *nous* of some sort of norm or norms *a priori*, without which acts of judgmentation in general could not happen. It equally requires the Organized Being to be in possession of some sort of standard gauge *a priori* that provides the condition or conditions under which the invocation of a norm is determined. This is the Critical context for the idea of perfection.

The *normative* Critical definition of perfection is the idea in general of entire completeness of or in something. In this context, philosophers usually speak of different specific kinds of perfection, all of which can be brought under one of three types. The first of these is

transcendental perfection. **Transcendental perfection is completeness of the whole and mutual harmony and connection of the whole.** This definition states an Ideal of pure Reason, i.e., it is an idea of "something to aim for" underlying all acts of pure Reason. The Organized Being does not possess an innate idea of such a thing *per se*, but the capacities of *nous* can one and all be regarded as capacities for *acting to perfect* in such a way that the overall structure of the Organized Being is slowly driven in the direction of attaining transcendental perfection overall. Seen in this light, transcendental perfection is the essence of *structuring*.

The second common brand of perfection used by philosophers is metaphysical perfection. **Metaphysical perfection** means completeness with regard to the highest degree of Reality. However, we possess no meaningful concept of such a highest degree and there is no standard by which metaphysical perfection can be judged. The third brand of perfection used by philosophers is physical perfection. **Physical perfection** means complete sufficiency of empirical representations. However, all empirical representations are contingent and so from the theoretical Standpoint there is no ground for presuming any real knowledge of physical perfection is attainable. Of the three brands of perfection, only transcendental perfection has objectively valid usage in Critical metaphysics and this usage is a relative, not an absolute, usage.

The Critical context of transcendental perfection places a strict limitation on its real objective validity. The only objective validity found for the idea of transcendental perfection is practical objective validity, i.e. objective validity vested solely and entirely in the *use* made of this idea. Perfection cannot be regarded, with objective validity, as any faculty or process of *nous*. Rather, its objectively valid role is *functional* and as such this role falls within the idea of transformations in the Self-structuring of the Organized Being. **A transformation is an action in which one representation is changed into another representation.** Structure in *nous* is effected by self-regulating transformations. These transformations, however, are such as to justly be called first-order transformations because they are under superior regulation by the transcendental Ideas.

Now, no capacity of *nous* can be a lawless capacity. Every capacity, regarded as part of the functional invariant of organization, must have its own local rules of determination, and this is where the idea of transcendental perfection finds its home. Acts of judgment require their norms and standards for the determinations of the making of these judgments. The processes of judgment occupy the place of Relation in the faculty of pure consciousness and so the idea of perfection finds a natural division in terms of the Standpoints that govern our three specific types of processes of judgment. These are: (1) logical perfection; (2) aesthetical perfection; and (3) practical perfection. The first pertains to standards for the making of cognitions, the second to standards for the making of reflective judgments, and the third to standards for the making of

practical judgments. Kant noted,

Perfection overall subsists in congruence with universal laws. [KANT (16: 135)]

The universal laws in this case are those transcendental laws that govern the functioning of the processes of judgment. Perfection in general goes to the entirety of acts of judgments, i.e. to the overall process of judgmentation in general. Furthermore,

All perfection seems to subsist in the harmonization of a thing, with freedom, hence in expedience, general usefulness, etc. Since all things properly in empirical understanding are only that which they are taken to be in way of relationship to the law of sensibility, the practical perfection of objects of experience is a congruence with the law of the senses, and this, as appearance, is called beauty; it is so to speak the outer side of perfection [KANT (15: 309)].

§ 2. The Divisions of Perfection

Even though perfection is neither a structure nor a process, our understanding of the idea of perfection nonetheless requires a representation. The 2LAR structure of this representation is shown in Figure 12.2.1 below. The task before us is to understand the synthetic functions listed under its four titles of Quantity, Quality, etc. These each, in order from top to bottom under each title, correspond to one of the general Standpoints for the overall process of judgmentation, i.e., the judicial Standpoint for aesthetical perfection, the theoretical Standpoint for logical perfection, and the practical Standpoint for practical perfection, respectively.

Possibly because perfection *per se* is neither a specific capacity of *nous* nor a specific process of *nous*, Kant did not bequeath to us any special treatment of the topic of perfection in its own right. The same is true, and for precisely this reason, in *CPPM*. However, the proper way for us to




Figure 12.2.1: The 2LAR structure of the idea of transcendental perfection.

view the general idea of perfection is in terms of its relationship to knowledge in general. Knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) taken in this wide sense is any conscious representation or capacity for making such a representation by or through which meanings are determined. Taken in this context, the idea of perfection is an idea of a *determining factor* in the acquiring and representing of knowledge generally. We thus understand transcendental perfection in terms of *the perfecting of knowledge*. Here Kant tells us,

The perfection of knowledge in general is:

1. logical;
2. aesthetical;
3. practical perfection.

Logical perfection goes to understanding and is knowledge of objects by way of them. The aesthetical goes to feeling and to the state of our Subject, namely: how we come to be affected by the Object . . . Practical perfection goes to our appetites, through which activity comes to be brought about.

The perfection of a cognition rests on four principal points.

1. For the Quantity of the cognition, as it is a universal. A cognition which serves as a rule must be more perfect than one that holds only in particular cases.
2. ... Quality, distinctness of the cognition. [It] contains the "in what way?" Logical perfection according to Relation is *distinctness*, the aesthetical is *liveliness*.
3. ... Relation, truth of the cognition. Truth is the Relation of the cognition to the Object . . . Logical perfection according to Relation is *objective truth*. The aesthetical is *subjective truth*.
4. ... Modality, so far as it is a certain and necessary cognition. Logical perfection according to Modality is the *necessity of cognitions according to understanding*. The aesthetical is empirical necessity. [KANT (24: 809-810)]

The same can be said, with appropriate adjustments made to place it in its proper Standpoint and its proper knowledge context, of all *modi* of perfection. As Kant's words above hint, the *modi* of perfection have the peculiarity of serving *only one* synthetical function within each title in our general 2LAR structure of representation. These are, namely, the idea of integration for Quantity, the idea of subcontrarity in Quality, the idea of transitive Relation, and the idea of the determining factor in Modality. This is because perfection is neither process nor function in any *constitutive* way. Perfection neither composes nor connects. Its only objectively valid role is found in *the orienting of the regulation of nous* by pure Reason.

The *a priori* standard of perfection can be said to "aim at" an Ideal of Reason, namely an absolute state of perfect *Existenz*, but we must clearly recognize that the Object of such an Ideal is not merely a *noumenon* but a *transcendent* (not transcendental) *noumenon*. The idea of a perfect *thing* goes well past the horizon of any possible experience and for this reason is utterly lacking in any objective validity whatsoever. However, perfection regarded as a *differential*, i.e. as a

direction for *change* through acts of *nous*, has transcendental validity, although only a practical objective validity, because it is the notion of something that is necessary for the possibility of regulating non-autonomic actions by the power of Reason. Perfection thus belongs to the *Kraft* of pure Reason and not to its faculty. In this context, and only in this strictly limited way, we can say the Object of perfection is the Ideal of Knowledge itself (*Wissen*). What we must do next is take up the topics of the *modi* of perfection one by one.

§ 3. Logical Perfection

In his *Logik* Kant states,

The logical perfection of cognition rests on its congruence with the Object, hence on *universally valid* laws, and thus likewise suits itself to be judged according to norms *a priori*. [KANT (9: 36)]

These norms of universal validity of which Kant speaks must, of course, be pure notions if they are to apply (as they must) to the processes of judgment. The idea of perfection of knowledge can be contrasted with its opposite, namely imperfection. Imperfection admits to a two-fold division:

The imperfection of our knowledge is

1. ignorance, the imperfection of lack, which thus constitutes an empty space;
2. error, an imperfection of enlargement, when I have collected Ideas that strive against the truth. [KANT (24: 817)]

It is interesting to note that the two imperfections Kant sets down more or less correspond to the two types of vices named by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*¹. Piaget called logic "the morality of thought" (and morality "the logic of actions"), and this is not an inappropriate way to look at the idea of logical perfection.

Determinant judgments stand as what we earlier called local laws concerning objects as phenomena. Logical perfection, then, concerns perfection of the manifold of concepts. However, we have also seen that the actions of the process of determining judgment are not carried out in utter independence of those of reflective judgment. As aesthetical perfection concerns the latter, we can and should expect that perfecting overall is in some way a balancing or adaptation in regard to the standard gauges for judging the effectiveness of achievements of Reason based on the norms of each – what system theorists often call a "multi-variable" or "multi-dimensional" optimization problem.

Kant did not enjoy the benefit of being able to use our modern quantitative terminology for

¹ "[Excellence] is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right, both in passions and actions," Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1017^a1-5.

expressing this idea. Nonetheless, he did have a qualitative way of stating what amounts to the same thing:

All our cognitions are either intuitions or concepts. The faculty of intuition is sensibility². The faculty of concepts is understanding³, and to recognize something through concepts is called thinking . . . From another side, sensibility can be explained thus, that it is a receptivity, a capability to come to be affected by objects. Understanding as a spontaneity, a capacity, puts forward things as they are, not such as they affect us⁴ . . . This gives a two-fold perfection of cognitions:

1. perfection according to laws of sensibility, aesthetical;
2. perfection according to laws of understanding, logical . . .

Logical perfection rests on the agreement of cognition with the Object, aesthetical on agreement with the Subject. The rules of congruence of cognition with the object must be necessary and must hold good for all knowledge and for every[one's] understanding, because so long as my cognition should be in agreement with the object, it must also be in agreement with that of others. Aesthetical perfection rests on the particular laws of human sensibility, and therefore is not universal for all creatures. But since objects will have been put forward not only through concepts but also through intuition, there must also be given necessary and general laws of sensibility. Herein lies the idea of the beautiful. [KANT (24: 806-807)]

To this two-fold dimensioning of perfection we must also add a third dimension. Determining judgment provides *local* laws of understanding, but we also require *global* laws as well. The provision for this possibility begins with reflective judgments but it cannot end there because all reflective judgments are subjective and concerned only with affectivity. The perfection of global objective laws of understanding (general concepts of Nature) requires the orienting and directing of the process of determining judgment (which does not determine its own employment) and this calls into the picture practical perfection, the process of practical judgment, and the ratio-

² Kant's "faculty" terminology has historically proven to be somewhat confusing. What he means here amounts to saying sensibility is an *organization* of sensuous representations.

³ Similarly to the previous footnote, the manifold of concepts is an organization of cognitions.

⁴ For the Organized Being, a *thing* can never *be* anything other than what the Organized Being *thinks* it is. This does not mean we cannot or do not come to think differently of a thing in the march of accumulating experience; clearly we do. But at any moment in time, for me a thing *is* what I understand it to be. To hold otherwise is to let ontology nudge epistemology out of the center position of our metaphysics. However, here there enters into consideration the difference between persuasions of judgment and objective verification of judgment, the latter judgment resting upon that lesson of experience that teaches us to seek consistency in material truth through confirming the agreement of *my* objective understanding of a thing with *yours*. All concepts of things begin with an inference of ideation, and this is merely a judgment of belief on subjective grounds. For our objective grounds for judging *material* truth, we rely upon our joint agreements and in that way are able to *know* a thing as an object whose *Existenz* is not tied to our own. Young children exhibit what Piaget called radical ego-centrism, i.e., they merely presume – as a judgment of belief – that everyone understands things in the exact same way as the child does. Thus, for example, the child thinks the sun follows us when we go for walks. Only later, and through the gainsaying of actual experience, does the child gradually come to form those *maxims of thinking* that provide a hypothetical imperative for *seeking* logical perfection through non-subjective verification of one's understandings. A **thing is an object regarded in terms of the possibility of actual or necessary *Existenz* independent of the Organized Being who represents that object in concepts.** Thing and object are ontologically distinct.

expression of speculative Reason.

Focusing now on the standards of logical perfection, we make a 2LAR division of this idea to analyze it in terms of our four general titles of representation. Kant describes the chief moments in the perfection of cognition as follows:

A cognition is perfect (1) according to Quantity, when it is *universal*; (2) according to Quality, when it is *distinct*; (3) according to Relation, when it is *true*; and finally (4) according to Modality, when it is *certain*. [KANT (9: 38)]

These are the four moments of logical perfection. Now we must clarify what they mean.

The first thing we must recognize is that norms for these four moments can never be other than *formal* norms. The Organized Being possesses no *a priori* material standards from which one can obtain any standard gauge to which to refer such norms. Accordingly, the only place we can seek the standard gauge of logical perfection is in the *structure* of the manifold of concepts. Kant had a rather nice metaphor for this,

Logical perfection is the skeleton of our knowledge. [KANT (24: 811)]

When the process of synthesizing concepts was described earlier in this book, it was said that concepts were swept into the synthesis of reproduction in imagination according to the relevant transcendental schemata in play. The standard gauge of logical perfection places a condition on this summoning of concepts into the free play of imagination and understanding, namely that the concepts so employed orient the structuring of the manifold of concepts in a direction congruent with the norms (rules) of logical perfection.

§ 3.1 The Standard Gauge of Quantity in Logical Perfection

In relationship to some condition, a concept has **objective universality** if its scope is **complete**. This means the concept can be predicated of all objects in the scope of that condition [KANT1: B379]. Scope pertains to objects and the categories of understanding are the notions of scope in determinant judgments. It is by means of the categories that concepts in the manifold are referred to the transcendental schemata in the synthesis of thinking. However, for a formal standard we must look to the structure of the manifold of concepts. Here it is sphere of the concept rather than scope of the concept that provides a measurable for comparison to a standard.

There are two factors from which it is possible to gauge the universality of any concept. The first is the extensive magnitude of the sphere of the concept. Recall that the sphere of a concept is made up of the totality of other concepts that stand under the former. The extensive magnitude of the sphere is simply the number of concepts in it and this is measured by number. The greater the number of concepts in the sphere of a concept, the more universal is that concept.

The second factor is the fecundity or "fruitfulness" of a concept in the making of cognitions. A concept that has been successfully applied on many occasions for the making of new cognitions is said to be *logically important*. For example, the idea of "energy" in physics is one of the most fruitful concepts in the possession of that science. On those infrequent occasions where appearances seem to contradict, e.g., "the law of conservation of energy," we find physicists willing and committed to going to great lengths to explain the phenomenon in a way that preserves the highly fecund idea of conservation of energy, and while "the matter is still in doubt," physicists do not for one moment abandon their use of this idea in its applications to other aspects of natural phenomena. To use a metaphor, the greater the fecundity of a concept, the greater is the "strength" with which it is bound in the manifold of concepts.

Extensive magnitude in the sphere of a concept falls under the notion of plurality because the measure concerns a measure of the extent of the sphere. The fecundity of a concept, by contrast, is a concept falling under the notion of unity because this idea speaks to the *demonstrated* power of the concept to unite diverse appearances under the same concept. Great fecundity elevates a concept to the status of a *maxim for reasoning* in the sense that the more fecund concept is tried more often in ratio-expression's orientation of determining judgment. Thus a way we can look at this idea of fecundity as a factor in logical perfection is in terms of the extensive magnitude of its occasions of invocation in the orientation of determining judgment.

The synthesis of the notion of unity and the notion of plurality is the notion of totality. Totality is the category by which we understand the idea of the standard gauge of Quantity as *logical expedience* (magnitude + fecundity). Kant called this synthesis the **logical horizon** of a concept:

With the enlargement of our cognitions or with the perfection of them according to their extensive magnitude, it is good to make an estimate as to how far a cognition is congruent with our purposes and capabilities. This consideration concerns the determination of the *horizon* of our cognitions, under which is to understand *the adequacy of the magnitude of the collective cognitions along with the capabilities and purposes of the Subject*. [KANT (9: 40)]

The standard gauge for logical perfection in regard to Quantity is: increase of logical horizon.

§ 3.2 The Standard Gauge of Quality in Logical Perfection

Quality is matter of composition in representation. When we turn to consideration of a standard gauge of Quality in logical perfection, our considerations turn from the context of extensive magnitudes to that of intensive magnitudes. The measure of intensive magnitude in a composition is called its degree. While the mathematical representation of extensive magnitude calls upon integers (specifically, the cardinal numbers) for its mathematical description, intensive magnitude is given mathematical representation through the real numbers and with all the

metaphysical distinctions between extensiveness and discreteness in Quantity vs. intensiveness and continuity in Quality we discussed earlier. Intensive magnitude is ordinal, extensive discrete.

Mathematical expressions in and of themselves come with no attached instruction sheet telling us when, where, and how to use them in application to Nature. We must dig a bit deeper to understand the idea of degree and its usefulness in application to the idea of a standard gauge of logical perfection in Quality. In other words, we must establish a *real context*.

Above we saw Kant list the Quality of logical perfection as *distinctness*. We are thus led to ask what this means. In explaining this term, Kant said,

All our clear representations can be logically distinguished into distinct and indistinct representations. Indistinct representation is the consciousness of a representation in the whole but without distinguishing this multiplicity which is contained in the whole. Distinctness is clarity that also gets to the parts. [KANT (24: 805)]

We recall that the term "clear representation" means representation with consciousness. The term is nearly synonymous with the term perception other than for the minute distinction that clarity refers to the state of the Subject while perception refers to the state of the representation. Elsewhere Kant remarked,

The first level of perfection of our cognition according to Quality is thus its clarity. A second level, or a higher degree of clarity, is *distinctness*. This subsists in *clarity of marks*. [KANT (9: 61-62)]

We have represented the logical structure of the manifold of concepts by using graphs and will continue doing so here. A mark of a concept is a higher concept which understands that which is common in two or more lower concepts standing under it. The mark of a mark is a still higher concept (thus it is part of a series) understanding that which is common in two or more marks. Cognition of a mark is what is meant by *clarity of marks*. **Perfect logical distinctness means the entire set of marks, which taken together make up the entirety of what is contained in the concept, have come to clarity (been made clear)** [KANT (9: 62)].

Every mark is said to be *contained in* the concept for which it is a mark. Thus, the number of marks extracted from a concept is one indicator of how distinct that concept has been made. A graphical representation, by its mathematical and visual nature, tends to emphasize thinking in terms of extensive magnitude. But degree is not extensive magnitude and must not be mistaken for an idea of extensive magnitude. Kant likened the extensive magnitude of a cognition to a *volume*, whereas he likened its intensive magnitude to a *density* [KANT (24: 110)]. To continue the simile, a baseball and a whiffle ball can be equal in volume, but the density of the former is significantly greater than that of the latter. This is a difference in *quality* (lower case 'q') between these two objects. A person knows this difference in quality by comparing their *relative weights*.

What corresponds to this in the context of a standard gauge for the logical perfection of Quality? It cannot be the extensive form of the manifold of concepts. Is there something that accompanies the structure in which we say *subsists* the clarity of the marks, something that is not *the series* of connected concepts but nonetheless *goes into* the composition of the series? Let us contemplate this question by beginning with the pure notions of Quality in determinant judgments, the categories of reality, negation, and limitation. These, we recall, are rules for the construction of concepts in regard to the transcendental schemata of Quality. The latter refers to time-determinations with respect to the ideas of: (1) something in representation that "fills time" (matter of sensation); (2) something necessarily in the representation in sensibility that "does not fill time" (form of intuition); and (3) their coalescence in synthesis.

Now, while we can (and do) say that the categories of understanding "qualify" a concept for the occasion of its participation in thinking (through the summons of reproductive imagination), we cannot say the category "does the summoning." Something else, something characteristic of the orientation of determining judgment through ratio-expression, does this. Distinctness in knowledge refers to the degree to which we are conscious *of the details* of that knowledge. In coming to grips with this admittedly still-vague idea, it is instructive to look at a hierarchy Kant called the grades of knowledge in representation. His most distinct presentation of this idea is found in *Logik*, where he presents it in terms of seven distinct grades of knowledge [KANT (9: 64-65)]:

1. *repraesentare* [*sich etwas vorstellen*], to represent something to oneself;
2. *percipere* [*wahrnehmen*], to *perceive* = to represent something with consciousness;
3. *noscere* [*kennen*], to be aware of something = to perceive in comparison with other things;
4. *cognoscere* [*erkennen*], to recognize = to be cognizant with consciousness;
5. *intelligere* [*verstehen*], to understand something = to recognize through understanding;
6. *perspicere* [*einsehen*], to see through = to know something through Reason;
7. *comprehendere* [*begreifen*], to comprehend = to know sufficiently for one's intent.

Two immediate comments are in order here. The first is that since this hierarchy reputed to be a table of grades of knowledge, we cannot suppose these levels are *discrete* degrees of knowledge but rather must be viewed as convenient *labeling points in a continuum*, within which there is no primitive smallest unit of difference. The second is to note that all seven of these grades are described as *verbs*; these grades make reference to actions and not representations proper. Degree of knowledge links up to what can be done with a representation, not where it might be located in a series in terms of its Quantity of composition.

Repraesentare is to represent without any degree of empirical consciousness; it is the = 0 compared to which the intensive magnitude of a representation is referred. *Percipere* is the grade

where conscious presentation begins; this is to say that within all the representations of *nous* referring to this perception there is some "representation that *this* representation is in me." The action of making this second order contribution to representation obviously alters in some way the "filling of time" because no representation lacking in conscious presentation can be said to "fill time" at all. But what, exactly, is the difference between *repraesentare* and *percipere*? The answer here is not so difficult. Both representations are representations in the synthesis of apprehension but the second also includes a presentation in the synthesis of *apperception*.

The next two levels, *noscere* and *cognoscere*, illustrate one of Kant's hair-splitting distinctions characteristic of his work. To be merely aware (*noscere*) is to have more than a simple perception but less than a full cognition. It thus applies to affective perception with intuition. In regard to intuitions, this denotes consciousness of an appearance but not consciousness of a phenomenon. Accordingly, we cannot say *objective* clarity has yet been achieved. This is presented at the next level, *cognoscere*, where the intuition now contains contributions from concepts and therefore constitutes a full *cognition*. Cognizance implies cognition.

These first four grades have their transcendental place of origin in receptivity. The fifth level, *intelligere* (to recognize through understanding), has reached the point where the transcendental place of the cognition originates from the manifold of concepts. It is here where the logical perfection of cognitions can be said to come under the ability of mind to act as agent in originating cognition. Yet here we are not asking for much agency because recognition through understanding merely refers to the making of determinant judgments in the manifold of concepts with the resulting concept being made available for use in the synthesis of imagination.

The sixth level, *perspicere* (to know through Reason), involves a still higher degree of cognition. At this level it is not merely the concept that can go into the process of thinking; in addition to the concept we have at this level of knowledge cognitive acts in which, so to speak, the concept can "take other concepts with it" into the synthesis of imagination. These other concepts are those that have either immediate or mediate connection with it in the manifold of concepts. This is something more than mere recognition; here we have "insight" – the recognition of relationships between the representations of sensibility and representations in the manifold of concepts that are not themselves presented in sensibility through sensation or lying contained in the first concept itself. *Perspicere* refers to a greater amount of association of concepts and anticipations that go into the synthesis of imagination in apprehension (affinity of concepts).

Finally we come to *comprehendere* – to know to a degree sufficient for one's intent. Here there is more involved than just association or anticipation in the process of thinking. There is, in addition, a purposiveness of pure Reason in terms of what Kant called the *Vernunftmäßigkeit* or

"moderation of Reason" [KANT (24: 127)]. At this level of distinctness a cognition is no longer merely the product of a rule for the reproduction of intuitions but a maxim for reasoning by means of the concept. *Degree* of distinctness is *ordinal* and grades are tic marks in the ordering.

Stepping back away from these details, what Kant's hierarchy illustrates as a common factor across all the levels is a trait or "logical essence" of the *degree of empirical apperception*. As we mount the ladder up Kant's successive levels of grades of knowledge, what we find is increasing *precision* and *fullness* in concept representation [KANT (9: 62-63] from the contributions of more noetic processes and knowledge sources within the logical anatomy of *nous*. Their actions *de-coalesce* what is in the concept and make its distinctness more perfect. (This will necessarily have its somatic counterpart in somatic signaling, e.g. in increased levels of metabolic activity in brain regions reciprocally coordinated with sensibility, determining judgment, and ratio-expression). So long as new marks can be extracted from a concept, its logical distinctness is incomplete. And from this, [the standard gauge for logical perfection of Quality is: increase the distinctness of a concept through the synthesis of more marks *contained in* that concept through the employ of more sources of knowledge in synthesizing the intuitions of those marks.](#)

§ 3.3 The Standard Gauge of Relation in Logical Perfection

Logical perfection for Relation is the perfection of objective truth. Now, here what we would like to possess is some universal criterion of *material* truth. This is to say that when one predicates something to be true what is meant is that the predication always holds for the thing regarded-as-it-is-in-itself of which it is predicated, and that no occurrence in experience will ever contradict what has been predicated. Unfortunately, this very idea of such a material truth is self-contradictory because this criterion of truth is one that has to be valid for all objects in general. Therefore it is one in which we must make abstraction from all differences among objects, and yet has to deal *with those very differences at the same time*. One cannot have a criterion of truth that both throws out and does not throw out the material differences among objects. Logicians have long recognized this and that is why formal logic restricts itself to dealing only with the form of logic statements and stands silent on the subject of the truth or falsity of the premises plugged into those formal statements.

[Truth is the congruence of a cognition with its object](#), but this explanation goes no further than to state a Relation of community between cognition and object and does not serve as an *operational definition* of *real* objective truth. The only such definition possible for the Organized Being is one that can stand as a universal *formal* criterion. Because all object concepts are empirical representations, grounded in some immediate sensuous representation, this formal

criterion is largely negative in character. This is to say we can recognize when a concept is untrue of its object (gainsaid by actual experience) but we cannot say the concept is absolutely true of its object. In logical Relation *our standard gauge of perfection and the operational definition of objective truth are one and the same*, and this standard gauge is deduced from **the principle of contradiction and identity**. The formal statement of the logical perfection of truth is thus: **Objective truth subsists in a judgment under the condition: everything of which the contradictory opposite is held-to-be-false is held-to-be-true, and everything of which the contradictory opposite is held-to-be-true is held-to-be-false**. To hold-to-be-true means making a transcendental affirmation of a predication; to hold-to-be-false means making a transcendental negation of that predication. This operational definition of objective truth is a principle of categorical connection in reasoning.

Logically perfect truth, as the speculative endpoint of acts of perfecting one's cognitions, thus involves the theoretically endless task of making every possible predication on the object, both those making every possible transcendental affirmation *and also* those making every possible transcendental negation through the contradictorily opposite predication. It is obvious that this is a mere ideal that can never actually be brought to completion by the Organized Being. Even so, the standard gauge of objective truth just given would be entirely in vain if reasoning in ratio-expression did not contain rules of reasoning by which the Organized Being could *work toward* the realization of the ideal. These are the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the excluded middle.

The **principle of sufficient reason** is: **Every inference requires a ground but if one false consequence flows from this ground then the ground is also false**. There are two criteria by which the principle of sufficient reason is expressible through speculative Reason. The first is the criterion of *modus tollens*: **one false consequence of a cognition falsifies the cognition**. The second is the criterion of *modus ponens*: **if all consequences of a cognition are true then the cognition is true**. Thus we have both a negative and a positive statement of norms for the perfecting of objective truth, although *real certainty* can attach only to the negative. The principle of sufficient reason is a principle of hypothetical proposition in reasoning.

The **principle of the excluded middle** is: **The inference from the negation of one of a pair of contradictory opposite predications to the affirmation of the other is valid, and the inference from the positing of one of a pair of contradictory opposite predications to negation of the other is valid**. It is the principle of logical disjunction in reasoning.

It is because there can be no material criterion for truth that the transcendental perfection of Relation occupies the slot of the external Relation in our 2LAR. Logical truth is something the

Organized Being determines for itself, but the maintenance of predications held-to-be-true or held-to-be-false is always subject to the overarching standard that what the Organized Being holds-to-be-true or holds-to-be-false is always subject to conditioning by actual experience in the on-going interactions between the Organized Being and its environment. The Organized Being *acts to perfect* its understanding, but it cannot guarantee, even to itself, *absolutely* perfect objective understanding.

§ 3.4 The Standard Gauge of Modality in Logical Perfection

The reader will have noted that the operational definition of objective truth just given is phrased in terms of *holding-to-be-true* and *holding-to-be-false* rather than the stronger statement of *being-true* or *being-false*. We would all prefer the latter to the former; the latter is more satisfactory for the drive to absolute completion dictated by the transcendental Ideas of Rational Cosmology and it is simply human Nature to prefer the latter and absolute idea. The Critical definition, on the other hand, sets out in sharp relief the underlying *subjective* factors that go into every determinant judgment and, indeed, into the very nature of human understanding. For a person who holds to an ontology-centered view of how he wants the world to be, this Critical requirement that we must sacrifice the comfort of some Hegelian notion of Absolute Truth is very uncomfortable, and there are people who are so dissatisfied with this that they will protest against it with great animation and vigor. Nonetheless, the fact is that here is an epistemological finding dooming not only the metaphysics of Hegel but those of Plato and Aristotle as well.

And this brings us to the topic of logical Modality in transcendental perfection. The reader will have noted that the formal norms and even the standard gauge of objective truth tell us nothing about *which* particular predication in a pair of contradictory predications will be the one held-to-be-true by an Organized Being. Logical perfection alone cannot determine this because the process of determining judgment is not the only process of judgment at work in judgmentation in general. The two other *modi* of perfection have their roles as well. Modality in judgment is the judgment of a judgment and Modality in representation is matter-of-the-matter of a combination (= matter of *nexus*). Modality in transcendental perfection is called *certainty*, and this is something quite different from truth.

Perhaps nothing better illustrates the role of Modality in transcendental perfection than the experience of meeting someone who, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, maintains what others of us hold to be the most absurd sorts of propositions. For example, there is a great deal of well-founded scientific evidence that the Earth is about four and one-half billion years old. This evidence is congruent with a great many scientific facts and is, indeed, so well

grounded in these facts that to deny this conclusion is *prima facie* absurd to one who has been well trained in science. Yet your author knows several people, people he regards as quite intelligent in other matters, who adamantly hold fast to the position that the Earth is no older than around six thousand years, and that this vast corpus of scientific knowledge is wrong, because someone told them once that Bishop Usher calculated the age of the Earth using the recital of the generations in *Genesis*. Perhaps you know some people who hold to this view as well. Similarly, the *Dasein* of biological evolution is a scientific *fact of actual experience*⁵ (*not* a theory; *natural selection* is a theory). Yet your author knows a number of people, who again he regards as quite intelligent and well educated in other matters, who hold fast to the story of Biblical creationism – an idea science condemns as so contrary to such an enormous body of facts that it must be called scientifically absurd. How in human nature is this possible? It will not at all do to judge that there must be something wrong – some mental defect or flaw of character – with the people who hold such views. Such a judgment is in wholesale contradiction with many other facts concerning the individuals involved – indeed, so wholly at odds with these facts that this impugning judgment of the character or intelligence or mental health of these people is itself an absurd judgment. So, again, how is this possible?

The answer lies with Modality in transcendental perfection. Kant writes,

Truth is *objective property* of knowledge, that judgment through which something becomes *represented* as true; the reference to an understanding and so to a particular Subject is *subjective holding-to-be-true*. [KANT (9: 65-66)]

Every concept in the manifold of concepts originates through an inference of judgment, either one of ideation, induction, or analogy. But, as we have seen, these acts are acts of reflective judgment, which is concerned only with affective perceptions and judges not concepts but sensibility. Thus all general concepts of objects have a subjective origin in thinking.

At the moment of their making, intuitions and concepts are represented as judgments of *belief* and belief is *unquestioned* holding-to-be-true. Now, to be unquestioned is not the same as to be certain. *Believing* imputes nothing more than apperception of a *subjectively* sufficient ground for holding-to-be-true unaccompanied by any *objectively* sufficient ground for holding-to-be-true. It is logically quite meaningless to say there is any *objective* degree of holding-to-be-certain for a belief because a belief utterly lacks objective grounds all the while it goes unquestioned, and to say there is an objective degree of holding-to-be-certain requires precisely such an objective ground. A belief is *aesthetically perfect* until it comes to be *questioned* by an act of aesthetical reflective judgment. Here we have our first hint that aesthetical perfection and logical perfection

⁵ It can be and has been directly observed in the laboratory, thus its *Dasein* is factual.

are *modi* of perfection that are, in a manner of speaking, at odds with one another.

Once a representation of belief has been called into question (because its involvement in the making of further cognitions produces inexpedience in judgmentation), it must undergo an accommodation in the manifold of concepts and only then does logical perfection become involved with the re-making of its representation in the manifold. Regardless of whether the propositions attending this accommodation involve transcendental affirmation (retaining some aspect or aspects of the concept of the former belief as true) or transcendental negation (retaining some aspect or aspects of the concept as false), to the holding-to-be-true (or –false) of the concept there is now in addition a *degree of certainty* attending this holding as matter of the *nexus* in perfection.

We can talk about the character of holding-to-be-certain in terms of three *modi* [KANT (9: 66)]. One of these is, of course, belief, and here the Modal character of believing is assertoric. A second is **opining**, which is holding-to-be-true (or –false) with apperception of insufficiency in the objective grounds for this holding-to-be. The Modal character of opining is problematic because the Organized Being is conscious of the possibility of error in the judgment. The third is **knowing**, which is holding-to-be-true (or –false) with apperception of *belief of objective sufficiency in the grounds for this holding-to-be*. The Modal character of knowing is apodictic and it is only here where one says of the judgment *it is held-to-be-certain*. With opining there is consciousness of contingency in the judgment; with knowing there is consciousness of necessity in the judgment. **Objective certainty is concept representation in the *modus* of knowing by determining judgment.**

Now, concepts in the manifold of concepts can have their transcendental place of origin either from receptivity (in which case the judgment is attended by contingency) or from spontaneity. Necessity springs from the latter because objects *per se* are not themselves apodictic; only *the model giving their concepts context* can be apodictic in judgment. Theorems of mathematics, for example, are concepts in the *modus* of knowing when their proofs are held-to-be complete and correct. This is why a mathematician refuses to call a mathematical proposition a theorem unless it is accompanied by an iron-clad proof.

Transcendental perfection in logical Modality has to do only with concepts in the *modus* of opining. This is because concepts in the *modus* of knowing are already held-to-be-objectively-certain, and thus are already regarded to be perfect, while concepts in the *modus* of believing are unquestioned and are regarded-to-be *facts*. Facts are the *materia circa quam* of *nexus* in the manifold of concepts. **The standard gauge of logical perfection in Modality is: transformation of concepts-of-opining into concepts-of-knowing.**

This does not mean that once a concept is converted into the *modus* of knowing it cannot later be contradicted in experience. Believing is always re-inserted somewhere in the context of the concept; this is the nature of the process of thinking and arises from the part played in this by reflective judgment. One cannot say we know something by its concept unless one also says there is contained in this concept something that is believed. This is the point of vulnerability for holding-to-be-true (or –false), and the unexpected lack of congruence between *anticipation* by a concept and *actuality* in a sensuous intuition of appearance is an occasion for a feeling of *Unlust* in reflective judgment. If this feeling of *Unlust* co-involves a concept held in the *modus* of knowing, the Quality of the aesthetical judgment is sublimity because the incongruence strikes not just at the concept but *at the entire structure of its context* in the manifold of concepts. The greater is the degree of logical perfection in the concept, the greater is the degree of the feeling of *Unlust* if the concept comes into conflict with actual experience.

Judgmentation can take one of two routes from here. If there is better *subjective* expedience in retaining the holding-to-be-true of the concept (or, in the companion case, retaining its holding-to-be-false), the original truth-judgment of the concept is retained and whatever other concepts now stand in contradiction with it are the ones that, in a manner of speaking, will be attacked by judgmentation as the Organized Being undertakes its process of re-equilibration. This is the epistemological source of *denial* exhibited in such ways as by the examples given earlier. On the part of determining judgment, the tipping point will come from whichever route *seems* to lead to greater expedience for logical transcendental perfection *in perfecting the structure of concepts*. Seeming underlies the causality for presentations of the aesthetic Idea to affect the process of determining judgment. The aesthetic Idea is the synthesis of continuity in perception linking composition in aesthetical reflective judgment and the noetic *Kraft* of adaptive *psyche*. It is therefore hardly a wonder at all that disagreements over evolution vs. creationism or between different religious or political dogmas often arouse such intense passion. The mechanisms of perfection in re-equilibration are those immediately involving the arousal of *Lust* and *Unlust*.

§ 4. Aesthetical Perfection

§ 4.1 The Moments of Aesthetical Perfection

This last point is our segue into perfection viewed from the judicial Standpoint. Here our concern is still with the perfection of knowledge but from this Standpoint our focus shifts to the role *Aesthetic*, the laws of sensibility, plays in the production of knowledge. Aesthetic is greatly under-studied by present day science. In one way this is understandable because aesthetical perfection deals with the determinable in the metaphysical *nexus* of perfection, whereas logical

perfection deals with the determination. However, there is nonetheless a necessity attached to aesthetical perfection because, to put it rather more aesthetically than logically, judgmentation of objective knowledge cannot make bricks without straw. Subjective knowledge is the straw.

The chief acroamatic context in considering aesthetical perfection is the cosmological Idea viewed from the hypothetical-judicial perspective:

- **Quantity:** absolutely complete equilibrium in judgmentation through suppression or equilibration of innovations;
- **Quality:** absolute completeness in a common ground of beliefs in all reflective judgments;
- **Relation:** the causality of freedom is the absolute beginning of all appearances;
- **Modality:** the *I* of transcendental apperception is the unconditioned condition for thinking the *Dasein* of any object.

Transcendental interests are *principles of regulation* in the spontaneity of the Organized Being. Taken collectively, they do not conflict with one another *per se* but this is not to say it is a logical impossibility for *presentations* of the special interests to conflict in the divers representations of understanding, judgment, and speculative Reason. Each of the higher faculties of knowledge – understanding, the power of judgment, and Reason – have their special *a priori* principles: lawfulness, expedience, and final purpose (*Endzweck*, **goal**)⁶, respectively. Nonetheless, the Organized Being *as a whole* is a structure – a system of self-regulating transformations that preserve the system as a whole – and empirical presentations of the special faculties that come into conflicts of interests are disturbing innovations summoning up re-equilibration to conserve the structure of the system overall. Some of the self-regulating transformations in a structure are local (specific to particular substructures) but the integrity of the whole structure is conserved by those self-regulating transformations that are global.

With these introductory remarks, let us now look at the contrast between logical and aesthetical perfection:

A cognition can be perfect either according to the laws of sensibility or according to the laws of understanding; in the first case it is *aesthetically* perfect, in the other *logically* perfect. The two, aesthetical and logical perfection, are thus of different kinds; the former relates to sensibility, the latter to understanding. The logical perfection of cognition rests on its congruence with the Object, hence on *universally valid laws*, and likewise suits itself to be judged according to norms *a priori*. Aesthetical perfection subsists in the congruence of cognition with the Subject and is grounded on the particular sensibility of man. Hence by aesthetical perfection there occur no objectively and universally valid laws in reference to which we can pass judgment on it *a priori* in a way that is universally valid for all thinking beings in general. So far as there are nonetheless universal laws of

⁶ The "goal" or "final purpose" of Reason is absolutely robust equilibrium, i.e. absolute conformity to the formula of the categorical imperative.

sensibility which have validity subjectively for the whole of humanity, although not objectively and for all thinking beings in general, it likewise suits oneself to think of an aesthetical perfection that contains the ground of a subjectively universal satisfaction. This is *beauty*, that which pleases in *intuition* and can be the object of a universal satisfaction just because the laws of intuition are universal laws of sensibility. [KANT (9: 36-37)]

With regard to knowledge, when we are considering laws of sensibility we are neither dealing with cognition proper (intuition plus concepts) nor with affective perception alone. The overall *Gestalt* of perception with which we must deal is neither cognition proper nor feeling. Rather, it is a mixture of the two that should properly be called **cognizance** (*Kenntnis*). Kant draws this distinction in what he decided to call an **aesthetical cognition**:

We have already talked first of the aesthetical perfection of a cognition and have said that it subsists in the effect on our feeling. From here we easily gather what an aesthetical cognition is, namely one that may have affected our feeling (through *Lust* or *Unlust*). [KANT (24: 48)]

Sensibility, lying at the junction of the determining and reflective powers of judgment, affects and is affected by both, and by this places these processes of judgment in reciprocal Relation with each other. Cognition affects, and in turn is affected by, the mutual interactions of judgment and from here we easily come to the basic character of aesthetical perfection:

Aesthetical perfection is the subjective congruence of understanding with sensibility – which the representation of an object enlivens. Because the congruence is only subjective so also will it be possible only through sensation. Feeling of *Lust* ensues from this, just as feeling of *Unlust* ensues by sensation of opposition. [KANT (24: 705)]

In the context of discussing of aesthetical perfection, "cognition" always means aesthetical cognition, which we properly regard as cognizance in consciousness rather than as cognition of an appearance. The four **moments of aesthetical perfection** are:

1. *aesthetical generality*. This subsists in the practicability of a cognition for a great many Objects that serve as examples to which its application gets made, and whereby at the same time it becomes useful for the purpose of popularity;
2. *aesthetical distinctness*. This is distinctness in intuition wherein an idea abstractly thought of is presented or elucidated *in concreto* through examples;
3. *aesthetical truth*. A merely subjective truth which subsists only in congruence of the cognition with the Subject and the laws of sense-semblance, and is consequently nothing more than a general semblance;
4. *aesthetical certainty*. This rests on what is necessary in consequence of the testimony of sense, i.e. what is endorsed through sensation and experience. [KANT (9: 39)]

The enfolding context for aesthetical perfection is the overall process of judgmentation. Within this and more specifically, the context of aesthetical perfection comes down to those

subjective experiences we characterize as a quality by using the word "beauty" and to the peculiar aesthetical character of judgmentation often called "taste" (as in "good taste in music, art, etc.").

What is essential to beauty subsists in congruence with concepts or at least with communicable concepts. Harmony of sensations; hence agreement with understanding. For this is the *principium* of the unity of all our representations. [KANT (15: 424)]

Taste liberates from mere senses and makes recommendations to understanding. Thus all that furthers the life of our knowledge pleases in taste. [KANT (15: 354)]

Kant devotes much effort to the discussion of taste and its abstract Object (which we call "the beautiful") in *Critique of Judgment*. Somewhat curiously, he does not there devote very much Critical analysis to the topic or to the attendant topic of aesthetical perfection. Nonetheless, this topic was in the back of his mind in that work, as Kant's notes on logic reveal, even though the reader catches only glimpses of it there:

A sensuous judgmentation of perfection is called taste. A cognition that is recognized as perfect by the sensuous power of judgment is called aesthetic. . .

The harmonization of the manifold in an object-matter with a common intention is called perfection. When everything harmonizes with the rules of the inferior power of knowledge⁷, then it is aesthetically perfect, i.e. when harmonization is known nakedly through the sensuous powers and thus the pleasure is aroused through the lower powers. [KANT (16: 100)]

In every perfection there is met with a rule or intention, secondly a harmonization with the same. One has of knowledge mainly two aims: to instruct oneself or to gratify oneself or both together. The first is attained through distinct insight, the second in two ways: either through the beauty of the Object or the pleasantness of the rendering. The latter, because it cannot be attained through perfectly distinct representations, is the aesthetic perfection of knowledge. [KANT (16: 101-102)]

§ 4.2 The Standard Gauge of Aesthetical Perfection

Palmquist has rightly criticized Kant's *Critique of Judgment* for being generally unsystematic. It tends to hop around from point to point and, just in those places where the reader expects Kant to pull together his various observations under a general principle, it goes off another direction and takes up some new bevy of observations. Kant is also, in my opinion, frequently and quite uncharacteristically careless in how he phrases some very important points he attempts to make.

Up to a point this is understandable: *Critique of Judgment* was published in 1790 when Kant was sixty-six years old, at a time when he was embroiled in a very bitter controversy with a man named Eberhard, was, according to his personal correspondences from this time, being deluged with many letters, inquiries, and requests while working on the *Metaphysics of Morals* and planning the unfinished work known today as Kant's *Opus Postumum*, and teaching his regular

⁷ By "inferior power of knowledge" Kant means sensibility.

schedule of classes. He also complains of declining health and the infirmities of old age in letters written to friends during this time. Even so, *Critique of Judgment* is arguably the most disappointing of his three great Critiques.

One particularly important point where Kant's phrasing of his arguments is easily misleading concerns aesthetical perfection. For example, in the *First Introduction to Critique of Judgment* he writes:

Now here it is particularly necessary to elucidate the explanation of *Lust* as the sensible representation of the *perfection* of an object. According to this explanation, an aesthetical judgment of sense or reflexion would always be a cognitive judgment of the Object; for perfection is a determination that presupposes a concept of an object, because of which, therefore, the judgment which annexes perfection to the object would not at all be distinguished from other logical judgments . . . Sensible representation of perfection is an express contradiction, and if the harmonization of the manifold as unity shall be called perfection, then it must be represented through a concept or else it cannot carry the name of perfection. [KANT (20: 226-227)]

This would seem to quite unequivocally state that sensible representation of perfection is impossible and even that the idea of such a thing is absurd. Other comments he makes in the *First Introduction* and in *Critique of Judgment* proper do not contradict this and even tend to support it, e.g.,

The judgment of taste is entirely independent from the concept of perfection. [KANT (5: 226)]

The problem, of course, is that this interpretation flies in the face of what Kant tells us about aesthetical perfection in his logic lectures and in *Logik* (published in 1800). *Critique of Judgment* cannot safely be read in isolation because of remarks like this that pepper its contents.

The resolution of this apparent contradiction is, of course, to understand that when Kant refers to "perfection" here, he is speaking only of *logical* perfection. Taken in that context, what he says of it in *Critique of Judgment* is perfectly true and not in the least contradictory. That this second interpretation is the correct one rings true from Kant's handwritten notes, e.g.,

Logical perfection relates as such to the Object (and goes to quality [*qualitaet*] or quantity [*quantitaet*]) and is either truth (perfection for matter or quality) or distinctness (perfection of form) or magnitude (perfection according to quantity)⁸. Subjective perfection is in relationship to feeling (aesthetical) or to will (practical). [KANT (16: 123)]

If we shift the context for the idea of perfection away from ontological implications and put it

⁸ Kant is making a subtle distinction here by his use of *qualitaet* and *quantitaet* in this note. He does not precisely mean Quality or Quantity as we use these technical terms in our 2LARs; i.e., he is not referring to *representation*. Rather, he is using these terms in their traditional philosophical connotation as properties of things, hence I translate as quality and quantity rather than Quality and Quantity. Kant's context is ontological rather than epistemological in this quote.

back in an epistemological context, where perfection bespeaks of knowledge rather than objects, then the idea of aesthetical perfection has a place in the theory:

The perfection of knowledge according to laws of Reason is logical, according to laws of sensibility is aesthetical. Aesthetical perfection of knowledge subsists either in the relationship of the same to the sensibility of the Subject, where that excites the play of inner acts, or to understanding of the same. The first is feeling, the second taste, i.e. order, unity, etc. Understanding belongs to taste, and through this it is properly an understanding in subjective agreement approved by everyone. [KANT (16: 125)]

All three *modi* of perfection have to do with judgmentation in general, with knowledge arising from judgmentation, and with the effect of the process of judgmentation on one's understanding of Nature and experience. Perfection differs from the specific constitutive functions (*momenta*) of judgment processes and from the regulative acroams of reasoning. To look at it as transformation is to look at it in the context of where, in a manner of speaking, the self-regulating transformations of *nous* are taking one along the path to knowledge. In the case of aesthetical perfection, this pathway concerns what we might call in a very poetic and metaphorical sense the junction of knowledge and soul.

But if this is the case, what validity is there in Kant's assertion that taste "is properly an understanding in subjective agreement approved by everyone"? For example, I regard Grieg's *Peer Gynt*, Homer's *Iliad*, and Frost's *The Road Not Taken* as beautiful works. My nephew, on the other hand, "does not have a taste" for classical music, classical literature, or poetry of any kind. Here is a vivid illustration that "taste" (as we commonly use that word) is subjective and not something found to be in *actual* agreement *in concreto* by everyone. "Beauty," as the saying goes, "is in the eye of the beholder." But Kant is not calling for actual *objective* universal agreement from aesthetical perfection; he merely calls for *a universal ground of subjectively approving*. My nephew does not object to *my* listening to *Peer Gynt* (so long as I don't make him listen to it too); my taste in music does not have to *agree with his*. It only has to be *approved by me*. My nephew *has his own things* of which he approves. Agreeability and approval are not synonyms.

Even so, if we are to regard aesthetical perfection as one of the *a priori* fundamental characters of the phenomenon of mind, there does have to be found for it something not distinctly personal to the individual and that is universally shared by all human beings⁹. This can have to do with nothing else than the *functioning* of judgmentation and not with whatever empirical understandings result from this functioning. Aesthetical perfection is perfection in regard to the laws of sensibility but this does not mean it has to do with *sensations* because

⁹ This is to say, all human beings who are not afflicted by some somatic pathological condition which, by reciprocity and the principle of emergent properties alters the usual mind functions in concert with the pathological effects this condition has on healthy brain function.

Since sensations cannot be communicated (either in understanding or in participation) they have the lowest rank of aesthetical perfection. This is chiefly acceptable as an effect of the inclination to communicate. Intuition can be described and preserved in imagination. Sensation allows for no touchstone; with regard to it everyone is right and it does not at all serve understanding. [KANT (15: 330)]

Rather than with sensations, aesthetical perfection *as a standard for judgmentation* has to do with what is required of judgmentation in order for empirical knowledge to be possible and for the Organized Being to hold-it-to-be knowledge and something that *belongs to* its Nature as an Organized Being. Kant described this "ownership property" in the following way:

Because the essential in every representation is the Idea of the object-matter, all aesthetical perfection is a union of the subjective with the objective. [KANT (16: 130)]

This brings us to the Critical *Realerklärung* of the idea of taste:

Taste is the faculty for judgmentation of an Object or a manner of representation through satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful*. [KANT (5: 211)]

We need to be clear on the meanings of the terms used in this *Realerklärung*. *Faculty* of judgmentation refers to the *organization* of representations by judgmentation. The clause that this is without any interest means without any *objective* interest, i.e. judgmentation of taste is not and *cannot be based* on making a *concept* of an object (although it can and does lead to the eventual *production* of such a concept; it is, in a manner of speaking, a *prerequisite* for such a production). This, indeed, is the basis for the *Realerklärung* of what it means to call something beautiful:

Beautiful is what is recognized without concept as the object of a *necessary* satisfaction. [KANT (5: 240)]

By *necessary satisfaction*, what is meant is *a satisfaction required for the possibility of marking an intuition as an intuition for a concept of what will eventually be understood as an object in the modus of the transcendental schema of persistence in time*.

An intuition produced with persistence in time as its form of inner sense is one destined to be conceptualized as an object *per se*. Now, in regard to Quantity all intuitions are called *axioms* – Self-evident truths of sensibility. As such, intuitions stand as empirical rules produced through judgmentation and

We are not seized by the judgment of taste from a rule but rather from intuition because the rules are not *a priori*. [KANT (16: 129)]

Furthermore,

Beauty is Self-sufficient where sensibility harmonizes according to Reason in regard to general laws. [KANT (16: 125)]

Objects of taste vary, objects called beautiful vary from person to person; but what does not vary among human beings is the condition in judgmentation for giving birth to their representations and understandings. The four moments of aesthetical perfection listed previously are the **norms of taste**, and for these

The norms of taste are models, not for imitation but rather for judgmentation. [KANT (16: 114)]

With this understanding of the moments of aesthetical perfection, we are now drawing near the *Realerklärung* of the standard gauge of aesthetical perfection. This standard gauge is quite different in kind from that of logical perfection, where we could call upon *a priori* rules of transformation in the making of determinant judgments. We have no rules of a similar kind for the laws of sensibility. Instead, the standard gauge for aesthetical perfection is a specific condition, a quite particular kind of aesthetical judgment rendered for the synthesis of apperception.

In a footnote in *Critique of Judgment* [KANT (5: 203fn)] Kant remarked that he was "guided by" the logical functions of judging (the logical *momenta* of Chapter 6), although in *Critique of Judgment* itself Kant doesn't strain himself to point out when he is being so-guided. However, armed with the norms of taste listed previously, we have no difficulty in coming directly to the conclusion. **The standard gauge of aesthetical perfection is a specific aesthetical judgment in which the *momenta* of judgment are:**

- in Quantity: the subjectively universal;
- in Quality: the *momentum* of beauty;
- in Relation: the subjectively categorical; and
- in Modality: the subjectively apodictic.

This explicit form of aesthetical judgment *is* the aesthetically perfect judgment. The fine details of it are exactly those provided in the *Realdefinition* of the four *momenta* in its makeup. Their assignment as the four titles for the standard gauge of aesthetical perfection can be dug out of Kant's lengthy discussion of "the beautiful" in *Critique of Judgment* once we have uncovered the correct context for interpreting it. One last minor comment is in order before passing on to practical perfection. The categorical assignment above stems from Kant's observation that taste is associated with the phenomenon of **genius**, which is an innovative and creative talent. This character of Critical taste is a property of judgmentation that can only be associated with one specific kind of inference of judgment, namely **the inference of ideation**. We can recall that the inference of ideation is the inference of reflective judgment that gives rise to object concepts, and

this is precisely the role of aesthetical perfection in judgmentation. This is what gives aesthetical perfection its Critical role in the perfection of *knowledge* because unity in understanding revolves around concepts of Objects whose representations *do the uniting* of divers appearances.

§ 5. Practical Perfection

Kant was explicit in naming practical perfection as the third manner of perfecting that completes the triad for the synthesis of perfection in general. He makes mention of practical perfection, often in its *nom de plume* of "moral perfection," in numerous places within the Kantian corpus of work. Unfortunately, he tended to speak of it only *en passant* within a broader discussion of his applied metaphysic of morals, ethics, or his critiques of religion. He did not treat practical perfection explicitly as a topic in its own right other than to briefly put it in context:

From the contemplation of all the perfections of knowledge we see that the principal capacities of our knowledge are properly the following: (1) *understanding*; (2) *feeling*; and (3) *appetite*.

If 1st I *make* my knowledge perfect in consideration of my *understanding*, then it is *logically perfect*. If 2nd I make my knowledge perfect in consideration of my *feeling*, then it is *aesthetically perfect*.

Finally, if 3rd I make my knowledge perfect in consideration of my *appetites* then it is *practically perfect*, or likewise *moral*.

Moral perfection rests on *logical* and on *aesthetical* perfection taken together. [KANT (24: 58)]

The categorical imperative of pure practical Reason is not itself a moral law according to typical standards of what one means by the word "moral" (although, again, it *is* the ground for the possibility of a human being's *development* of a personal moral code and ethical standards). It is altogether curious that Kant apparently did not see fit to apply the same piercing Critique to the fundamental grounds of practical perfection as he brought to bear on other foundational topics. Perhaps he merely underestimated the depth of analysis required or, contrarily, overestimated its difficulty. Or perhaps Kant, who was basically more scientist than moralist, simply thought the topic of moral perfection needed no piercing analysis of its constitution. This attitude is suggested by a passing footnote he made in *Critique of Practical Reason*:

A reviewer who wanted to say something to the censure of this work hit it better than he himself may have intended when he said that no new principle of morality but only a new *formula* is set forth in it. But who would even want to introduce a new first principle of all morality and, as it were, first invent it just as if before him the world had been ignorant of what duty is or in thoroughgoing error about it? [KANT (5: 8fn)]

Regardless of how it may have been in Kant's mind, when once we have abandoned any attempt to make the categorical imperative a moral law in and of itself, we are then obliged to

better explain this idea of practical perfection. This task was undertaken in chapters 19 and 20 of *CPPM*, although it must here be confessed that there this was done *en passant* and that work fails to clearly set out and mark the details. That fault in *CPPM* will be set right here.

§ 5.1 The Moments of Practical Perfection

In one way deduction of the moments of practical perfection is almost trivially straightforward and in another way it is not. As the third tip in a ILSR of transcendental perfection, the moments are obtained from a synthesis of those of logical and aesthetical perfection. After a quick glance back at these and a little contextual reflection, one may simply write down:

A rule is **practically perfect**

1. according to Quantity – when it is a practically universal law;
2. according to Quality – when it is a practical value, i.e., when it is distinctly valuable;
3. according to Relation – when it is a practical imperative;
4. according to Modality – when it is a rule of Self-respect, i.e., when apodictic necessitation according to the rule is practically absolute.

This is the easy part of the matter. The difficult part comes with understanding what these different terms mean. Even here the two form terms (Quantity and Relation) are not difficult to explain. Regarding the manifold of rules in a graphical form like the one we use for the manifold of concepts, a practical rule is universal when the sphere of the subject-rule is entirely contained in the sphere of the predicate-rule or else is entirely excluded from the latter. The rule itself is *practically* universal when there is no appetite whatsoever that is not determinable under the rule. Here we can imagine the structure of a graph of the manifold of rules ascending to a single apex, the rule that *practically understands* all other rules. This, however, is not the categorical imperative because the categorical imperative is not a rule constructed by practical judgment but only the formula regulating all practical *judgments*. The graphical image of the manifold of rules we imagine above is an *ideal*.

As for Relation, this also is not difficult. A rule is *logically categorical* when it stands under no higher rule that serves as its condition. Such a *practical* rule is an *imperative* of practical Reason. But all such *constructed* rules can only be regarded as *practically hypothetical* imperatives because there is only one categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Our ideal image of a universal practical rule is also the ideal image of a supreme *constituted* categorical imperative, but again this can only be a mere ideal of Reason because the manifold of practical rules arises through experience by means of practical judgments. For any given state of the manifold of rules, imperatives *serve as norms for the organization of motivation*.

As is often the case, the matter terms (Quality and Modality) require a bit more thinking to bring them to understanding. A distinct representation is a clear representation of a characteristic of a clear representation. In perception a **value** is the form of an affective perception of desire presented in an aesthetic Relation of sense of interest from the judicial Standpoint. It is referenced to the somatic *Kraft* of adaptive *psyche* through the synthesis of objectivity in judicial continuity, and it is referenced to appetitive power through the synthesis of desiration in an act of teleological reflective judgment.

However, from the *hypothetical-practical* reflective perspective of Rational Cosmology, **value** is seen as a means for organizing a process of equilibration inasmuch as values serve to affectively steer the Organized Being toward ideal equilibrium through ever-more-robust equilibrating structures in the manifold of rules. The practical manifold of rules is a **value structure**, i.e. a system of self-organizing transformations through adaptation insofar as this structure is viewed in context with the presentations of reflective judgment. This is to say a value in affective perception is **valued** in practical judgment. **Practical value is the unity of a complete system of transcendental affirmations, negations, and limitations determining specific values of acts.** **Valuable** means the ability to value a representation. The cosmological Idea of Quality in the practical Standpoint is absolute value in the division of the given whole of *Existenz*, a practical notion for which the Ideal would be a most-primitive underlying value from which all values obtain what is specifically valuable about them. **Practical perfection in Quality is that property of rules by which appetitive power can be determined according to practical value by the norm that every rule is distinctly valuable in regard to the presentations of reflective judgment.**

The determination of a choice on the subjective ground of happiness is called self-love. **Practical self-respect** (*Achtung*) is the representation through spontaneity of a value prejudicial to self-love in the determination of appetitive power. **The notion of a first and pure *a priori* interest of practical Reason is called Self-respect.** It is seen as a determining factor for acting to perfect the structure of the manifold of rules. A practical rule standing as a rule of Self-respect is practically perfect for the determination of appetitive power because **it is a rule that answers to no other interest whatsoever than *absolute coherence* in the formula of the categorical imperative.**

§ 5.2 The Standard Gauge of Practical Perfection

Practical perfection is viewed from the practical Standpoint as the Ideal of practical judgment in terms of the perfection of determinations of the purposes of human actions. However, the moments of practical perfection just discussed would all be vain and empty notions unless it is possible to assess perfection through the process of judgmentation in general. The Ideal of

summum bonum is this standard gauge, but we must understand what this means.

Materialist philosopher though he was, Santayana glimpsed an insight of fundamental relevance to this point. His insight is well worth quoting in detail:

We have found in the beauty of material and form the objectification of certain pleasures connected with the process of direct perception, with the formation, in the one case of a sensation, or quality, in the other of a synthesis of sensations or qualities. . . Our ideas half emerge for a moment from the dim continuum of vital feeling and diffused sense, and are hardly fixed before they are changed and transformed, by the shifting of attention and the perception of new relations, into ideas of really different objects. . . This discrimination and classification of the contents of consciousness is the work of perception and understanding, and the pleasures that accompany these activities make the beauty of the sensible world.

But our hold upon our thoughts extends even further. We not only construct visible unities and recognizable types, but remain aware of their affinities to what is not at the time perceived; that is, we find in them a certain tendency and quality not original to them, a meaning and a tone, which upon investigation we shall see to have been the proper characteristics of other objects and feelings, associated with them once in our experience. . . The quality thus acquired by objects through association is what we call their expression. Whereas in form or material there is one object with its emotional effect, in expression there are two, and the emotional effect belongs to the character of the second . . .

Expression is not always distinguishable in consciousness from the value of material or form, because we do not always have a distinguishable memory of the related idea which the expression implies. . . Expression then differs from material or formal value only as habit differs from instinct – in its origin. Physiologically, they are both pleasurable radiations of a given stimulus; mentally, they are both values incorporated into an object. But an observer, looking at the mind historically, sees in the one case the survival of an experience, in the other the reaction of an innate disposition. . . In all expression we may thus distinguish two terms: the first is the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing; the second is the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed.

These lie together in the mind, and their union constitutes expression. [SANT3: 119-121]

For the sake of greater clearness we may begin by classifying the values that can enter into expression; we shall then be better able to judge by what combinations of them various well-known effects and emotions are produced. The intrinsic value of the first term can be entirely neglected, since it does not contribute to expression. . . The first term is the source of stimulation, and the acuteness and pleasantness of this determine to a great extent the character and sweep of the associations that will be aroused. [SANT3: 126]

If our consciousness were exclusively aesthetic, this kind of expression would be the only one allowed in art or prized in nature. We should avoid as a shock or an insipidity the suggestion of anything not intrinsically beautiful. As there would be no values not aesthetic, our pleasure could never be heightened by any other kind of interest. . .

Instead we prefer to see through the medium of art – through the beautiful first term of our expression – the miscellaneous world which is so well known to us – perhaps so dear, and at any rate so inevitable, an object. . . Thoughts of labor, ambition, lust, anger, confusion, sorrow, and death must needs mix with our contemplation and lend their various expressions to the object with which in experience they are so closely allied. . .

Practical value is the same. More important and frequent is the case of the expression of utility. This is found whenever the second term is the idea of something of practical advantage to us, the premonition of which brings satisfaction; and this satisfaction prompts an approval of the presented object. . . We do not conceive clearly what this practical advantage will be; but the vague sense that an advantage is there, that something desirable has been done, accompanies the presentation and gives it expression. [SANT3: 128-129]

If we reflect Critically upon Santayana's insight – with its cast of expressions, values, desires, sensations, pleasures, moment-to-moment variations, and premonitions – what we find at work here is *the motivational dynamic* in judgmentation: {want, drive, drive state, type-of-motive}. Our sought-after explanation of the standard gauge of practical perfection is found in the context of the motivational dynamic.

Our first Critical observation here is the practical role of *Lust per se*. *Lust per se* is the practical reflection of a degree of *incompleteness* in the totality of practical perfection, and any such incompleteness denotes a lack, an *imperfection*. The determination of appetitive power can call upon no *positive* innate idea of perfection, but in judgmentation Reason can call upon a practical judgment of the *Dasein of imperfection*.

Quantity in desiration presents as a particular want *in concreto* in the motivational dynamic. The regulative principle of Reason here is the hypothetical-practical Idea of Quantity in Rational Cosmology, i.e., absolute completeness in the composition of all wants. The only criterion for validation of want in the motivational dynamic is practically universal compatibility with the manifold. This, however, can only be judged in the negative, i.e., by *invalidation* of want. Thus **the standard gauge of Quantity** for practical perfection is [complete compatibility for the synthesis of the compositional form of desiration with the form of composition in the manifold of rules](#). Again, however, only the *lack* of compatibility can be discovered by judgment.

The means for organizing a process of equilibration is a value. Value projected to an Ideal of equilibrium is absolute value and this Ideal goes with the Idea of Quality in the hypothetical-practical perspective. It is the Idea of the Ideal matter of composition for a perfect organization of equilibrium. The idea of a *drive* behind an action is the idea of a condition under which what is contrary to equilibrium is resolvable. Here **the standard gauge of Quality** in practical perfection is [absolute negation of the feeling of *Lust per se*](#).

The determination of appetitive power is always, in a manner of speaking, a forward-looking determination because it has to do with either bringing an object into actuality or abolishing its actuality, depending on whether in *psyche* we are dealing with *Lust* or *Unlust*. Into any consideration of this forward-looking character of Reason's regulation of non-autonomic actions we must take into account the total perfection of knowledge and this includes perfection of

understanding. This in turn leads us to consider the thinking Nature of the synthesis of *comprehension* in sensibility, for which the power of imagination is governed by [three laws of imagination](#). Kant described them thusly:

The faculty of imagining is the capacity for intuition of objects of past time, the faculty of anticipating is the capacity for intuition of objects of future time. The capacity for intuition so far as it is not entirely bound to time is called the fictive faculty. All three capacities have their laws. The first law is the law of association of ideas. The law of the power of imagination for seeing in advance is the law of expectation of similar occasions. The law of the fictive capacity is the law of the compatibility of ideas. [An idea] is to be conceived according to the law of compatibility, it is to be reproduced according to the law of the association of ideas. [KANT (28: 585)]

The **law of compatibility** is: [concepts can be combined in the manifold of concepts only if the intuition of the combination is formally expedient for a purpose of pure Reason](#). Viewed in the theoretical Standpoint, this law pertains to identification in Quantity. But viewed from the practical Standpoint of pure Reason, it is an idea of a condition for equilibrium because inexpedience necessarily denotes lack of equilibrium for judgmentation. Acting to satisfy the law of compatibility necessarily presupposes the determination of an act, which in turn presupposes a rule for this determination (a norm). Here we have *the notion of rule-determined choice*, and this is the original notion by which we understand the idea of drive state in the motivational dynamic. Thus, **the standard gauge of Relation** in practical perfection is none other than [the law of compatibility of ideas](#).

The judicial Modality of judgmentation speaks to the freedom of the capacity for judgment in the Organized Being, thus to its ability and agency to judge. Theoretical Modality speaks to the connection in metaphysical *nexus* of that which is judged to the manner in which the judgment is rendered (problematically, assertorically, or apodictically). But when viewed practically, the ability to judge in any particular manner presupposes as a ground a way that each such manner of judgment leads to a particular manner of satisfaction of the interests of pure Reason. But this is Modality as type-of-motive in the motivational dynamic.

Now, the unconditioned object of appetitive power is the Ideal of *summum bonum*. Modality in practical perfection must speak to the manner in which the particular interest of Reason coheres with Self-respect, the notion of a first and pure *a priori* interest of Reason. The regulative principle of Reason in this regard is the hypothetical-practical Idea of Modality in Rational Cosmology: absolute completeness of the changeable in appearance is sought through apperception of *Existenz* in relationship to the Ideal of *summum bonum*. *Summum bonum* is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded by the categorical imperative. The determining factor for determination of an act in which apperception of the aforementioned

Existenz is presented can only be a condition by which a motive will serve the categorical imperative. This, in turn, can only be a transcendental anticipation of unity in the series of conditions in synthesizing the prosyllogism in the manifold of rules needed to effect this unity.

The three types-of-motive in the motivational dynamic are: (1) groping for equilibration is the problematic dynamic for which the form of inner sense in perception is the transcendental schema of non-contradiction; (2) determination of *elater animi* is the assertoric dynamic for which the form of inner sense in perception is the transcendental schema of actuality; and (3) regulation of motivation is the necessitated dynamic for which the form of inner sense in perception is the transcendental schema of possibility coherent in the sum-total of the actual in time. Now, to make an anticipation of equilibrium through a series of motivations requires employment of judgmentation in the stimulation of imagination, for which the law of imagination in the logical-theoretical perspective is the **law of expectation of similar occasions: the concept of a consequent proposition must be presented in intuition as an anticipation whenever the concept of the antecedent proposition is presented in intuition**. In this representation there is always a time-determination through imagination that references the category of Modality in the connection of the antecedent and consequent propositions.

But with any such presentation in imagination there is determined from this transcendental schema of Modality the inner sense *in desire* that presents either as a feeling of tendency, a feeling of presentment, or a feeling of accord in transcendental-judicial perspective in aesthetical reflective judgment. In the first case, the type-of-motive is groping; in the second it is an *elater animi*; in the third it is a regulation of motivation.

Now, either the reflective presentation in the synthesis of motivation will or it will not pass practical valuation with the particular aesthetical Modality so presented. Here the regulative principle of Reason is provided in the *practical* Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General: (1) those acts that cannot be validated under the conditions of the manifold of rules are impossible; (2) the act of reflective judgment that coheres with the conditions of the manifold of rules becomes an action; (3) that whose context with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of valuation is necessitated. We can call these *the grades of practically anticipated satisfaction in a motive*.

In terms of perfection, these regulations move from least-perfecting to most-perfecting in order of the grades assigned to them. From here we uncover the standard gauge, namely: **the standard gauge of Modality** in Self-respect is **choice of the type-of-motive for which Modality in the transcendental anticipation of desire occupies the highest grade of practical satisfaction passing the valuation of Reason according to its corresponding practical postulate of empirical**

thinking in general.

§ 6. *Terminatio*

The technical objective of this book has now been satisfied and I will here draw the boundary line for this treatise. In its pages have been set down the fundamental principles from which we obtain the *Critical Realerklärung* of the *phenomenon* of mind, its relationship to body, and the *Realdefinition* of its primitives. The architectonic and functional structure of the phenomenon of mind have been illustrated, as has been its doctrine of method (the theory of representation in the system of perspectives and Standpoints). That these principles lack the appealing simplicity of Newton's laws or Maxwell's equations or other familiar examples drawn from the special sciences reflects nothing more and nothing less than the underlying complexity of our topic. If mind were a simple thing, we should have understood it well enough to at least *rigorously define it* centuries ago. That mastery of these principles should require a considerable investment of study is perhaps unfortunate but this is no more than the price tag for a mathematical science of mind, that which I have named mental physics.

There remains for the present work only one more thing to do. This is a *scholium* and, as it were, an epilegomenon for looking at the tasks that lie in front of us for the maturation of this nascent science. That shall be the topic of our next and final chapter.